concurring and dissenting:
I agree with much of the majority’s discussion. However, in order to effectuate economic justice between the parties, I find merit in several of Wife’s arguments, and therefore, I would grant at least partial appellate relief.
I am particularly concerned that the trial court restricted Wife’s pre-trial discovery which would have led to a more accurate depiction of Husband’s earning capacity.- The court ordered alimony without considering whether Husband could have afforded a higher award, and the trial court failed to consider Wife’s former standard of living. The court also did not adequately consider the parties’ children’s prior standard of living. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order to the extent it relates to alimony, spousal support, and child support.
I also believe that there is sufficient evidence of record for this Court to hold that Wife need not replenish her children’s gift accounts. Finally, I would reverse the trial court’s order denying Wife counsel fees.
Discovery as to Husband’s Earning Capacity .
Wife argues that the trial court erred by not permitting her to conduct discovery which would have aided in determining the value of Husband’s new sole proprietorship, Perlberger Law Associates. Wife maintains that many of the cases on which Perlberger Law Associates has been retained are asbestos cases which can be traced to Husband’s ex-partnership in Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, a marital asset. I agree that Wife was entitled to review completed cases, but not open cases, in order to project Husband’s earning capacity. With the power to investigate the completed asbestos cases, Wife could have further enlightened the court with regard to Husband’s future earning capacity.
“Although marital property is identified at the date of separation, the value of the property is determined at the date of distribution.” Butler v. Butler, 423 Pa.Super. 530, 539, 621 A.2d 659, 664 (1993), citing Adelstein v. Adelstein, 381 Pa.Su*287per. 221, 553 A.2d 436 (1989) and Sutliff v. Sutliff, 518 Pa. 378, 543 A.2d 534 (1988). Marital property includes all property, unless specifically excepted by statute, acquired during the marriage. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3501(a). A partnership interest in a professional firm is marital property. See Buckl v. Buckl, 373 Pa.Super. 521, 542 A.2d 65 (1988) (en bane) (plurality).
In the instant case, Husband was a partner at Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley for several years. On the date of separation, May 4, 1987, Husband was still a partner there. He did not leave that firm until one year later, in May of 1988. Therefore, his partnership at Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley was marital property. The issue is how much value that partnership had.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that the primary factor to be considered in determining a partner’s interest in a law firm is the partnership agreement. McCabe v. McCabe, 525 Pa. 25, 575 A.2d 87 (1990). In McCabe, the partnership agreement restricted partners who left the partnership from realizing anything more than the balance of the partner’s capital account. In that case, the agreement precluded the husband from removing work in progress and other accounts which could determine a “going concern” value. The court emphasized that the rule of law in McCabe would not be applicable to all partnership interests:
It is to be recognized that partners in certain other law firms may possess greater rights upon withdrawal from their firms than do the partners at Rawle & Henderson. Some may be governed by partnership agreements that allow them to realize values corresponding to some or all of the elements that enter into the computation of a firm’s value as a “going concern.”
Id. at 30, 575 A.2d at 89.
In Fexa v. Fexa, 396 Pa.Super. 481, 578 A.2d 1314 (1990) (plurality), I opined:
If the nature of the economic good will is purely personal to the professional spouse, it is not alienable; hence it cannot actually be realized and may not be included in the equita*288ble distribution. Cf. [McCabe, supra; Ullom v. Ullom, 384 Pa.Super. 514, 559 A.2d 555 (1989); Beasley v. Beasley, supra; DeMasi v. DeMasi, 366 Pa.Super. 19, 530 A.2d 871 (1987) ]. If, however, a portion of the economic good will is attributable separately to the corporation or business and ■ can be realized by sale to another (by selling the enterprise in whole or in part, buy-in’s and buy-out’s included), then to that extent, there is good will value subject to equitable distribution. McCabe; Ullom; Buckl.
Id. 396 Pa.Super. at 487, 578 A.2d at 1317.
