This is an Interlocutory Appeal. The Plaintiffs-Appellants challenge pre-trial rulings of the Superior Court as to the extent to which the State waived its sovereign immunity by the purchase of commercial liability insurance covering accidents involving two buses operated by the Delaware Administration for Regional Transit (“DART”). The issue presented to the Superior Court was which statute controls these proceedings: 2 Del.C. § 1329, enacted by 66 Del.Laws C. 360 (“1989 Bond Act”), or 18 Del.C. § 6511. Title 2, Del.C. § 1329 waives the State’s sovereign immunity, as to DART, up to a maximum of $300,000 for each occurrence, if DART has in place the commercial insurance coverage authorized to be purchased by the 1989 Bond Act. Title 18, Del.C. § 6511 waives sovereign immunity generally, up to the limit of insurance coverage, if there is in place the insurance authorized to be purchased under that Section.
The Superior Court held that, as between 18 Del.C. § 6511 and 2 Del.C. § 1329, Section 1329 was the more specific and later enacted statute and, therefore, its provisions control. Consequently, the Superior Court determined that 2 Del.C. § 1329 limits the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity, as to accidents involving DART, to the lesser of the amount of applicable insurance coverage, or $300,000. The Superior Court held, alternatively, that because the applicable insurance coverage was not purchased as part of the State Insurance Coverage Program created by 18 Del.C. § 6511, the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by 18 Del.C. § 6511 could not apply.
The Superior Court granted the Plaintiffs’-Appellants’ Motion for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal and we accepted it pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 42(b). We then granted the motions of the Delaware Trial Lawyers Association and Defense Counsel of Delaware to file amicus curiae briefs in support of appellants’ position.
We agree with the holding of the Superior Court. Accordingly, the interlocutory rulings of the Superior Court are affirmed.
I.
Five actions were filed in the Superior Court seeking damages arising out of two accidents involving buses operated by DART, a State agency. The suits were consolidated in the Superior Court. At the time of the accidents, DART had primary liability insurance coverage with Reliance Insurance Company in the amount of $1 million per occurrence for which it had paid $609,113 as the annual premium. In addition, DART had an umbrella policy with General Star Indemnity Company in the amount of $5 million, for which it had paid an annual premium of $160,000. DART also carried excess coverage insurance with Crumb and Forster in the amount of $5 million, purchased with an annual premium of $40,000.1
The issue is whether 2 Del.C. § 1329, enacted by Section 68 of the 1989 Bond Act, which waives the sovereign immunity of the State up to a maximum of $300,000 for each occurrence, if there is applicable commercial insurance coverage, or 18 Del.C. § 6511 which waives sovereign immunity without limit, if there is applicable insurance coverage, controls in this instance.
II.
Sovereign immunity has been a part of the law of Delaware throughout the State’s history. This Court first considered the question of sovereign immunity as applied to a lawsuit brought against the State in the case of Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. v. State, 55 Del. 298, 187 A.2d 71 (1962). In that case, Justice Wolcott noted that sovereign immunity is not a judicially created doctrine, but rather, was part of the common law of England at the time of the American Revolution. The Shell-hom court took note of the long tradition of sovereign immunity enjoyed by English mon*1374archs and held that because sovereign immunity was unquestionably a part of the English common law prior to 1776, it was retained by Article 25 of the 1776 Constitution, which provided that the common law of England would remain in force in Delaware until altered by the newly formed Delaware General Assembly.
The 1792 Constitution, in Article I, § 9, directly addressed sovereign immunity, providing that “suits may be brought against the state, according to such regulations as shall be made by law.” That language, present without alteration in all successive Delaware Constitutions, reinforced the constitutional basis for the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Delaware, subject, however, to waiver by the General Assembly. Id. at 74.
Sovereign immunity, therefore, is an absolute bar to liability claims against this State unless it is waived by the General Assembly. Wilmington Housing Authority v. Williamson, Del.Supr., 228 A.2d 782, 786 (1967).
III.
