dissenting.
I dissent and would revoke the original order in County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 517 Pa. 65, 534 A.2d 760 (1987). As I stated in my dissent in County of Allegheny, I do not believe that this Court enjoys the prerogative of questioning the wisdom of the General Assembly’s financing scheme. Id. at 87, 534 A.2d at 768 (Nix, C.J., dissenting). Therefore, this Court should never have interfered with a legislative scheme entirely within the province of the General Assembly. The tragedy of the present situation is that the majority’s order in County of Allegheny is unenforceable, and unenforceable orders like this breed contempt for the judgments of this Court.1
. This is in no way inconsistent with this Court’s opinion in Lavelle v. Koch, 532 Pa. 631, 617 A.2d 319 (1992). In that matter, which originated as a complaint in mandamus,' we stated that "[ojnly when the legislature’s denial of funds genuinely threatens the administration of justice (thereby violating the constitution) may the judiciary exercise its inherent power to compel funding.” Id. at 636, 617 A.2d at 321. Lavelle addressed the obligation to provide the funding whereas the matter herein involves the General Assembly’s discretion in determining an appropriate scheme of funding.