In addition to the partnership agreement, all other relevant information such as the partner’s actual ability to remove work in progress or other value must be considered. See id. at 488, 578 A.2d at 1318 (“there may ... be difficulties in determining a credible value for the alienable/realizable good will; whether these difficulties are surmountable may vary with the peculiar facts of particular cases.”). Cf. Butler, supra (although marital property is identified at time of separation, the value is ascertained later, at the time of distribution).
In the' instant case, therefore, we are guided by Husband’s partnership agreement and other relevant occurrences after the date of separation which are relevant to the value of Husband’s partnership interest. The balance of Husband’s capital account, when he left Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, was $243,652.35. The trial court found that such amount was used by the parties to satisfy a joint tax obligation. Thus, that amount was no longer marital property available for distribution.1
Relying upon Beasley v. Beasley, 359 Pa.Super. 20, 518 A.2d 545 (1986), allocatur denied, 516 Pa. 631, 533 A.2d 90 (1987), the trial court also concluded that none of the value of Husband’s sole proprietorship, whose existence perhaps depended upon cases taken from Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, would be evaluated or considered as marital property. Wife argues that she should have been permitted to *289inspect at least the records of the fledgling firm’s completed cases in order to project a value on all of the cases derived from Husband’s former partnership. I agree to the extent such projected value could be relied upon to determine Husband’s future earning capacity.
The value of Husband’s partnership interest at Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley consisted of more than that available in his capital account. Pursuant to an understanding with that firm, Husband was permitted to take to his new firm over one thousand asbestos cases which had not as yet been settled. Thus, unlike the situation in McCabe, supra, in the instant case, Husband actually was able to remove work in progress and realize value therefrom. Of course, any expense which Husband had to pay should be considered, but the value of those cases which followed Husband cannot be ignored in a divorce proceeding to determine future earning capacity.
Does Beasley v. Beasley, supra preclude any attempt at evaluating the worth of those one thousand asbestos cases to determine future earning capacity? I believe not.
The en banc Superior Court has held that cases which produce income based upon contingency fees may not be included as marital property for purposes of marital distribution because a calculation of the contingency would be too speculative. Id. at 38-39, 518 A.2d at 554. However, the court explained that the value of completed contingency cases could base a projection of the future earning capacity of the spouse who would receive income from the completion of the pending cases.
[T]he Divorce Code is flexible and in this respect, the income producing capacity reflected by such cases can be estimated on the basis of compensation for completed cases and, therefore, that record should be sufficient to project the earning capacity of the attorney without speculating on the nebulous return that might be derived from examining active contingent fee cases. Permanent alimony, as support, is modifiable, and should the expectations vary either upward or downward, adjustments can be made by the *290court in an expeditious and reasonable manner. For support, and recently for alimony, earning capacity has been one of the considerations upon which an award may be based.
Id. at 39, 518 A.2d at 554.
I agree with the majority that the trial court properly refrained from evaluating the one thousand pending asbestos cases for purposes of equitable distribution. However, pursuant to Beasley, I believe that Wife should have been permitted to research the asbestos cases which had already been settled.2 As we opined in Beasley, such an investigation would be sufficient to project Husband’s future earning capacity. While the majority and the trial court in this case acknowledge that the earning capacity calculation was based upon, in part, Husband’s and his firm’s tax records and the firm’s large case load, I believe that a full advocative discovery into completed cases would have allowed for a more accurate evaluation of Husband’s earning capacity, and thus, a more accurate alimony calculation.
Alimony, Spousal Support, and Child Support
Wife argues that the trial court erred in awarding her an inadequate amount of alimony, spousal support, and child support. Wife suggests that the trial court wrongfully attributed to her a $30,000.00 per year earning capacity. Although I have serious questions as to the accuracy of the expert opinion which concluded that Wife has such an earning capacity, I recognize that the trial court was entitled to believe that version. Moreover, this Court is without the power to reverse the trial court’s finding which was based on evidence of record. O’Callaghan v. O’Callaghan, 530 Pa. 176, 607 A.2d 735 (1992). Wife also cites as erroneous the trial court’s failure to consider the Wife’s and children’s standard of living during the marriage. On this count, I agree and would award appellate relief. *291In fashioning an alimony award, the trial court must consider the several factors enumerated in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b).
