*76OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
The amended pleading of Elkins in the record before us on submission of this appeal was his third amended petition. Simultaneously with the filing of his motion for rehearing, Elkins filed his second motion for leave to file a supplemental transcript containing his first amended petition. Elkins contends that had his first amended petition been before us, the trial court’s order of dismissal as to the causes of action alleged in counts one and three of his third amended petition would have been reversed and remanded rather than affirmed. El-kins argues that, in view of the allegations in his first amended petition, the allegations in the third amended petition, which added the deceptive trade practice allegation to count one, could not deprive the county court at law of jurisdiction because the general rule, rather than the exception relied on in our original opinion, would be applicable; to wit, “where jurisdiction is once lawfully and properly acquired, no subsequent fact or event in the particular case serves to defeat the jurisdiction.” Isbell v. Kenyon-Warner Dredging Co., 113 Tex. 528, 261 S.W. 762 (Tex.Comm’n App. 1924, opinion adopted); Flynt v. Garcia, 587 S.W.2d 109 (Tex.1979) and Haginas v. Malbis Memorial Foundation, 163 Tex. 274, 354 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex.1962). We do not reach this issue because we deny Elkins’ second motion for leave to file the supplemental transcript. We also overrule Elkins’ motion for rehearing.
This appeal was submitted on October 19, 1982. Prior to that time, on March 25,1982, Elkins filed his initial motion for leave to file a supplemental transcript and tendered this same supplemental transcript containing his first amended petition. The sole reason given in support of the first motion was Elkins’ conclusions that “Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition is relevant to the facts and issues in controversy in this appeal, and it would serve the interests of justice, and would be of assistance to this Honorable Court to have such document included in the record by way of a supplemental transcript.” By order dated April 8, 1982, another panel of this court denied Elkins’ motion “without prejudice to show materiality of supplemental transcript.” Elkins, however, did nothing prior to submission to show this court the materiality of his first amended pleadings. Moreover, following oral argument, Elkins did not seek to bring his first amended petition to our attention. Only on rehearing does El-kins again urge the materiality of the supplemental transcript and seek to place his first amended petition before us.
We conclude that Elkins’ efforts to present this court with a sufficient record come too late. The burden is on the appellant to see, before submission of the cause, that a sufficient record is presented on appeal which preserves any error upon which he relies. Tex.R.Civ.P. 413; Irrigation Construction Co. v. Motheral Contractor’s Inc., 599 S.W.2d 336, 343 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ); Archer v. Storm Nursery, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1974, no writ). Although the Rules of Civil Procedure give us the discretion to allow supplementation of the record after submission, such discretion should not be exercised absent “unusual circumstances.” To do so would be contrary to the spirit and purposes of Rules 386, 413, 428 and 429 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and interfere with the orderly administration of justice. Irrigation Construction Co., supra, at 344; Archer, supra, at 85.
We conclude that Elkins has failed to show “unusual circumstances” and that to allow Elkins to supplement the record at this late date would interfere with the orderly administration of justice. In the present case our opinion made known to Elkins the materiality and importance of his first amended petition. It should have worked the other way around. Given our invitation, he should have made known to us the materiality and importance of his first amended petition. Much attorneys’ and appellant judges’ time and effort has been expended in deciding Elkins’ appeal on the record he left before us. Judicial econo*77my and efficient expenditure of attorneys’ time and effort is crucial to the administration of justice. We choose, therefore, to leave Elkins’ appeal in the posture he placed it and decide that appeal accordingly-
Elkins’ second motion for leave to file supplemental transcript is denied and El-kins’ motion for rehearing is overruled.