All the parties agree that DART, as a state agency, is protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity unless a waiver has occurred. Similarly, they assert that sovereign immunity, at least partially, has been waived as to the accidents that are the subject of this action, but they differ as to the extent of the waiver.2 Appellants and amici assert that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been waived, up to the amount of liability insurance coverage ($5 million), pursuant to 18 Del.C. § 6511. The other parties contend that 2 Del.C. § 1829, enacted by Section 68 of the 1989 Bond Act, which waives sovereign immunity only up to $300,000 per occurrence, applies.
IV.
DART is governed by the Delaware Transportation Authority Act, 2 Del.C., Chapter 13.3 Title 2, Del.C. § 1329, enacted by Section 68 of the 1989 Bond Act, addresses the issue of liability as to any service provided by the Delaware Transportation Authority (“Authority”). It states, in pertinent part:
Any operation, service or program provided by the Delaware Transportation Authority ... not covered by a general liability policy, self-insurance or other insurance policy as shall be legally established and funded by said Authority shall be covered and protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity of the State which shall be applicable not only to the Authority but to each of its agencies, administrations, subsidiaries and each of their respective officers and employees ... In the event that insurance has been provided, such claim, including any award for damages or costs assessed against the Authority, its administrations, subsidiaries, officers or employees either individually or on behalf of their employer shall not exceed the amount of said insurance covering the risk or loss or the amount of $300,000 whichever amount shall be lesser for any and all claims arising out of a single occurrence (emphasis added).
This language states the general rule that DART, as a State agency operated by Authority, is protected against tort claims by the doctrine of sovereign immunity unless the General Assembly has waived it. Only a limited exception to this general rule of immunity is provided, and that exception has two requirements: there must be liability insurance and any recovery against DART cannot exceed the limit of $300,000 for a single occurrence.
Appellants, nevertheless, assert that 18 Del.C. § 6511 controls instead. It was enacted in 1970 as part of 18 Del.C., Chapter 65, *1375“Insurance for the Protection of the State.” 18 Del.C. § 6511 states:
The defense of sovereignty is waived and cannot and will not be asserted as to any risk or loss covered by the state insurance coverage program, whether same be covered by commercially procured insurance or by self-insurance, and every commercially procured insurance contract shall contain a provision to this effect, where appropriate (emphasis added).
Title 18, Del.C. § 6511 was intended to provide a method by which those injured by the State or its agencies would be compensated while, at the same time, protecting the State Treasury. Accordingly, that statute allows claims against the State only if insurance has been purchased pursuant to the “state insurance coverage program” (“State Insurance Coverage Program”).
Y.
The Superior Court, in its decision, noted that although the defense of sovereign immunity is waivable under 18 Del.C. § 6511, that section provides for a waiver only as to risks covered by the State Insurance Coverage Program, a program that has never existed. It also held that 2 Del.C. § 1329, as the later enacted and more specific statute, superseded 18 Del.C. § 6511. It, therefore, correctly limited coverage in this case to $300,000 per occurrence, as is provided by 2 Del.C. § 1329. Turnbull v. Fink, et al., Del.Super., C.A. No. 90C-10-135, Alford, J. (Feb. 17, 1994) (Memorandum Opinion), slip op. at 7, 1994 WL 89641. Delaware courts have on several occasions considered the applicability of 18 Del.C. § 6511 where it has been alleged that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been waived because of the purchase of liability insurance by the State. It has been consistently concluded that the State Insurance Coverage Program mandated by 18 Del. C., Chapter 65, has never existed.
In Raughley v. Department of Health & Social Services, Del.Super., 274 A.2d 702, 704, (1971), the Superior Court held that 18 Del.C. § 6511 “is merely enabling [legislation], notwithstanding its mandatory direction.” That court determined that “a fully developed and integrated program [of insurance] protecting both the State and the public was contemplated.” The Superior Court in Raughley determined that because the State Insurance Coverage Program was not in existence, the waiver in 18 Del.C. § 6511 was not effective. Similarly, in Pipkin v. Department of Highways & Transportation, Del.Super., 316 A.2d 236 (1974), the Superior Court concluded, on a more limited basis, that without insurance coverage there could be no waiver.