The determination of the amount to be awarded, whether of alimony or alimony pendente lite, rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent an abuse of that discretion, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s award. In the context of such determinations, the proper employment of judicial discretion includes the mandate to apply the Divorce Code in a compassionate and reasonable manner to effectuate the overriding goal of achieving economic justice between the parties.
Schneeman v. Schneeman, 420 Pa.Super. 65, 77, 615 A.2d 1369, 1378 (1992) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in determining the nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony, the court must consider numerous factors including the parties’ earnings and earning capacities, income sources, mental and physical conditions, contributions to the earning power of the other, educations, standard of living during the marriage, the contribution of a spouse as homemaker and the duration of the marriage.
Edelstein v. Edelstein, 399 Pa.Super. 536, 540, 582 A.2d 1074, 1076 (1990), allocatur denied, 528 Pa. 611, 596 A.2d 157 (1991). Moreover, the court must state its reasons for the alimony award and for the amount of the award. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(d).
An important factor to consider in determining alimony is the standard of living to which the parties grew accustomed during their marriage. Of course, “[t]here is no absolute obligation on the part of a supporting spouse to see that the dependent spouse’s life style remains unchanged from that enjoyed during the marriage.” Fexa v. Fexa, supra 396 Pa.Super. at 490, 578 A.2d at 1319. While that duty is not absolute, the court should consider the prior standard of living. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b)(8). See also Edelstein v. Edelstein, supra; Pacella v. Pacella, 342 Pa.Super. 178, 492 A.2d 707 (1985). And, to the extent husband has the resources, his duty is “to maintain his family’s standard of living at a level *292consistent with their station in life before the separation.” Sutliff v. Sutliff, 339 Pa.Super. 523, 555, 489 A.2d 764, 780 (1985), affirmed, 515 Pa. 393, 528 A.2d 1318 (1987). Thus, the standard of living should be considered in determining spousal support. Id.
Likewise, with regard to child support, a court should not countenance a supporting parent’s extravagant lifestyle while he leaves his children with less than reasonable support.
[P]arents do have an obligation to share with their children the benefit of their financial achievement. See Conway [v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 538, 318 A.2d 324, 325 (1974) ] (“station in life of the parties” is relevant in determining parents’ capacity to support their children). Thus, where the par- . ents’ incomes permit, it may be perfectly proper for a court to recognize that certain expenditures for recreation, entertainment, and other nonessential items are reasonable and in the best interest of the children. See Spingola v. Spingola, 91 N.M. 737, 580 P.2d 958, 964 (1978) (“Where the income, surrounding financial circumstances and station in life of the father demonstrates an ability on his part to furnish additional advantages to his children above their actual needs, the trial court should provide such advantages within reason.”).
Melzer v. Witsberger, 505 Pa. 462, 470-71, 480 A.2d 991, 995 (1984). See also Francis v. Francis, 358 Pa.Super. 391, 395-96, 517 A.2d 997, 999 (1986), quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Stump v. Church, 333 Pa.Super. 166, 172, 481 A.2d 1358, 1361 (1984) (“Reasonable expenses are not limited to the bare necessities of life, but extend to articles that are reasonably necessary for the proper and suitable maintenance of the child in view of his social station in life ... and the fortune possessed by him and his parents.... ”). Justice Musmanno has more colorfully observed:
In arriving at the amount a mother and children need in order to live properly, the Court below seemed to be of the belief that so long as they were assured a roof over their heads, sufficient raiment and adequate food on the table, the husband-father had met his obligations of support. This *293reasoning is an erroneous one. If the husband-father can afford for himself a caviar-champagne standard of living, it is not justice, nor legal, that the wife should be content with a tent and bread-and-butter menu for herself and brood. Dignity of living, commensurate with income, is as much a necessity as the bare essentials for survival.
