dissenting:
I join in the Dissenting Opinion of my colleague, Judge Cirillo, and write separately to expand upon the reasons why I believe the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.
Appellant, Felix Berrios Rivera, raises two issues for our consideration, namely: (1) whether the trial judge committed reversible error, while giving the jury additional instructions, when he orally advised the jury that no evidence was presented by the Commonwealth that would warrant convicting appellant of robbery by physically removing property from the person of another; and (2) whether there was insufficient evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction for recklessly endangering another person.
*249On December 28, 1981, three males and one female entered the home of Mrs. Maybelle Jacoby, while another male remained in a car outside. When inside, the foursome sought to rob the Jacoby safe. Two of the assailants took turns holding a rifle on Mrs. Jacoby and Mrs. Decker, a tenant from an apartment in the Jacoby home. When the foursome was unable to obtain the combination from Mrs. Jacoby, they tied up Mrs. Jacoby and Mrs. Decker. The foursome took various items of property from the Jacoby home and left.
Subsequently, the female assailant became a Commonwealth witness who identified appellant as one of the foursome. Appellant was tried before a jury. There were three counts of robbery filed against appellant. The first count was based on 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(h).1 The second count was based on 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(l)(iv),2 and the third count was based on 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(l)(v).3 The court instructed the jury on the law of robbery. After having begun its deliberations the jury, on three occasions, asked for additional instructions on robbery. On the third occasion, when the jury requested instructions on robbery, count 3 only, the court gave the following additional instructions to the jury over the objection of defense counsel:
*250I have told you that you are the sole judges of the facts in the case. That’s why I have been a little reluctant to tell you this up until this point but obviously you’re dealing with something that I feel in all fairness I must explain.
There is no evidence in this case that could substantiate a finding of guilty of count 3. The elements of that offense require the taking of property from the person of another. The section was added by the legislature in 1976, and it really covers purse snatching. There is no evidence in this case that anybody took anything from the person of either Miss Jacoby or the other lady.
However, if you disagree with my recitation of facts and if you find that there is evidence, and I again tell you that your finding of the facts is what governs and not mine. The elements are first of all that it must have been committed in the course of committing a theft. I have explained to you what that means. Theft is stealing. It’s taking property of another without right, privilege, authority or consent with the intention of depriving the owner of it permanently. The taking must have been from the person of another, not from the room or the building. It must be taken from the person of another. It must have been in the possession of the person from whom taken and there must be some force employed however slight.
The legislature added [sic] that I might tell you because the act of taking a purse from a persons [sic] hand does not require much force. That’s the significance that that particular crime was meant to cover. I wasn’t going to tell you this, but I guess it’s time to tell you.
N.T., Court’s Charge, June 30, 1982, at 38 and 39. Five minutes after this instruction the jury returned a verdict of guilty of robbery, based on count 1, burglary,4 theft by unlawfully taking property worth $200 or more,5 conspir*251acy6 and recklessly endangering another person.7 Appellant was not found guilty of the robbery, count 3. Appellant filed post-verdict motions, which were denied. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment of not less than four (4) nor more than eight (8) years. This appeal followed.
Relying upon Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 474 Pa. 27, 376 A.2d 617 (1977) and Commonwealth v. Archambault, 448 Pa. 90, 290 A.2d 72 (1972) for support, appellant argues that the trial judge improperly invaded the province of the jury when he stated that there was insufficient evidence to convict appellant of robbery, count 3. I do not agree.
In Commonwealth v. Archambault, supra, the trial judge, during his charge, told the jury that he thought “it would be a miscarriage of justice to find [the] defendant not guilty.” Finding the strongly worded opinion of the trial judge to have been of such coercive influence upon the jury that other instructions given during the lengthy charge about the jury’s role as the final arbiter of the facts and the verdict were unable to vitiate the impact of the trial judge’s opinion statement, it was held that the trial judge’s opinion improperly invaded the province of the jury. In Commonwealth v. Whitfield, supra, the Supreme Court, citing Archambault, held that a trial judge’s statement that the defendant was “guilty of murder or he [was] not guilty of any kind of unlawful homicide” improperly invaded the province of the jury to determine the degree of the defendant’s guilt.