In 1976 this Court first considered the meaning of 18 Del.C. § 6511 and the State Insurance Coverage Program in Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429 (1976). We determined that Title 18, Chapter 65, created “a comprehensive insurance program with implementing administrative provisions.” Id. at 435. We also noted that Chapter 65 mandated that a Committee be formed to determine insurance coverage (Section 6502), specified the forms of coverage (Section 6503), authorized the Insurance Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out policy determinations (Section 6504), and formed a State Insurance Coverage Office (Section 6505). We also found that the provisions of the chapter are mandatory, because the word “shall” is used in every significant section. It was, therefore, concluded that 18 Del.C., Chapter 65, was more than mere enabling legislation and was a viable program. This Court, therefore, determined that the State could not escape liability merely by arguing that Section 6511 is inanimate “until vitalized by appropriation.” Id. at 436. Instead, it held that sovereign immunity was presumptively waived, and that the burden would be “upon the State to provide all of the facts as to how the Committee met its responsibilities under 18 Del.C., Chapter 65 ... [including] whether self-insurance is or was feasible to provide coverage for such risk and the reason for no coverage.” Id.
In 1985, however, in Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d 1175 (1985), we determined that the State had overcome the presumptive waiver of sovereign immunity provided in 18 Del.C. § 6511. We reached that conclusion because of the events that had transpired during the nine years since Pajewski. We *1376held that the Committee formed by 18 Del.C. § 6511 had made numerous good faith attempts to secure funding from the General Assembly to formulate a comprehensive insurance coverage plan, but to no avail. Id. at 1177-78. We noted that “it was never said that the Committee was responsible for ensuring that coverage actually exists. It was impossible for the Committee to create coverage without funding.” Id. at 1177. We therefore found, as a matter of law, that the State had not waived its sovereign immunity because the State had never provided for the State Insurance Coverage Program as mandated by 18 Del.C. § 6511.
In Sandt v. Delaware Solid Waste Authority, Del.Supr., 640 A.2d 1030 (1994), we recently considered the issue of waiver of sovereign immunity as to the Delaware Solid Waste Authority (‘Waste Authority”). We held that the General Assembly had expressly waived Waste Authority’s sovereign immunity by enacting 7 Del.C. § 6406(a)(5) which gives Waste Authority the power to “[s]ue and be sued.” We were therefore not called upon to rule on Sandt’s alternative argument that Waste Authority’s purchase of insurance waived its sovereign immunity under 18 Del.C. § 6511.
VI.
Notwithstanding the $300,000 maximum limitation as to the waiver of sovereign immunity in 2 Del.C. § 1329, appellants claim that DART’s purchase of insurance, with the maximum coverage of $5 million, constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity, up to that limit, pursuant to 18 Del.C. § 6511. It is not disputed that the insurance at issue was purchased pursuant to Section 67 of the 1989 Bond Act.
Section 67 of the 1989 Bond Act states:
Transit operations: The Delaware Transit Authority is hereby authorized to expand existing transit operations and the sum of Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000) is hereby appropriated for that purpose. Said transit operations may consist of expanded rail or bus service or such other services which shall serve to promote commuter transit, to relieve road congestion and/or to provide such other traffic mitigation measures as shall be determined to be in the best interest of the State. The funds authorized by this section may be used for capital or operating costs, costs of insurance or bonding and any other costs reasonably related to provide the expanded transit operations described herein. Any of the funds authorized herein and used for insurance purposes may be utilized as determined by the Delaware Transportation Authority to purchase a general liability or such other insurance policy or to participate in the State’s self insurance fund to the extent necessary to provide for the potential liability exposure as shall be determined by the Delaware Insurance Determination Committee pursuant to Section 6501, Chapter 65 of the Delaware Code (emphasis added).
Appellants’ argument that 18 Del.C. § 6511 controls instead of 2 Del.C. § 1329 fails for several reasons.