Commonwealth ex rel. Gitman v. Gitman, 428 Pa. 387, 394, 237 A.2d 181, 185 (1967) (plurality).
Review of the trial court opinion reveals that the trial court did not consider Wife’s previous standard of living for purposes of computing alimony. This was error. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b)(8). While the trial court correctly based the award on Wife’s need to stay home and raise her younger children, the court merely equated the alimony with Wife’s assigned earning capacity.
Moreover, the court’s limited discussion and highlight of the children’s standard of living, in my view, is inadequate. The court criticizes Wife for giving too much attention to her children. The court even suggests that Wife wastes money by picking up her daughter with a taxi, due to Wife’s inability to drive at night. The court would require a sixteen year old girl to obtain a driver’s license so she could drive at night. In the court’s view, the Wife would then be able to save on taxi cab expenses. However, the court failed to consider that the addition of a teenaged driver to an automobile insurance policy which covers a Mercedes and Volvo would be costly, if not prohibitively expensive.
Before Husband and Wife separated, their children were able to buy clothes whenever they wanted to do so. After separation, the oldest daughter, Jennifer, testified that her mother could not afford to buy her clothes for Jennifer’s first year at college. N.T. August 17, 1990 at 37. The family previously had an available income of $30,000.00 per month. N.T. June 6, 1990 at 6-7. The court’s order of alimony and child support leave available for Wife and the children approximately one-fifth of that amount.
*294Meanwhile, Husband was determined to have an earning capacity of $165,000.00 per year. As I have opined above, a more thorough investigation into Husband’s completed asbestos files would result in a more accurate, higher earning capacity. In addition, Husband’s law firm pays his paramour $40,800.00 per year plus benefits and her daughter $17,000.00 per year. See N.T. August 14, 1990 at 180-81. Husband determines these salaries. Husband’s paramour also earns $50.00 per hour for consulting work that she does for the firm’s clients. N.T. August 21, 1990 at 120. Although Husband makes these outlays through his law firm, his paramour pays ninety to ninety-five percent of his living expenses. Id. at 136-37.
Contrary to the trial'court’s conclusion, I would conclude that Husband’s earning capacity never fell below $325,000.00, his previous income as a partner at Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley. To the trial court’s attribution of $165,000.00, I would add his paramour’s salary of $40,800.00 and her daughter’s salary of $17,000.00, because Husband realized economic benefit by circling funds through them. If a more accurate picture of the completed asbestos files were allowed, I believe the court would have realized that Husband’s store of one thousand unsettled cases could result in Husband earning at least an extra $100,000.00 per year above what was already considered. These factors lead me to conclude that Husband’s earning capacity remained $325,000.00 despite his efforts to the contrary.3 There is room in Husband’s earning capacity to effectuate for Wife and the children at least a semblance of their prior standard of living.
I would hold that the trial court erred in awarding Wife only $30,000.00 per year and the children only $701.00 per week in support for three children and $640.00 per week in support for two children since the eldest had started college. I also believe that Wife’s spousal support award of $565.00 per week *295was erroneous. While the awards of alimony and support may appear to some as high, they drastically diminish the standard of living of the family which Husband left while not diminishing his.
Pennsylvania Uniform Gift to Minors Act Accounts
Wife argues that the court of common pleas had no jurisdiction to decide whether she should replenish the funds in her children’s accounts which were established pursuant to the Pennsylvania Uniform Gift to Minors Act [PUGMA]. Wife further asserts that the trial court erred in requiring her to pay back funds which she had withdrawn from those accounts. Wife asks this Court to reverse that holding and remand to the Orphans’ Court for determination. I agree that the trial court erred, but I disagree that a remand is necessary.
