dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the second count of appellant Anthony D’Angelo’s conviction for bribery involving his acceptance of $50.00. However, I would conclude that the evidence, which consists primarily of Officer Dooley’s testimony, is sufficient to sustain the bribery conviction for accepting $300.00 as consideration for D’Angelo’s promise to violate his duties as a public servant. A reviewing court may not, as does the majority, revisit the trial court’s decision that Dooley’s testimony was credible, reject it and then determine that the remaining evidence is insufficient. Because Officer Dooley’s testimony provides sufficient evidence to convict D’Angelo, I must dissent.
At trial, the Commonwealth relied principally upon Dooley’s testimony. It was D’Angelo who introduced the transcripts of the taped conversations into evidence, apparently *420while Dooley was on the stand. D’Angelo’s defense was that the transcripts did not support Officer Dooley’s interpretation of the conversations. This defense, though plausible, failed; the factfinder found Dooley credible despite the transcript. Although the transcripts lacked coherence, partly because the tape was inaudible in places, they do not contradict Dooley’s testimony. The majority concludes that the parties’ words, as testified to by Dooley, when considered along with the transcripts, fail to compel an interpretation of intended illegality:
We have only Officer Dooley’s interpretation of the words, an interpretation which is not necessarily supported by a recitation of the words themselves as they appear in transcription, and which is actually belied by appellant’s actions.
Opinion by Montemuro, J. at 416-418.
The majority improperly substitutes its own credibility determination for that of the factfinder, in this case, the trial court. It is a basic tenet of our system of jurisprudence that issues of credibility are properly left to the trier of fact for resolution. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 512 Pa. 298, 308, 516 A.2d 689, 694 (1986). The finder of fact is entitled to give credence to witnesses’ testimony, and we must defer to the court’s determination of Dooley’s credibility and acceptance of his recollection of the meeting. The significant phrase in our standard of review is “all the evidence and all the reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which if believed the [factfinder] could properly have based his verdict.”
While a jury is not permitted to return a guilty verdict where the evidence offered is so unreliable or contradictory as to make any verdict based upon it pure conjecture, Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 60, 354 A.2d 545, 550 (1976); Commonwealth v. Maute, 336 Pa.Super. 394, 406, 485 A.2d 1138, 1144 (1984), this rule applies only to those cases in which the testimony is so patently unreliable that any decision based upon it would be pure conjecture. Commonwealth v. Upsher, 497 Pa. 621, 625, 444 A.2d 90, *42192 (1982). Contradictions by other witnesses and prior inconsistent statements affect the credibility of the witness and do not render testimony patently unreliable under the Farquharson standard. Id.
We have written, with regard to the function of credibility in determination of a verdict:
Mere evidence of a conflict in the prosecution’s evidence is not fatal to its case, ... because the Commonwealth is not bound by everything its witnesses say, and the jury can believe all, part, or none of the testimony (citation omitted). The applicable standard is whether the evidence, taken as a whole, would support a verdict. Commonwealth v. Farquharson, [467 Pa. 50, 60, 354 A.2d 545, 550 (1976)].
Maute, 336 Pa.Super. at 406, 485 A.2d at 1145. In other words, construing evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth does not mean merely that we are to look only to the Commonwealth’s evidence. Even if the Commonwealth’s evidence is contradictory and inconclusive in itself, we must look to the entire record to find enough evidence to constitute sufficiency; we grant great deference to the finder of fact. Of course, in doing this we disregard the evidence which does not support the verdict. That a reviewing court must look at the evidence taken as a whole if the Commonwealth’s evidence alone is insufficient to support the verdict rendered cannot mean what the majority implies, that a reviewing court may disregard the trial court’s credibility determinations and re-examine evidence on both sides of a credibility conflict.
The majority’s analysis, although set forth as a sufficiency determination, actually amounts to a re-examination of the weight of the evidence; it ultimately examines all the evidence, not just the evidence encompassed by our standard of review for sufficiency. Although D’Angelo abandoned the challenge to the weight of the evidence on appeal, I will respond to the majority’s discussion that essentially reviews the weight of the evidence.
*422In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we start with the presumption that the evidence was sufficient and examine whether, nevertheless, the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 501 Pa. 314, 461 A.2d 604 (1983), cert. denied, Vogel v. Pennsylvania, 465 U.S. 1104, 104 S.Ct. 1603, 80 L.Ed.2d 133 (1984); Commonwealth v. McLean, 396 Pa.Super. 23, 578 A.2d 4 (1990). Under this standard, assuming that the transcript of the taped conversations were totally inconclusive, we still have Officer Dooley’s testimony, which we may not discount once the factfinder accepts it as credible. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania wrote in Commonwealth v. Farquharson:
Traditionally under our system of jurisprudence, issues of credibility are left to the trier of fact for resolution. (Citations omitted). While there may be some legitimacy for a trial court, who has also observed the witnesses as they testified, to consider the weight of the evidence and to that extent review the jury’s determination of credibility, there is surely no justification for an appellate court, relying solely upon a cold record, to exercise such a function.
“On appellate review of a criminal conviction, we will not weigh the evidence and thereby substitute our judgment for that of the finder of fact. Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 261, 164 A.2d 98 (1960). To do so would require an assessment of the credibility of the testimony that is clearly not our function.”
Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. at 59-60, 354 A.2d at 550 (additional citations omitted).