As held in Doe v. Cates, 499 A.2d at 1175, 18 Del.C. § 6511 provides for the waiver of sovereign immunity only as to risks or losses covered by the State Insurance Coverage Program. It is not disputed that the insurance at issue was authorized to be purchased pursuant to § 67 of the 1989 Bond Act. Section 67 of the 1989 Bond Act, by its terms, does not provide for the procurement of insurance through the State Insurance Coverage Program created by 18 Del.C. § 6511. As the emphasized text of Section 67 provides, the Delaware Transit Authority is permitted to purchase insurance without utilizing the State Insurance Coverage Program. This is what was done. In light of the nonexistence of the State Insurance Coverage Program that could arrange for the purchase of insurance, the General Assembly obviously realized the need for DART to acquire its own insurance. The loss in question, therefore, cannot be covered by the non-existent State Insurance Coverage Program provided for by 18 Del.C. § 6511. Doe v. Cates, 499 A.2d at 1175.
As discussed previously, sovereign immunity is firmly rooted in both the common law and the Delaware Constitution. A *1377waiver of sovereign immunity must be a clear and specific act of the General Assembly. Raughley v. Department of Health & Social Services, Del.Super., 274 A.2d 702 (1971). Section 67 of the 1989 Bond Act is not a clear or specific waiver of sovereign immunity.
Appellants’ interpretation of the combined effect of Section 68 of the 1989 Bond Act, which enacted 2 Del.C. § 1329 and 18 Del.C. § 6511 is also inconsistent and irreconcilable with the text of the 1989 Bond Act. Sections 67 and 68 of the 1989 Bond Act must be read together and harmonized, if possible. If they cannot be reconciled, the more specific provision must prevail over the general. Hamilton v. State, Del.Supr., 285 A.2d 807, 809 (1971); State ex rel. Price v. 0.0673 Acres of Land, Del.Supr., 224 A.2d 598, 602 (1966). When Sections 67 and 68 of the 1989 Bond Act are read together, as they must be, it is clear that the General Assembly, regardless of any other statute, intended that the sovereign immunity of the State would not apply as to DART only if DART had obtained insurance and, if so, the waiver would be limited to $300,000 for each occurrence, regardless of how much insurance was purchased by DART.
Lastly, the interpretation given to 18 Del.C. § 6511 by Appellants is irreconcilable with 2 Del.C. § 1329. Where possible, a court will attempt to harmonize two potentially conflicting statutes dealing with the same subject. If they cannot be reconciled, however, the specific statute must prevail over the general. Hamilton v. State, 285 A.2d at 809; 2B SutheRLAND StatutoRY CONSTRUCTION, § 51.04 (5th ed. 1992). Likewise, if the two acts are irreconcilable, the later enacted statute must prevail over the earlier. State ex rel. State Highway Dept. v. George F. Lang Co., 56 Del. 126, 191 A.2d 322 (1963). Title 2, Del.C. § 1329, imposes a $300,000 limit on the waiver of sovereign immunity as to DART. It is the more specific act and it is the later enacted. Consequently it must prevail over 18 Del.C. § 6511.
We, therefore, reject Appellants’ argument that the General Assembly waived DART’s sovereign immunity without any dollar limitation to the extent of DART’s purchase of liability coverage.4
VII.
Appellants also argue that 2 Del.C. § 1329 was unconstitutionally enacted and, even if validly enacted, deprives them of their constitutional equal protection and due process rights and their constitutional right to a jury trial and access to the courts.
Appellants incorrectly assert that sovereign immunity was conferred upon DART by 2 Del.C. § 1329. That statute merely reaffirmed sovereign immunity as it already existed under the Delaware Constitution. If we were to hold, as Appellants request, that Section 1329 is a nullity, the constitutional principle of sovereign immunity would deny all recovery to Appellants. We do not, however, find 2 Del.C. § 1329 to be unconstitutional.
