dissenting.
The revocable trust agreement before us on this appeal was executed on December 13, 1989 at Palm Beach Gardens, Florida by Harold Fellman and Marie Fellman as Grantors. The agreement expressly provides that controversies arising out of the agreement shall be settled by arbitration in the City of Miami, Florida. It further expressly sets forth that the Grantors are residents of the State of Florida, and all questions shall be judged and resolved in accordance with Florida law.
The order which we are called upon to review does nothing more than deny a citation to certain parties who sought to have issues surrounding the revocation of the trust agreement litigated in Pennsylvania. I cannot find any abuse of discretion on the part of the Honorable Robert A. Kelly, who denied the citation, or the Orphans’ Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which dismissed the exceptions to Judge Kelly’s order. I therefore must vigorously dissent from the Opinion of my colleague, Judge Wieand, which would flaunt both the express terms of the trust agreement and the expressed wishes of the parties.
Appellate review of equity matters is limited to a determination of whether the chancellor committed an error of law or abused his discretion. Lower Frederick Township v. Clemmer, 518 Pa. 313, 322, 543 A.2d 502, 507 (1988); Sack v. Feinman, 489 Pa. 152, 165-66, 413 A.2d 1059, 1066 (1980) decided after remand 495 Pa. 100, 432 A.2d 971 (1981). The scope of review of a final decree in equity is limited and will not be disturbed unless it is unsupported by the evidence or demonstrably capricious. Id.
The revocable trust agreement sets forth, in § 25:
§ 25. Fidelity Bond and Governing Law.
This Agreement has been drawn and executed in the State of Florida, and the Grantor, the Trustee, and most, if not all, of the prospective beneficiaries identified *588herein are residents of the State of Florida. All questions concerning the meaning, intention or validity of this Agreement, and all questions relating to performance hereunder, shall be judged and resolved in accordance with the laws of said state.
The Harold and Marie Fellman Revocable Trust, dated December 13, 1989, page 26; Petition for Citation filed July 25, 1990, Exhibit A; R.R., page 36a. (emphasis added). At § 29, the agreement goes on to set forth, in pertinent part:
§ 29. Arbitration.
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Trust Agreement, or any breach thereof, shall be to the extent permitted by law settled by arbitration in the City of Miami, Florida, in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
The above § 7 and § 28 require that a dispute concerning the competency of a beneficiary or Trustee be arbitrated. The Grantor recognizes that the issue of the competency of the Grantor, his spouse, his children and other descendants, all of whom are potential beneficiaries and Trustees hereunder, involves not only the financial affairs of the Trust but the family relationships among Grantor, his spouse, his children and other descendants and it is his intention whenever possible to avoid litigation on the issue of competency and to resolve that issue entirely through the process of arbitration.
Id. at pages 32-33; R.R. at pages 42a-43a (emphasis added).
In the case before us, Sidney J. Fellman, as a named Trustee, declined to cooperate in the redelivery of trust assets to Harold and Marie Fellman, separate Grantors under the Agreement and also co-trustees. Sidney Fellman advanced the alleged physical and/or mental impairment of the Grantors as the basis for his refusal to join in the reversion of the assets. As Judge Wieand observes in his majority opinion, Florida law requires that the grantor be *589competent at the time the grantor acts to revoke a trust. Florida National Bank of Palm Beach County v. Genova, 460 So.2d 895 (Fla.1984).
The majority concludes that “only the judicial system is equipped to handle incompetency hearings and the legal ramifications following a determination of incompetency.” It goes on to hold that, “as a matter of public policy, issues of incompetency cannot be submitted to arbitration.” Majority opinion, 267. I must vigorously dissent.
First, neither the order of October 4, 1990 nor the order of November 8, 1990 directed the parties to submit to arbitration as the majority states in its opinion. The order of October 4, 1990 did nothing more than deny the citation sought by the petitioners. The order of November 8, 1990 merely dismissed the exceptions filed to the earlier order. The issue before this court therefore is not, as the majority would posit it, in what forum should the issue of competency be determined? The issue is more appropriately, whether the chancellor abused his discretion by refusing to issue a citation where the revocable trust agreement expressly provided that disputes concerning the competency of the Grantors must be decided under Florida law and through arbitration.
The Petition for Citation contains averments concerning the residency of the Grantors which is both expressly denied by the respondent Trustee and at odds with express averments contained in the Revocable Trust. The Petition does not set forth any reason why the citation was sought in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania in the face of those provisions of the agreement sought to be revoked which provide for the application of Florida law and the utilization of the Florida system of arbitration.
The trial court found no authority on the question of whether an arbitrator may determine issues of competency. I do not read the majority opinion of my colleague, Judge Wieand, as finding otherwise. The majority examines New York law on a variety of matters not involving competency, and cites to the United States Supreme Court for the *590principle that the resolution of statutory and constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts. I find none of this helpful in determining whether, under Florida law, arbitration of the issue brought under the Fellman Trust can be accomplished.
The majority would reverse and remand “for further proceedings.” The majority does not give any guidance to the trial court upon remand concerning the proper interpretation of the trust agreement. Is a Pennsylvania orphans’ court judge to apply Pennsylvania law (just announced by this panel) in construing a Florida document which states, in no uncertain terms, that Florida law is to be applied? If Pennsylvania law is to be applied, would this be because it is the same as Florida law? Similar to Florida law? Or because we do not care how Florida would decide the same question? If the Allegheny County Orphans’ Court Division tries to comply with the directive(?) of the majority, should it only decide the question of Grantor competency, since public policy would not thereby be offended, and leave other issues in dispute for resolution by the Florida arbitration system? Should the Pennsylvania trial court assume that, arguably, this court is seeking to announce Florida law? Need the Florida courts grant full faith and credit to any decision of this court which does not attempt to consider Florida law while interpreting public policy issues surrounding a Florida document?
Since Harold Fellman and Marie Fellman are now residents of Florida, how shall the Orphans’ Court proceed to consider their competency? The Petition did not request a determination of competency. The prayer of that Petition merely seeks to force Sidney J. Fellman,.as co-trustee, to cooperate in the redelivery of assets to the Grantors, and to compel Pittsburgh National Bank, Paine Weber, Landmark Savings and NCNB to redeliver assets to the Grantors. How does the court abuse its discretion in declining to do something that the petitioner has not even requested?
All of these questions could be avoided. On December 24, 1991, counsel for the Grantors, appellants, filed a Joint *591Application to Discontinue Appeal with this court which was consented to by Sidney J. Fellman, appellee pro se. The Joint Application avers that all of the parties to this dispute have agreed to settle the matter and have entered into a written settlement agreement dated September 16, 1991. The only action taken by the orphans’ court which we could review is its denial of the citation. Since it now appears that the Grantors do not require a citation, I would refrain from seeking to pronounce new law where it is neither invited nor required. See Pa.R.A.P. 1973, Discontinuance.
Hence, this dissent.