dissenting. There was evidence at trial that a large, complete, and functioning methamphetamine lab was found in the basement of the house where appellant lived with the owner. When the police arrived, appellant told them that he lived there and admitted possessing a quantity of methamphetamine.
I disagree with the majority’s holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that appellant was in constructive possession of the methamphetamine lab, precursors, and other paraphernalia, and, in light of that conclusion, I also disagree with the decision to reduce the conviction for possession with intent to deliver. The State need not prove that the accused physically possessed the contraband in order to sustain his convictions if.the location of the contraband was such that it could be said to be under the dominion and control of the accused, i.e., constructively possessed. Walley v. State, 353 Ark. 586, 112 S.W.3d 349 (2003).1 Constructive possession can be implied when the contraband is in the joint control of the accused and another. Id. Joint occupancy, though, is not sufficient in itself to establish possession or joint possession. There must be some additional factor indicating the accused’s knowledge and control of the contraband and linking it to the accused. Id.
As was the case in Walley, supra, the issue here is whether the State presented the jury with additional evidence linking appellant to the methamphetamine lab. In Walley, the supreme court held that the obvious presence of an ongoing drug manufacturing process and chemical odor detectable from outside the residence were, by themselves, facts from which
the jury could reasonably conclude that Walley knew of the existence of the drugs and drug manufacturing paraphernalia in the kitchen of his residence. The jury did not have to believe Walley’s testimony that he did not notice the smell in the house, did not notice the stains in the kitchen, did not notice the black plastic on the windows, and did not know what was in the locked cabinets.
Id. at 597, 112 S.W.3d at 354. In the present case, we have similar evidence showing appellant’s knowledge, i.e., an extensive, currently-operating methamphetamine lab in appellant’s home, and a chemical odor that could be detected from the street.
When joint occupancy has been established, as it was here, all that is required to prove constructive possession is an additional factor linking the accused to the contraband. In. the present case, we have an additional factor linking appellant to the methamphetamine lab — appellant admittedly possessed methamphetamine when the police arrived to search his residence. I cannot agree that the jury was required to believe that the lock on the laboratory door was any more than a ruse on the part of the manufacturers, or that appellant’s admitted possession of methamphetamine — the end product of the manufacturing process — is not as compelling an additional factor as Walley’s purchase of materials that could have been used to manufacture methamphetamine but could equally well have been used for an aquarium.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority, in a footnote, attempts to distinguish Walley by asserting that there was no evidence of joint occupancy in that case. I suggest that it is odd to suggest that joint occupancy was not at issue in Walley; the supreme court devoted considerable attention to that issue, thoroughly discussed the law that is peculiarly applicable to it, and based its decision on its analysis of joint occupancy.