1. The Enactment of 2 Del.C. § 1329
In this Court, Appellants raise for the first time a claim that Section 68 of the 1989 Bond Act, which enacted 2 Del.C. § 1329, is unconstitutional.5 Specifically, they assert that the Act violated Article II, Section 16 of the Delaware Constitution because it contained more than one subject and that the subject “waiver of sovereign immunity” was not set forth in the title to the bill.6
*1378The text of Article II § 16 of the Delaware Constitution precludes Appellant’s argument. It states: “No bill or joint resolution, except bills appropriating money for public purposes, shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.” Delaware courts have consistently followed the “plain meaning rule” for construction of statutes or the Delaware Constitution. One formulation used by this Court in stating the “plain meaning rule” is: “In the absence of any ambiguity, the language of the statute must be regarded as conclusive of the General Assembly’s intent. The judicial role is then limited to an application of the literal meaning of the words.” State v. Cooper, Del.Supr., 575 A.2d 1074, 1076 (1990) (citing Evans v. State, Del.Supr., 516 A.2d 477, 478 (1986); Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., Del.Supr., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1985)). See also In re Adoption of Swanson, Del.Supr., 623 A.2d 1095 (1993); Moses v. Bd. of Educ., Del.Supr., 602 A.2d 61 (1991).7 It has been consistently followed in the construction of the Delaware Constitution. Barron v. Kleinman, Del.Supr., 550 A.2d 324, 326 (1988); Marker v. State, Del.Supr., 450 A.2d 397, 399 (1982); Opinion of the Justices, Del.Supr., 290 A.2d 645 (1972).
As noted by Millard H. Ruud in his article No Law Shall Embrace More than One Subject, 42 Minn.L.Rev. 389, 414-452 (1959), the text of the Delaware Constitution is more permissive than any other state constitution because it provides that a bill of the Delaware General Assembly which appropriates money for public purposes is free of the restraint that it be limited to one subject. •As Professor Ruud points out, in 1958 18 states had adopted constitutional provisions specifically dealing with the limitation of contents of bills making appropriations — both general appropriations bills and other appropriation bills. Id. at 414-417. The Constitutions of seven of those 18 states (including Pennsylvania) expressly excepted only general appropriation bills from the one subject restriction. Id. at 414-417. There are only four states, including Delaware, in which a “one subject” limitation provision in the State’s Constitution is exempted as to all appropriation bills. Id. at 416. Of these four states only the Delaware Constitution provides that any bill appropriating money for public purposes is excepted from the one-subject and title requirements. Id. at 416.
The 1989 Bond Act is clearly a bill appropriating money for public purposes, and its provision relating to the waiver of sovereign immunity in Section 68 relates to the insurance authorized to be purchased in the Act. The 1989 Bond Act is similar to the Annual Budget Act and differs only as to the number of appropriations and its source of funds. The 1989 Bond Act makes over 130 separate appropriations and the money appropriated has several sources including the General Fund, general obligation bonds, revenue bonds, funds made available from the repeal of prior appropriations not yet expended, and *1379certain special funds. As a bill appropriating money for public purposes, the 1989 Bond Act clearly falls within the exception in Article II, § 16 of Delaware Constitution. No other provision in the Delaware Constitution requires a one-subject limitation or a requirement for a title for a bill appropriating money for public purposes. There is, therefore, no requirement in the Delaware Constitution that the 1989 Bond Act be limited to one subject that is expressed in its title. See Opinion of the Justices, 57 Del. 19, 194 A.2d 855 (1963). The framers of the Delaware Constitution undoubtedly recognized, even in 1897, the difficulties in limiting an appropriation bill to one subject or setting forth its provisions in a title.
Appellants do not assert that they have been mislead or prejudiced by any deficiencies in the 1989 Bond Act. To the contrary, they are benefitted by the enactment of Section 68 that enacted 2 Del.C. § 1329 because it waives the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity, up to $300,000 per occurrence, if DART has in place the insurance coverage authorized to be purchased by the Act. Without Section 68, Appellants would not have the benefit of this waiver.
