Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:I believe that a conflict of interest existed when eodefendants whose statements implicated each other were represented by the same counsel, and I would grant appellant a new trial.
Initially the majority opinion obviously has misstated the standard by which we judge conflict-of-interest claims. The majority states that “counsel is effective (and thus no conflict) if there is a reasonable basis upon which counsel seeks to effectuate his client’s interest, Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A. 2d 349 (1967).” Although the majority has correctly set out the effective counsel rule established in Washington, its statement that because Washington standards have been met there is *402“thus no conflict” flies in the face of the conflict-of-interest rule this Court established in Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 176 A. 2d 641 (1962). Rather than looking to the attorney’s conduct of the defense under a “reasonable basis ... to effectuate his client’s interests” rule, Whitling commands a prophylactic rule under which, once a conflict is shown, “the mere existence of such a conflict vitiates the proceedings, even though no actual harm results. The potentiality that such harm may result, rather than that such harm did result, furnishes the appropriate criterion.” Id. at 48, 176 A. 2d at 643 (Emphasis in original).
Viewing this case under the proper standard of Whitling, I find that a conflict did exist, and thus believe a reversal is compelled. Here each codefendant incriminated the other. The majority blithely asserts that “the only difference in the present case is that the statements were not exculpatory but were incriminatory,” and thus concludes that Commonwealth ex rel. Gallagher v. Rundle, 423 Pa. 356, 223 A. 2d 736 (1966), controls. I believe that that difference is crucial. In Gallagher, each defendant supported the other’s statement that he was innocent; here each said the other was guilty. It matters not that each one told essentially the same story. Had appellant had his own counsel, he might have been advised to not testify at all, leaving counsel free to attack on cross-examination the testimony of codefendant which incriminated appellant.
It is clear to me that appellant’s attorney, faced with the prospect of defending appellant and his co-defendant, decided that his best strategy was to attempt to put the brunt of the blame on Riddle, hoping to get his clients off on a lesser charge. Appellant’s counsel succeeded, it would seem, and I mean in no way to criticize his handling of the case. The point, *403however, is that by representing both appellant and his codefendant, counsel was likely forced to conclude that he would be unable to obtain two acquittals, and that he would do better by getting each client half a loaf. I do not believe that appellant may be forced to settle for a defense that requires that he be convicted of some degree of crime. Perhaps if appellant had his own counsel, there would have been no change in his strategy. That is not the point. Once appellant was placed in the position where corepresentation required his defense strategy to be tied to that of codefendant, a conflict existed and WMtling thus demands a new trial.
It is of course irrelevant that appellant made no objection at trial to counsel’s strategy, or that the inculpatory testimony of each defendant was consistent with their trial plan. Counsel was handling this case, and it is hardly reasonable to expect appellant to have had sufficient legal or practical sophistication to start countermanding his attorney’s advice. The whole thrust of our theory of waiver has required advice of counsel, see Commonwealth v. Mumford, 430 Pa. 451, 243 A. 2d 440 (1968), and where, as here, the question concerns counsel, appellant can hardly have been expected to have been advised by counsel as to this issue. Furthermore, the very problem here is that the conflict of interest may compel counsel to adopt trial strategy that may not be consistent with appellant’s best interest. It can be no answer to then say that this problem is excused because the trial proceeded in a manner consistent with that strategy.
I also do not believe that appellant is barred by having requested the appointment of the same counsel as had been retained by his codefendant. Again, appellant can hardly be expected to be sophisticated enough to have appreciated the conflict of interest dif*404ficulties that were inherent in that choice. This hardly excuses the majority’s failure to give appellant a new trial, free from a conflict of interest of counsel.
At oral argument, it also was made clear that this case presented a problem under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968), decided on May 20, 1968, and made fully retroactive by Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 88 S. Ct. 1921 (1968). Although I feel that Bruton does not directly control this case, I believe that it is important in evaluating appellant’s conflict of interest claim.
Appellant here argues that his codefendant’s out-of-court statement which incriminated appellant should have been excluded under Bruton. In Bruton, however, contrary to the facts in this case, the codefendant did not take the stand to testify. It is quite clear from the opinion in Bruton that the Supreme Court’s concern was a deprivation of “petitioner’s right of cross-examination secured by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment.” 391 U.S. at 126, 88 S. Ct. at 1622. This was true because the codefendant “did not take the stand.” Id. at 128, 88 S. Ct. at 1623. Here appellant’s codefendant did take the stand. There was an opportunity for cross-examination, and thus Bruton on its facts does not directly control.
This however points up even more strongly the defect in appellant’s representation by the same counsel as represented codefendant. Although codefendant’s presence on the stand made him subject to cross-examination, it is obvious that since the counsel who would cross-examine him was also his own defense counsel, that cross-examination would in reality be of little aid to appellant. Although Bruton does not bar the introduction of codefendant’s statements where codefendant is available for cross-examination, its reasoning should bar the use of a procedure whereby appellant is realistically deprived of the opportunity for *405cross-examination which Bruton requires. This should establish once and for all that there is the type of conflict present in this case that is within our rule in WhitUng, and I believe that if the WhitUng rule did not encompass this situation, it would be unconstitutional under the radiations of Bruton.
For the foregoing reasons I dissent.
Mr. Justice Eagen joins in this dissenting opinion.