To determine whether in the instant case the trial judge’s additional instructions invaded the province of the jury, we must examine the instructions as a whole, and it is the general effect of the instructions that controls our determination. Commonwealth v. Whiting, 501 Pa. 465, 462 A.2d 218 (1983).
The trial judge stated to the jury that no evidence was presented that would justify the jury in finding appellant *252guilty of robbery count 3. His comment related strictly to the state of the factual evidence presented at trial. It was not coercively phrased as was the opinion statement in Archambault. It did not imply or indicate that appellant was more appropriately found guilty of another offense or grade of robbery based on the evidence the jury had before it. More importantly, the trial judge, immediately after commenting on the lack of evidence, instructed the jury that it was free to disagree with his recollection of the evidence and that its recollection controlled over his. Consistent with this instruction the trial judge then reiterated the law regarding robbery count 3.
Although the trial judge’s statements reflected his opinion that appellant should be acquitted of robbery count 3 because of insufficient evidence, they were immediately followed by an unequivocal instruction that the jury was the final arbiter of the facts and that its decision was determinative. This instruction clearly conveyed to the jury that it could disagree with the trial judge and return a verdict of guilty on robbery count 3. The trial judge reinforced the effect of this instruction by reiterating the law regarding count 3. Thus, the impact of the trial judge’s comments as to the lack of evidence was immediately and unequivocally offset by the trial judge himself. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Whitfield, supra; Commonwealth v. Bennett, 471 Pa. 419, 370 A.2d 373 (1977) (where the trial judge may express an opinion that the evidence does not support a voluntary manslaughter verdict as long as he instructs the jury inter alia that the jury is not bound by his comments on the evidence because the jury is the sole arbiter of the facts). Viewing the additional instructions as a whole, I conclude that the overall effect of the trial judge’s comments did not invade the factfinding function of the jury.
Appellant also argues that his conviction for recklessly endangering another person was founded on insufficient evidence that he possessed the actual present ability to place Mrs. Jacoby and Mrs. Decker in danger of death or serious bodily harm. He maintains that the evidence *253presented at trial failed to show that the rifle employed during the incident was loaded, as is required by our decision in Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 261 Pa.Super. 109, 395 A.2d 1337 (1978). Admitting that no direct evidence was presented to show the rifle was loaded, the trial court in its opinion rejected appellant’s argument citing, as circumstantial evidence of the actual present ability to inflict harm, the testimony of Mrs. Jacoby that one of her assailants, other than appellant, asked in a serious manner whether he should kill Mrs. Jacoby and Mrs. Decker. In this appeal, the Commonwealth relies upon this position of the trial court. Because of inadequacies in the record, the majority would remand for completion of the record. Hence this dissent.
The record certified to this court did not contain a complete transcript of testimony from appellant’s trial. Only a partial transcript containing the testimony of appellant’s female accomplice, Kathy Laughman, was transmitted to this court.8 Her testimony did not refer to the question the trial court relied upon in its opinion; nor did it provide an independent basis for concluding that appellant possessed the actual present ability to inflict harm. The testimony of Mrs. Jacoby is not part of the record transmitted to this court. As Judge Cirillo correctly observes, it is not our obligation to complete the record, but rather that of appellant.
Since there is no showing of record that appellant was prohibited from securing a transcript of the testimony at trial, and since the second issue, relating to the alleged invasion of the jury’s province by the judge during his charge, is answered by the record before us, I would affirm the judgment of sentence. Hence, this dissent.
. The pertinent portions of the Crimes Code definition of robbery are as follows:
§ 3701 Robbery
(a) Offense defined.—
(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he:
(ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury;
(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury;
(v) physically takes or removes property from the person of another by force however slight.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a) et seq.
. See note 1 supra.
. See note 1 supra.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502.
. Id. §§ 3902, 3921.
. Id. § 903.
. Id. § 2705.
. Submission of a partial transcript of testimony to this court is permissible under Pa.R.A.P. 1922(b)(2) and Pa.R.Crim.P. 9030(b). The record does not indicate at whose behest the court reporter transcribed only part of the trial record, containing the testimony of Kathy Laughman.