(concurring).
The disposition of appellant’s claim that his formal statement was the product of unnecessary delay between his arrest and arraignment * is governed by our decision in Commonwealth v. Rowe, 459 Pa. 163, 327 A.2d 358 (1974). In Rowe, we held that, where a statement which is not the product of unnecessary delay is followed after unnecessary delay by another statement which only repeats the contents of the first, the later statement is *634not reasonably related to the delay. Id. at 169, 327 A.2d at 361-362. It is therefore not made inadmissable by Futch.
Because I agree that appellant’s other contentions are also without merit, I concur in the result.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this concurring opinion.Pa.R.Crim.P. 130; Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 458 Pa. 281, 327 A.2d 43 (1974); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 459 Pa. 171, 327 A.2d 618 (1974); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201, 321 A.2d 611 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hancock, 455 Pa. 583, 317 A.2d 588 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa. 444, 311 A.2d 613 (1973); Commonwealth v. Wayman, 454 Pa. 79, 309 A.2d 784 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 547, 307 A.2d 238 (1973); Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973); Commonwealth v. Jones, 449 Pa. 619, 294 A.2d 889 (1972); see Geiger Appeal, 454 Pa. 51, 309 A.2d 559 (1973); Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Pa. 615, 306 A.2d 901 (1973).