dissenting:
The issue presented is whether an order dismissing six out of forty-five paragraphs of appellant’s complaint is a final and immediately appealable order under Praisner v. Stocker, 313 Pa.Super. 332, 459 A.2d 1255 (1983). I dissent from the majority’s holding that this order is final and would hold that the order appealed from is interlocutory. Since the appeal must be quashed, I would not address the constitutional issue raised by appellant.
Appellant Gwendolyn Jenkins sued the Hospital of the Medical College of Pennsylvania and two doctors practicing at the Hospital, Dr. Grabowski and Dr. Barbo (“appellees”), in a three count complaint. Appellant avers that she received medical care relating to her pregnancy and the delivery of her child at the Hospital, that the medical care was negligently provided and that in treating appellant the Hospital and its doctors acted without appellant’s informed consent. More specifically, appellant contends that appellees should have performed diagnostic testing on appellant and that their failure to do so prevented them from detecting that appellant’s child was afflicted with Down’s Syn*632drome. Appellant also contends that appellees should not have performed a sterilization procedure on appellant immediately after the birth of the child when they knew that the child they had just delivered had Down’s Syndrome but appellant, who was under anesthesia, was not aware of her child’s condition.
Appellant’s complaint is inartfully drafted. Although it is divided into three counts, the allegations in each count repeat and overlap the allegations in the others. The first count, against the doctors only, contains a laundry list of allegations of negligence, some of which generally allege that the medical care provided to appellant was inadequate and some of which specifically relate to the contentions set forth above. The second count, against the doctors and the Hospital, incorporates the allegations in the prior count but characterizes them as breach of contract.1 The third count, against the Hospital only, also incorporates all of the allegations of the prior counts. It too contains a laundry list of negligence allegations relating to the generally inadequate medical care of appellant, the failure of the Hospital to train and supervise its doctors, and the failure of the Hospital to assure that appellant would receive proper diagnostic testing and would not suffer a sterilization procedure without her informed consent.
In all counts, appellant sought recovery for the same basic alleged losses. In count I, appellant alleged the following losses:
28. As a direct result of the injuries aforementioned and caused solely thereby, Plaintiff has suffered great physical and mental and emotional pain and will continue to suffer such pain and anguish for an indefinite time into the future, all to her great detriment and loss.
29. As a direct result of the aforementioned injuries, Plaintiff has suffered a complete sterilization, which has left her unable to bear any further child, all to her great detriment and loss.
*63330. As a further result of the aforesaid, Plaintiff has been unable in the past, and may be unable in the future, to attend to her usual duties, occupations, and avocations and has suffered a loss of earnings and future earning capacity, all to her great detriment and loss, financial and otherwise.
31. As a direct result of Defendants failing to perform the aforementioned diagnostic testing which resulted in Plaintiff delivering a child suffering from Down’s Syndrome, which is a permanent medical condition, Plaintiff has suffered severe economic loss and will continue to suffer tremendous economic costs in the raising of said child and in affording said child the appropriate medical treatment and care, as well as appropriate and necessary educational and other social services necessary for the child to have a life which is as normal as is possible under the circumstances.
32. As a direct result of the failure of Defendants to afford the appropriate diagnostic amniocentesis testing and availing Plaintiff of the opportunity to abort said pregnancy, Plaintiff has been unable to resume her prior employment opportunities and has suffered significant financial loss, all to her great detriment and loss, and will continue to do so for an indefinite time into the future in order to afford the appropriate treatment and care of Plaintiff’s child, Cory Jenkins, who requires constant care and attention of Plaintiff, Gwendolyn Jenkins, and will need said care for an indefinite time into the future.
33. As a further result of the aforesaid, Plaintiff has been required and will be required in the future to expend and become liable for substantial sums of money for medicines, and medical treatment and care for herself and in particular, Plaintiff has incurred and is liable for the costs of the aforesaid sterilization procedures and hospitalization costs attending to the delivery of her child,, Cory Jenkins, all of which would have been avoided if Plaintiff was timely made aware of the genetic abnormality of her child in time to abort said pregnancy.
*634In Count III almost all of the foregoing allegations are also present. Paragraphs 40-42 of Count III are identical to paragraphs 28-30 in Count I (quoted above). Paragraphs 43-45 of Count III are substantially the same as paragraphs 31-33 (quoted above).
In the order that is the subject of this appeal, the trial court dismissed paragraphs 31-33 of count I and paragraphs 43-45 of count III because in those paragraphs of each count appellant sought damages for what the court characterized as the “wrongful birth” of appellant’s child. The trial court found no right to recover for “wrongful birth” under Pennsylvania law. Since the separate counts of appellant’s complaint are overlapping and redundant, the court obviously concluded that the only manner in which it could dismiss the portion of appellant’s case that sought recovery for wrongful birth was to excise particular paragraphs. Thus, the court ordered that the paragraphs in which appellant sought to recover for the costs and expenses of having and raising her child be stricken.
Appellant argues that this order is final under the appeal-ability doctrine enunciated in Praisner, supra. Appellant argues that in dismissing these six paragraphs of the complaint, the trial court deprived appellant of the right to litigate a separate cause of action and that, under Praisner, an immediate appeal must lie from this dismissal. Appellees argue that since each of the counts at issue are overlapping, neither one clearly stating a separate cause of action but rather both containing the same allegations of wrongdoing and loss, there should be no appeal from the dismissal of certain paragraphs of each of those counts.
I see no need to enter into the difficult inquiry of how Praisner should properly be applied to the facts of this case. I have opined on the viability of Praisner at some length in my dissenting opinion in Trackers Raceway, Inc. v. Comstock, 400 Pa.Super. 432, 583 A.2d 1193 (1990) (en banc), which was argued as a companion to this case because it too presented a question of the appealability of an order dismissing fewer than all of the claims for relief *635against a particular defendant in a multi-count complaint. In Trackers, I concluded that the test for appealability announced in Praisner, which held that a partial dismissal order was final and appealable if it put the litigant out of court on a separate cause of action, was unworkable and had no firm basis in established finality principles or reason. Thus I concluded that the Praisner doctrine should no longer be applied and that orders dismissing fewer than all claims for relief against a particular defendant in a multicount complaint are interlocutory and not immediately appealable as of right.2
Applying this conclusion to this case, the disposition becomes clear. Appellant is still in court as to all three defendants. In fact, appellant retains the right to litigate each and every one of her allegations of wrongdoing as to each defendant. Since the order appealed from did not put appellant out of court as to all claims for relief against any particular defendant, I would hold that the appeal must be quashed.
. This count was dismissed by the trial court as being redundant. Appellant did not appeal the order dismissing count II.
. I need not reiterate the analysis that led me to the conclusion that Praisner should be overruled. Rather, I incorporate that analysis herein by reference to my dissenting opinion in Trackers.