2. Equal protection
Appellants also argue that 2 Del.C. § 1329 unconstitutionally discriminates between injured persons based on whether their claims against DART are greater or less than $300,000.
In any equal protection case, the threshold issue is the standard of review to be applied to the government action in question. Usually, “governmental action enjoys a presumption of constitutionality and statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them”. State v. Robinson, Del.Super., 417 A.2d 953, 961 (1980), quoting McDonald v. Board of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1408, 22 L.Ed.2d 739, 745 (1969); see also Marine v. State, Del.Supr., 607 A.2d 1185, 1206-1207 (1992), cert. den., — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 28, 120 L.Ed.2d 952 (1992). Under this “rational relationship” test, the person objecting to the state action bears the burden of proving the lack of rational justification.
In cases, however, where the state action infringes upon a “fundamental right” or creates a “suspect classification,” the more rigorous “strict scrutiny” test will be applied. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (invalidating durational residency requirements for voting); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (invalidating ban on interracial marriages). A governmental action survives strict scrutiny only where the state demonstrates that the test is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest.
Between the levels of “rational basis” and “strict scrutiny” lies the “intermediate basis” test, a standard of review intended primarily for cases involving classifications based upon gender or illegitimacy. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (invalidating state statute providing that husbands, not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978) (involving illegitimacy). For governmental classifications to survive intermediate scrutiny, they must “serve important governmental objectives and [must be] substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 279, 99 S.Ct. at 1111, 59 L.Ed.2d at 316.
Discrimination against those who have suffered economic injury generally does not implicate a suspect classification. See, e.g., Marine, 607 A.2d 1185. See also Ronald D. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 8.3 (1992). Accordingly, this Court has applied the rational basis test to analyze legislation that creates economic classifications. Cheswold Vol. Fire Co. v. Lambertson Const. Co., Del.Supr., 489 A.2d 413, 419 (1985) (holding that economic legislation must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose).
Title 2 DeLCode § 1329 creates no distinction among plaintiffs based upon classifications that are inherently suspect, such *1380as race, color, religion, or ancestry.8 The application of this statute, therefore, does not deprive Appellants of a fundamental right, such as the right to vote. Nor does this case involve classifications based upon gender or illegitimacy. Instead, 2 Del.C. § 1329 creates nothing more than a economic distinction among potential plaintiffs.
Appellants suggest that this Court should adopt the minority rule embraced by a very few courts in other jurisdictions, which have applied augmented standards of scrutiny when determining the constitutionality of liability limitation statutes. Appellants cite Brannigan v. Usitalo, 134 N.H. 50, 587 A.2d 1232 (1991) and Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990).
Although we remain cognizant of the interests of tort victims in receiving redress for their injuries, we are unwilling to follow the minority rule that utilizes a heightened standard of scrutiny in reviewing statutes that create socioeconomic distinctions among plaintiffs. It is the rule in this state that absent suspect classification or alleged deprivations of a fundamental right, socioeconomic legislation need bear only a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Cheswold Vol. Fire Co. v. Lambertson Const. Co., 489 A.2d at 418. Therefore, we must follow the rational basis test.
Under the rational basis test, Appellants bear the burden of showing that there is no conceivable justification for the classification created by 2 Del.C. § 1329. They failed to meet that burden. Numerous justifications exist for limiting the recovery of potential plaintiffs in tort actions against the state. Among them is the need to protect the state treasury, maintain insurance premiums at a manageable level, and promote stability in the insurance market. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102, 115 (1992). Therefore, Appellants’ equal protection argument is without merit.
3. Right to jury trial
Amicus curiae, the Delaware Trial Lawyers Association, argues that 2 Del.C. § 1329 is unconstitutional because it deprives plaintiffs of their right to adjudication by a jury.
