Walsh v. City of Philadelphia

*244NIX, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

Once again I must dissent from the majority’s misinterpretation of the Recreational Use Act, 68 Pa.C.S. § 477.1 et seq. (“RUA”). The majority here perpetuates the strained reasoning by which it exempted the defendant in Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary of St. Charles Borromeo, Inc., 510 Pa. 1, 27, 507 A.2d 1, (1986) (Nix, C.J., dissenting), from immunity. As I stated in Rivera, no basis exists in the RUA for an exclusion for improved land. The language of the statute expressly provides that “an owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangeroüs condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes.” 68 P.S. § 477-3. “Land” by definition includes the buildings and structures thereon. 68 P.S. § 477-2.

However, even accepting the conclusion by the majority in Rivera, the instant facts are clearly distinguishable. In Rivera, the swimming pool was enclosed and the Seminary controlled access to it by requiring advance notice and supervision by a priest or member of the Seminary. Rivera, supra, 510 Pa. at 12, 507 A.2d at 6. Conversely, the Guerin Recreational Center is open to the public without restriction. Certainly this is the type of land use the Act was designed to encourage. Any interpretation of the Act which, denies the City immunity under these circumstances serves no function other than to frustrate the purpose of the RUA, which is “to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability____” 68 P.S. § 477-1.

Moreover, the creation of a playground does not require the type of improvements contemplated by the Rivera court. Rather, it preserves “large, private land holdings for outdoor recreational use,” 1 Rivera, supra, 510 Pa. at 15, *245507 A.2d at 8, consistent with this Court’s interpretation of the Act. The minor adjustments which change land into a recreational facility are the kinds of “ancillary structures attached to open space lands made available for recreation” that the Rivera court deemed permissible under the Act. Id.

Accordingly, I would affirm the Commonwealth Court’s holding that the City is immune from suit.

McDERMOTT, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. The majority concedes, despite this statement by the court in Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 510 Pa. 1, 507 A.2d 1, that the Recreational Use Act, 68 P.S. § 477.1, et seq., makes no distinction between private or public ownership of land. See Commonwealth of *245Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources v. Auresto, 511 Pa. 73, 511 A.2d 815 (1986).