Paul Marsella prevailed against Bath Iron Works Corporation, his employer, in a proceeding before the Workers’ Compensation Commission in which he sought compensation for a back injury that occurred on July 13, 1987. Birmingham Fire Insurance Company, the insurance carrier, filed a timely notice of controversy on August 7, 1987.1 The Commission held an informal conference on October . 28, 1987, two months beyond the time within which it was required to be held by section 94-B of the Workers’ Compensation Act.2 The informal conference failed to resolve the controversy, and the case proceeded through the formal hearing process. The Commis*803sion issued an award of benefits to Marsel-la on October 14, 1988.
Marsella then moved for an award of attorney fees. The insurance carrier objected to a fee award for legal services rendered prior to one week after the informal conference was held on the ground that such an award was precluded by section 110(2) of the Act.3 The Commission awarded Marsella attorney fees of $1,616.80, an amount reduced by $671.39 “for services prior to [the] informal conference.” After the Commission denied Mar-sella’s motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law, he appealed to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division affirmed the Commission’s decision, ruling that section 110(2) “is clear that the employer is not responsible to pay attorneys fees for services rendered prior to one week after the informal conference, regardless of when the informal conference is held.”
On appeal to this court, Marsella requests that we revisit sections 94-B and 110(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Specifically, he asks us to construe section 110(2) to require the employer to pay the employee’s attorney fees for the period beginning one week after the informal conference was required to be held by section 94-B instead of one week after it was actually held. Because such an interpretation would contravene the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, we decline to do so.
We need not delve into legislative history or policy considerations to determine the meaning of section 110(2) as read in conjunction with section 94-B. “In construing a statute our duty is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature as evidenced by the language of the statute. If the meaning of the language is plain, we must interpret the statute to mean exactly what it says.” Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co., 411 A.2d 1017, 1020 (Me.1980). “Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for resort to rules of statutory interpretation to seek or impose another meaning.” Central Maine Power Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 405 A.2d 153, 159 (Me.1979).
The language of the two provisions is clear. Section 94-B provides: “Upon filing of a notice of controversy, ... the matter shall be referred to a commissioner, who shall schedule an informal conference to be held no later than 3 weeks from the date of that filing.” 39 M.R.S.A. § 94-B(l) (1989). Section 110(2) provides: “The employer may not be assessed costs of an attorney’s fee attributable to services rendered prior to one week after the informal conference under section 94-B ... unless a party adverse to the employee was so represented at that stage.” Id. § 110(2) (1989).
Although it might be expedient to add a judicial gloss to the statute and hold that a conference held beyond the statutory time frame does not constitute an “informal conference,” such a construction would leave employees completely without remedy in the future. An informal conference is a necessary prerequisite to a hearing on a petition for compensation. The plain language of the statute cannot be so easily avoided.
We earlier read these statutory sections according to their unambiguous meaning in Ayotte v. United Services, Inc., 567 A.2d 430 (Me.1989). There we said that “[s]ection 110(2) ... specifically exempts the employer from responsibility for the employee’s attorney fee prior to one week following an informal conference ... where ... no party adverse to the employee was actively represented by counsel during that period.” Id. at 434. We also said in Ay-*804otte that under section 94-B “ ‘the employee retains the right to secure legal counsel’ during the informal conference period, but if no adverse party is represented by counsel in that period the employee must retain counsel ‘at his own expense.’ ” Id. at 436 (quoting 39 M.R.S.A. § 94-B(3)).4
The fact that the Commission failed to hold an informal conference within three weeks after the filing of the notice of controversy does not make the statutory language less clear. Furthermore, reversing the Commission and the Appellate Division would be inconsistent with our duty to construe the statute in a neutral fashion.5 We assume that the Commission does not intentionally delay the scheduling of informal conferences. The proper remedy to such unforeseen administrative delay, if one is needed, is legislative and should not be provided by judicial fiat.
The entry is:
Decision affirmed.
McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN and CLIFFORD, JJ., concur.
. Under the "early pay” system adopted by the Maine Legislature in 1983, compensation for work-related incapacity generally becomes due and payable within fourteen days after the employer has notice of the claim. 39 M.R.S.A. § 51-B(3) (1989). The employer must then begin making compensation payments unless he files a notice of controversy with the Commission within that time. Id. § 51-B(7) (Supp. 1990). Once the employer has begun making payments, he may cease payments and file a notice of controversy within forty-four days after receiving notice of the claim. Id.
. Section 94-B provides in pertinent part:
1. Conference scheduled; waiver. Upon filing of a notice of controversy, and instead of proceeding by way of a petition, the matter shall be referred to a commissioner, who shall schedule an informal conference to be held no later than 3 weeks from the date of that filing....
3.Representation. In preparation for and at the conference, the commission shall assure that competent technical staff from the Office of Employee Assistants is available to provide advice and assistance to the employee.
If at this stage the employer or insurer elects to be represented by legal counsel, the employee is entitled to be similarly represented by legal counsel of his choice, with all reasonable attorney fees to be assessed against the employer. If no adverse party elects to be so represented, the employee retains the right to secure legal counsel at his own expense.
39 M.R.S.A. § 94-B (1989).
. Section 110(2) provides in pertinent part:
If an employee prevails in any proceeding involving a controversy under this Act, the commission or commissioner may assess the employer costs of a reasonable attorney’s fee....
The employer may not be assessed costs of an attorney’s fee attributable to services rendered prior to one week after the informal conference under section 94-B ... unless a party adverse to the employee was so represented at that stage.
39 M.R.S.A. § 110(2) (1989).
. Our reading of sections 94-B and 110(2) is consistent with our statement in Stickles v. United Parcel Service, 554 A.2d 1176, 1181 n. 3 (Me.1989), that "[a]n important purpose of the early pay system is to avoid lawyer involvement at this stage [prior to the informal conference].”
. We are no longer permitted to liberally construe the statute in favor of the injured employee. The Act now provides as follows:
In interpreting this Act, the commission shall construe it so as to ensure the efficient delivery of compensation to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers. All workers' compensation cases shall be decided on their merits and the rule of liberal construction shall not apply to those cases. Accordingly, this Act is not to be given a construction in favor of the employee, nor are the rights and interests of the employer to be favored over those of the employee. 39 M.R.S.A. § 94-A(3) (1989).