The 1792 Delaware Constitution provided that “trial by jury shall be as heretofore.” This language has appeared unchanged in four successive Delaware Constitutions and it was left unaltered when Article I, § 4 of the present Delaware Constitution was amended in 1984. “This Court and the other courts of Delaware have always construed that provision in the Delaware Constitution as ‘guaranteeing the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law.’ ” Claudio v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 1278, 1297 (1991) (quoting Fountain v. State, Del.Supr., 275 A.2d 251 (1971)). At common law and under the Delaware Constitution, lawsuits against the state have always been barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless waived by the General Assembly. The enactment of 2 Del.C. § 1329, therefore, represents a modification of the common law rule, by allowing lawsuits against DART through a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Section 1329 does not deprive the petitioners of their existing right to a jury trial, rather, it creates a new right to sue. By enacting 2 Del.C. § 1329, the General Assembly exercised its power to create, and at the same time, limit the new cause of action. Cf. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992) (holding that a statutory damage cap does not violate the equal protection clause or the right to a jury trial) and Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989) (holding that a statute limiting medical malpractice recovery does not violate due process, equal protection, or the right to a jury trial). Therefore, we reject the argument that Appellants are being denied their constitutional right to a jury trial.
4. Due Process
The amicus Delaware Trial Lawyers Association further argues that the limitation of liability contained in 2 Del.C. § 1329 is *1381unconstitutional as it violates plaintiffs’ due process rights and access to the courts as guaranteed by the Delaware Constitution. Article I § 9 of the Delaware Constitution states in part:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his reputation, person, movable or immovable possessions, shall have remedy by the due course of law, and justice administered according to the very right of the cause and the law of the land, without sale, denial, or unreasonable delay or expense; ...
The amicus, in effect, argues that Section 1329 might impermissibly deny full compensation to some plaintiffs. It also suggests that the liability limitation in that Section creates a “one department class, DART, which can limit its liability below the other State departments and agencies.”
Amicus cites decisions from other jurisdictions that have held some types of legislative limitations on tort recovery to be a denial of due process. The issues in the cases cited by it, however, are distinguishable from the issue here because those cases all deal with statutes regulating recovery for private torts, rather than torts committed by the state. The failure to perceive this distinction is apparent in amicus’ summary to its own argument:
The number of ramifications and permutations of this argument revolve around one, a common law right can be mitigated; two, where it is mitigated, a person should be afforded an equal remedy if the remedy is deprived; and three, that if there is no State purpose for this act, the limitation must be suspect.
The instant case does not involve the abrogation of a “common law right.” As we have noted above, there could be no recovery in tort against the State at common law.
Furthermore, we reject amicus’ argument that there is no “public function” for creating “a small infringed class” that is not permitted to recover damages to the extent of the State’s insurance coverage. First, this argument is purely conclusory. 2 Del.C. § 1329 does not create “a small infringed class.” Rather, it allows some recovery for all persons who can prove they were injured by a negligent action of DART. The quid pro quo for the break with the common law and Delaware Constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity was the limitation of liability under the new cause of action. Second, the limitation of liability serves the public function of making a recovery possible as to torts involving one State agency, DART, while protecting the State treasury and maintaining liability insurance premiums at an affordable level.
VIII.
For the foregoing reasons, the pre-trial rulings of the Superior Court that 2 Del.C. § 1329, enacted by Section 68 of the 1989 Bond Act, applies to this lawsuit and that it limits any recovery to $300,000 per occurrence are AFFIRMED and this proceeding is REMANDED for further action.
. The wisdom or legality of the purchase of insurance in excess of the $300,000 per occurrence limit imposed by 13 Del.C. § 1329 is not before us.
. There has been no claim that the insurance carriers agreed to assume any liability greater than the liability of the State.
. 2 Del.C. § 1403(5) empowers the Delaware Transportation Authority “[t]o use funds available in DART operations 'public' to cover the expenses, both capital and operating related to public transportation services provided by DART
. Appellants' reliance upon Kennerly v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 561 (1990) is misplaced because the applicability of 18 Del.C. § 6511 was not at issue in that case. Nor did the Kennedy Court attempt to reconcile Kennerly with Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d at 1175 (1985).