The majority does not assert that Officer Dooley’s testimony, taken by itself, is insufficient. In its ensuing analysis of the sufficiency/weight of the evidence, the majority, having decided that Dooley’s testimony is not credible, completely disregards it and examines only the transcript. This a reviewing court may not do. Dooley’s testimony, which was proper evidence before the factfinder, contains *423sufficient evidence which, if believed, supports a conviction for bribery of a public official. Officer Dooley’s testimony constitutes the entire body of evidence in support of the guilty verdict. We may not disregard it.
Furthermore, as a witness, Officer Dooley was not testifying as a mere “interpreter” of a cold transcript. If he were, and if his testimony were challenged, it might not have been admissible. I reject the suggestion that Dooley’s testimony may have been improper for this reason, and for the reason that, as an undercover police officer, Dooley was “interested” in the outcome of the case. Dooley testified because he himself was a party to the conversation; not only did he hear the words spoken, but he was a participant in the exchange and was in a unique position to comment upon it. D’Angelo’s defense hinged entirely upon his effort to use the transcript to discredit Dooley’s testimony, a defense that failed.
Here follows the relevant testimony of Officer Dooley: Q. What if anything happened after you met Mr. D’Angelo there?
A. Mr. D’Angelo came back to the table that I was sitting at, introduced himself and, of course, I introduced myself and I explained to him who I was and what I needed from [the Bureau of Licenses and Inspections]. I said we were going to be—when I say “we”, my company—was going to invest quite a bit of money in the Center City area, preferably around the convention center, and I needed the cooperation of [the Bureau]. I didn’t want any problems, I was here to smooth over any possible problems that would arise from [the Bureau] during the purchasing and construction of the buildings. Q. What if anything did Mr. D’Angelo tell you?
A. ... And he said at that time, “Anything I could do for you, you know, I’ll do, anything that I can”—
Mr. D’Angelo said anything he could do, he would do for me. I said to him, I told him, “I shouldn’t be telling you *424this, but I had developed contacts in the Redevelopment Authority,” and he said good. I said this contact had given me selected locations in the Center City area and I was wondering if he might, if I gave him these locations, would he be able to check them out for me to see if there were any violations, and if there were violations in existence, could he have them removed, the sites themselves, [sic] would they be good investment sites, and so forth.
Q. Did Mr. D’Angelo tell you if he would check out these addresses for you?
A. Yes, he did. He said he would help me with ordinances, with zoning information and things of that nature.
Q. Was there any conversation that you had with Mr. D’Angelo, Detective Dooley, concerning use of other people in Mr. D’Angelo’s department?
A. Yes. He said if I supplied him with information, with addresses, he would be able to use his department personnel, building inspectors, to go down to those addresses and examine the properties. Of course these men would not know, Mr. D’Angelo said, what they were looking at; he would just tell them to go down and inspect the building and they’d come back with a report, and that report would be relayed to me.
Q. Did you at any time during the conversation give any money to Mr. D’Angelo, Detective Dooley?
A. Yes. Towards the end of the luncheon I explained to Mr. D’Angelo that I appreciated his assistance and promise of assistance in helping me, and I handed him a business card with three one hundred dollar bills, which he accepted and put in his pocket and said, “It’s a pleasure.” (emphasis added).
N.T., 7/14/87 at 21-25. With this testimony, the elements of a violation of § 4701 are before the factfinder: 1) that the individual is a public servant, that he solicited or agreed to accept money or another benefit, and that he agreed to *425violate a known legal duty or other exercise of discretion. Commonwealth v. Goldbard, 276 Pa.Super. 193, 197, 419 A.2d 161, 163 (1980).
The trial court as the finder of fact could reasonably have found from this testimony that an agreement was formed. Dooley’s testimony establishes that D’Angelo’s proposed performance of illegal acts was discussed openly and unequivocally, after which Dooley expressed his appreciation for what D’Angelo said he would do. D’Angelo accepted the $300.00 stating “It’s a pleasure.” The promise to utilize city employees to inspect sites on city time for the sole purpose of rendering private advice without the knowledge of the employees involved is a violation of a known legal duty or an abuse of his discretion. D’Angelo accepted $300.00 in consideration for that promise. Thus, the requisites of the bribery statute are satisfied. That D’Angelo had yet to perform any discretionary acts on Dooley’s behalf is of no consequence. Once an offer or agreement is made, the crime of bribery is complete. Commonwealth v. Ohle, 291 Pa.Super. 110, 435 A.2d 592 (1981).
Finally, the majority places undue reliance upon the Official Comment to § 4701 as authority for reversing D’Angelo’s conviction. While Official Comments can be used in some instances to assist in the application of statutes, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1939, I do not agree with the attempted application of the Comment in this case. The Comment recognizes and accepts the practice of tipping because it is so widespread. However, the practice is not condoned. Most important, I disagree with the majority that D’Angelo’s acceptance of the $300.00 was a tip. Tips normally are received subsequent to performing an act. Here D’Angelo had yet to perform any act necessary to warrant such an extravagant tip. This discrepancy is further magnified by the fact that D’Angelo was offered and accepted a $50.00 payment after spending two hours escorting Dooley around Philadelphia.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of sentence of the trial court with respect to D’Angelo’s convic*426tion for bribery in political matters for his acceptance of the $300.00 payment. I therefore dissent.
ROWLEY, WIEAND and BECK, JJ., join.