I agree with the majority’s analysis that the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the merits of Wife’s contentions regarding the PUGMA accounts. Moreover, the majority correctly held that the standard to be used in determining whether a custodian wrongfully depleted PUGMA assets is lower than the standard which the trial court employed.
PUMGA specifically sets forth the relevant standard:
(b) The custodian shall pay over to the minor for expenditure by him or expend for the minor’s benefit so much of or all the custodial property as the custodian deems advisable for the support, maintenance, education and benefit of the minor, in the manner, at the time or times, and to the extent that the custodian, in his discretion, deems suitable and proper, with or without court order, with or without regard to the duty of himself or of any other person to support the minor, or his ability to do so, and with or without regard to any other income or property of the minor, which may be applicable or available for any such purpose.
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5305(b). Pursuant to this standard, the custodian is given broad discretion in expending the minor’s funds for the benefit of the minor. See Sutliff v. Sutliff, 515 Pa. 393, 404, 528 A.2d 1318, 1323 (1987) (plurality), citing 20 Pa.C.S.A. *296§ 5305(b) (custodian has duty to use property for child’s benefit). Therefore, the trial court’s use of an inconsistent standard, ie., whether the expenditures were for “non-necessities,” Conclusion of Law No. 13, or for “non-essential items,” Trial Court Opinion at 23, was erroneous.
While both the majority and I agree on the proper standard, we disagree as to the appropriate remedy. The majority remands for a redetermination according to the proper standard. In my view, a remand is not necessary in this case.4 This is a legal question, and I would draw the legal conclusions based upon the facts of record which the parties have already developed on the issue of the propriety of Wife’s use of PUGMA funds.
I would conclude, based upon the record, that Wife need not replenish the PUGMA accounts. Wife described how her use of the funds benefited her children. Moreover, she was compelled to resort to those accounts because Husband refused to fund any summer activities for his children’s recreation. Husband has not directed our attention to any evidence of record to refute Wife’s testimony.5 Therefore, the only remaining issue, whether the expenditures were for the benefit of her children, is a legal one.
Giving deference to Wife, the custodian, see 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5305(b), I would find that Wife did not abuse her statutory discretion. She testified how each of the expenditures helped in the education or benefit of her minor children. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5305(b).
During their marriage, the parties established gift accounts for their children. The funds would become available when the children turned eighteen years old. N.T. February 25, 1991 at 365. Wife spent $6,000.00 of the PUGMA account on *297tennis and piano lessons and math and chemistry tutoring for her children. Id. at 396-98. The children had incurred $1,000.00 in tax liability, and that was satisfied with PUGMA funds. Id. at 398. Wife had insufficient funds to personally pay for the opening of the swimming pool, so she borrowed from her children to open it for their summer enjoyment. Id. at 399.
Wife took her children to Washington D.C. three times to avoid the depression they were all suffering from the breakup of their family. She borrowed from them $4,500.00 for transportation, hotels and meals for the three trips. Id.
And also a portion of the carrying of the [New Jersey Shore] condominium. For the last two, three summers the children were home with nothing to do because [Husband] refused to pay for any programs for them. The only place where they’re actually happy is the shore....
Id. at 399-400. Therefore, she used $30,000.00 of the PUGMA funds to pay for the mortgage, condominium fees, maintenance and utilities for approximately two years. Wife also disbursed from those accounts the costs of transportation to and from the shore, dining, amusements, concerts, and shows, which totalled $6,000.00. See id. at 401-02. Wife also used $5,000.00 to pay for legal fees in an attempt to create for her children a more stable visitation schedule from their father. Id. at 402.6
Wife was forced to spend the children’s money on more of their expenses, id. at 403-04, including the children’s visits to a psychiatrist occasioned by the breakup of the family. Id. at 404. Contrary to Wife’s expectations,7 Husband did not reimburse the children for these costs. Id. Wife also had to attend psychological therapy just to maintain her balance as a *298good mother. “It was my duty to these children and to God to get some therapy and to be able to deal with them; that they have a full parent and not a depressed mother.” Id. at 405. Finally, some of the money went to medical care. Id. at 406-08.