. Supr.Ct.R. 8 was not followed because this issue was first raised in this Court. We nevertheless consider the argument in the interests of justice and judicial economy. Sandt v. Delaware Solid Waste Authority, Del.Supr., 640 A.2d 1030, 1032 (1994).
.The title to the 1989 Bond Act (66 Del.Laws C. 360) states: a bond and capital improvements act of THE STATE OF DELAWARE AND CERTAIN OF ITS AUTHORITIES AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS OF THE STATE AND REVENUE BONDS OF THE DELAWARE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; APPROPRIATING FUNDS FROM THE FIRST STATE IMPROVEMENT FUND AND THE TRANSPORTATION TRUST FUND; PLEDGING DOCUMENT FEES TO THE TRANSPORTATION TRUST FUND TOGETHER WITH MOTOR FUEL TAXES AND MOTOR CARRIER REGISTRATION FEES; MAKING CERTAIN ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS TO AND READOPTING TITLE 2, CHAPTER 13 AND CHAPTER 14; TRANSFERRING CERTAIN GENERAL OB*1378LIGATION BOND AUTHORIZATIONS TO THE TRANSPORTATION TRUST FUND; TRANSFERRING CERTAIN DELAWARE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY BOND AUTHORIZATIONS TO THE TRANSPORTATION TRUST FUND; DEAUTHORIZING CERTAIN GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS OF THE STATE AND CERTAIN BONDS OF THE DELAWARE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY AND CERTAIN AUTHORITY FOR GUARANTEED INDUSTRIAL REVENUE BONDS; REVERTING AND REPROGRAMMING CERTAIN SURPLUS FUNDS OF THE STATE AND REPROGRAMMING CERTAIN FUNDS OF THE DELAWARE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY CREATING CERTAIN FUNDS OF THE STATE, APPROPRIATING CERTAIN GENERAL AND SPECIAL FUNDS OF THE STATE AND THE DELAWARE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; AUTHORIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES TO ALLOCATE STRIPPER WELL FUNDS TO CERTAIN ELIGIBLE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS AUTHORIZED IN THIS ACT; AMENDING CHAPTER 50, TITLE 29 OF THE DELAWARE CODE RELATING TO THE CREATION OF A DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVE FUND; AMENDING TITLE 29 OF THE DELAWARE CODE BY ADDING A NEW 34 RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMISSION ON NATURAL AREAS AND OPEN SPACES; AMENDING TITLE 29, CHAPTER 65 OF THE DELAWARE CODE, REGARDING THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION CAPITAL PROGRAM AUTHORIZATIONS AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEM, AMENDING TITLE 2, CHARTER 14 OF THE DELAWARE CODE RELATING TO THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DELAWARE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; AMENDING VOLUMES 65, 66 AND 62 OF THE LAWS OF DELAWARE RELATING TO NATIONAL GUARD PROJECTS AND SHORELINE STABILIZATION; AMENDING TITLE 29, CHAPTER 74 OF THE DELAWARE CODE REGARDING PAYMENT OF DEBT SERVICE AND CHAPTER 83 REGARDING NOTIFICATION OF BOND ISSUANCES; AMENDING CHAPTER 51, TITLE 30 OF THE DELAWARE CODE REGARDING MUNICIPAL STREET AID; AMENDING CHAPTER 69, TITLE 29 OF THE DELAWARE CODE RELATING TO BID PROCEDURES; AMENDING TITLE 30, CHAPTER 30 OF THE DELAWARE CODE RELATING TO THE DELAWARE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.
. Although some commentators have criticized the use of the plain meaning rule, the text of a statute or Constitution is always the primary essential source of the meaning. Alfieri v. Martelli, Del.Supr., 647 A.2d 52, 54, n. 1 (1994).
. Amicus curiae, the Delaware Trial Lawyers Association, concedes in its brief that the fact that some plaintiffs may not recover full compensation “is due to the extent of waiver of sovereign immunity under Title 18 Chapter 65 and not because of an arbitrary classification.”