The foregoing testimony establishes that Wife spent the children’s money for their education and benefit. While the funds were spent on more than bare necessities, Wife’s use of those funds enabled her children to approximate the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. When Wife was left with bored, depressed children and had little money to entertain them, she was entitled, as custodian, to allocate the children’s money for their happiness and well-being. I would not bind the custodian in this situation from reaching PUGMA funds. By divesting discretion in custodians, the General Assembly did not intimate such unreasonable restraint.
My analysis does not change due to Wife’s statements that she intended to repay the money derived from the PUMGA accounts. See Order, July 28, 1988 (noting Wife’s stated intention to return funds from “children’s trusts”); N.T. February 25, 1991 at 396. The determinative question before us is whether Wife must return the funds. She need not.
Counsel Fees
Wife maintains that the court should have granted her attorney’s fees. I agree.
The purpose of an award of counsel fees is to ensure that the financially dependent spouse will be able to maintain or defend against an action for divorce, as well as to effectuate economic justice. Schubert v. Schubert, 398 Pa.Super. 284, 580 A.2d 1351 (1990). Counsel fees in a divorce proceeding are not awarded automatically; the petitioning spouse must show actual need before such an award is justified. Kohl v. Kohl, 387 Pa.Super. 367, 564 A.2d 222 (1989).... The amount of an award for counsel fees, costs, and expenses awarded in a divorce action is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to an abuse of discretion standard *299on appeal. Williamson v. Williamson, 402 Pa.Super. 276, 586 A.2d 967 (1991).
Butler v. Butler, 423 Pa.Super. 530, 621 A.2d 659 (1993).
The “character, situation and surroundings of both parties must be considered.” Benson v. Benson, 357 Pa.Super. 166, 172, 515 A.2d 917, 920 (1986). A party seeking counsel fees is not necessarily entitled to full reimbursement of legal costs. See Williamson v. Williamson, 402 Pa.Super. 276, 290, 586 A.2d 967, 974 (1991), citing Brong v. Brong, 129 Pa.Super. 224, 195 A. 439 (1937). “Rather, the amount awarded should be sufficient so as to advance just results and to place the litigants on equal footing.” Williamson v. Williamson, supra. See also Wilder, Mahood and Greenblatt, Pennsylvania Family Law Practice and Procedure Handbook § 11-4 at 112 (2nd ed. 1989) (citations omitted) (the counsel fee award should be “sufficient to place the parties ‘on par’ in asserting their rights in the litigation and to prevent the denial of justice”). Therefore, to determine what “equal footing” means, the court must consider both parties’ financial ability to retain competent legal representation. Counsel fees are especially appropriate for those expenses necessitated by the party in the more advantageous financial position. See Endy v. Endy, 412 Pa.Super. 398, 407-08, 603 A.2d 641, 646 (1992) (where husband was responsible for prolonging litigation, wife was properly awarded counsel fees).
In the instant case, Wife’s present attorneys have billed $283,000.00 in legal fees and almost $45,000.00 in costs.8 The record indicates that she was able to pay approximately $175,000.00 of this amount.
Husband also retained a law firm which has billed a large sum of money. Before this appeal, Husband had incurred $150,000.00 in legal fees. In addition to having representation by hired counsel at all of the relevant court proceedings, Husband himself is an experienced divorce lawyer in the Montgomery County legal community. More importantly, *300Husband entered his appearance as co-counsel. Hence, from November 9, 1989, when Husband entered as co-counsel, throughout the litigation, Husband had the benefit of two attorneys. He paid for the services of one. I add that Husband is the attorney of record in this appeal.
I believe the trial court should have considered Husband’s free representation of himself. First, it indicates that the presence of two counsellors for a litigant was not unreasonable. As Husband had two attorneys, Wife should not have been penalized because her firm often sent two, and occasionally three, attorneys to hearings. Secondly, the court should have considered that Husband suffered no out-of-pocket cost for his own representation, while Wife is being charged for the services of every attorney who has worked on her case. Therefore, Husband’s attorneys’ fees of $150,000.00 do not reflect any less of a representation than Wife had; he only paid less for it.
Moreover, some of Wife’s attorney’s fees and costs can be attributed to issues which Husband insisted on litigating. For example, he pressed the contention thát Wife was not entitled to support payments. Wife’s legal counsel thoroughly defended and eventually won this issue. The trial court should have considered that much of Wife’s attorney’s fees were reasonably related to issues which she had to defend or risk prejudicing her legal rights. Husband should not be punished for raising issues in a divorce proceeding, but nor should Wife. While the court emphasized that Wife’s attorney’s fees were sometimes excessive,9 it never compared those fees to the *301value of Husband’s total representation. Further, the court did not sufficiently address the reasonableness or necessity of all of Wife’s attorney’s fees.
When these factors are considered, Wife is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. Although I would not disturb the trial court’s finding of fact that Wife was able to afford the legal fees which were already paid, I would hold that the court erred in not considering Husband’s capacity to aggressively represent his own interests and Wife’s need to spend much of the fees which she did in defending her interests and those of their children. I would hold that the court erred in not awarding Wife the amount of counsel fees which had been billed less that which she has already paid.
For the above reasons, I dissent.
. See Duff v. Duff, 510 Pa. 251, 507 A.2d 371 (1986) (joint tax liability to be considered in calculation of marital properly).
. The discussion of Beasley certainly makes the settled asbestos cases relevant and therefore discoverable. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3505; Pa. R.CÍV.P. 4003.1.
. While the majority accepts the trial court’s statement that Husband did not intentionally reduce his income, I conclude from the record that the more relevant factor, Husband’s capacity, see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b)(1), never decreased.
. Indeed, a remand will only perpetuate this involved litigation and again place Wife at a disadvantage of having to spend twice as much money on counsel than Husband does.
. In his appellate brief, Husband asserts that Wife used at least $52,-500.00 in PUGMA funds to pay her divorce attorney’s retainer. See Husband's Brief at 26. However, Husband fails to cite to any evidence in support of that contention.
. With assistance of counsel, Wife entered into an agreement with Husband whereby he would accept visitation with the parties’ children, every other weekend, for a period of three months. See Agreed Temporary Order Without Prejudice, March 8, 1989 at 1, para. 2.
. See Agreed Temporary Order Without Prejudice, March 8, 1989 at 2, para. 6 ("Father agrees to be solely responsible for the psychiatric expenses of the children with Dr. Schecter during this [temporary three month] period as are reasonably appropriate.”).
. The trial court states that Wife may still owe over $28,000.00 to previous counsel.
. As the majority notes, "the court may consider ‘discrepancies in counsel's statement of account.' ” Majority Opinion at 285, quoting Gioia v. Gioia, 382 Pa.Super. 538, 550, 555 A.2d 1330, 1337 (1989). While this is true, the trial court in this case reported no “discrepancies.'' The trial court merely chose isolated incidents where two or three attorneys worked on Wife’s case on the same day. The trial court was not satisfied with the accounting of legal fees because "[c]onferences or telephone calls in many cases did not indicate either the subject or the person called, research does not show what was being researched, preparation of memoranda of law does not show the subject matter of the memorandum of law." Trial Court Opinion at 21.
*301My review of the exhibits on Wife’s attorneys’ fees and litigation costs indicates that many of the charges do indicate who was called and are otherwise reasonably specific. See generally N.T. March 5, 1991 at 171 and exhibits entered into evidence. I would not require counsel to spend more billable hours in order to render more specific statements of expenses.