dissenting.
Because I believe the statute of limitations was tolled by Montgomery County’s failure to file the report required by Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.), Art. 101, § 26(b), I respectfully dissent. I have no quarrel with the analysis set forth in Part II of the majority opinion. It is Part I that troubles me.
To recapitulate the statutory scheme briefly, Article 101, § 38(b) requires an employer to report to the Commission an accidental injury “within [10] days after the receipt of notice of such accident, ... and injury resulting therefrom____” Section 26(b) requires a similar report by the employer “promptly upon obtaining knowledge or notice” that an employee is subject to “a disability from an occupational disease____” The accidental injury section expressly provides that the employee’s failure to report tolls “the limitations prescribed by this article____” Section 38(c). There is no parallel explicit tolling provision in § 26.1 What conclusions should be drawn from this apparent lack of statutory symmetry?
We have repeatedly stated “that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the actual intention of the legislature.” Lovellette v. City of Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 282, 465 A.2d 1141, 1147 (1983); see generally In re Kemmo N., 315 Md. 193, 195-196, 553 *487A.2d 1273, 1274 (1989). In particular, the Workmen’s Compensation Act is to be construed
as liberally in favor of injured employees as the Act’s provisions will permit so as to effectuate its benevolent purpose as remedial social legislation. Any uncertainty in the meaning of the statute should be resolved in favor of the claimant.
Lovellette, 297 Md. at 282, 465 A.2d at 1147; see also Howard Co. Ass’n, Retard. Cit. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210, 1213 (1980) (same).
As we have seen, § 26(b) declares that “it shall be the duty of the employer promptly upon obtaining knowledge” of a disability from an occupational disease, suffered by an employee, to report to the Commission. [Emphasis supplied]. “We have stated on numerous occasions that under the settled principles of statutory construction the word ‘shall’ is presumed to have a mandatory meaning.” State v. In re Patrick A., 312 Md. 482, 490, 540 A.2d 810, 813 (1988); see also, e.g., Carter v. Harris, 312 Md. 371, 377, 539 A.2d 1127, 1130 (1988); State v. One 1980 Harley Davidson, 303 Md. 154, 160, 492 A.2d 896, 899 (1985); State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356, on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334, 334, 403 A.2d 368, 369 (1979). Unless the legislative purpose suggests otherwise, “shall” “ ‘denotes an imperative obligation inconsistent with the exercise of discretion.’ ” In re Patrick A., 312 Md. at 490, 540 A.2d at 814 (quoting In re James S., 286 Md. 702, 709, 410 A.2d 586, 589 (1980), in turn quoting Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 321, 384 A.2d 709, 713 (1978)).
Section 26(b), then, imposes on the employer a duty to report if the statutory conditions are met, but unlike § 38, it provides no express sanction for nonperformance of the duty. The question becomes what sanctions, if any, should be applied in order to effect the legislative goal. In re Patrick A., 312 Md. at 490-493, 540 A.2d at 814-815; In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 102-107, 527 A.2d 35, 37-39 (1987); State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529, 533-536, 474 A.2d 898, 900-902 (1984). In the absence of an express sanction, the *488purpose of the statute is determinative of the sanction, if any, to be implied.
For example, in State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 90, 553 A.2d 672, 680-681 (1989), this Court reasoned that Maryland Rule 4-346(c)’s apparent mandate that a probation revocation hearing “shall be held before the sentencing judge, whenever practicable” conferred no enforceable rights on individual litigants. We held that violation of the rule did not carry a sanction which would inure to the benefit or detriment of a litigant. Id. See also, e.g., In re Dewayne H., 290 Md. 401, 407, 430 A.2d 76, 80 (1981) (failure to comply with Rule 915a’s requirement that a disposition hearing in a juvenile proceeding “shall be held no later than thirty days after the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing” does not require sanction of dismissal); Resetar v. State Bd. of Education, 284 Md. 537, 547-550, 399 A.2d 225, 230-232, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838, 100 S.Ct. 74, 62 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979) (failure to follow rule requiring county board of education to decide case within specific time period does not deprive board of power to act beyond that time period); Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 370, 46 A.2d 607, 611 (1946) (no sanction for circuit court’s failure to comply with requirement of Art. IV, § 23 of the Maryland Constitution that circuit court judges “shall render their decisions ... within two months after” argument or submission); McCall’s Ferry Co. v. Price, 108 Md. 96, 112-114, 69 A. 832, 838-839 (1908) (no sanction for Court of Appeals’ failure to comply with requirement of Art. IV, § 15 of the Maryland Constitution that decisions of this Court “shall be filed within three months after” argument or submission); Harvey v. State, 51 Md.App. 113, 120-121, 441 A.2d 1094, 1097-1098, cert. denied, 293 Md. 616 (1982) (release of defendant not proper sanction for failure to follow mandatory time requirements of former Art. 59, §§ 27 and 27A, regarding completion of a mental evaluation after defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity); and see Lewis v. State, 79 Md.App. 1, 17, 555 A.2d 509, 517, cert. denied, 316 Md. 549, 560 A.2d 1118 (1989) (dismissal of case *489is not appropriate sanction for violation of McLCode (1988 Cum.Supp.), Health-Gen. Art., § 12-110(c)(2), regarding completion of a mental evaluation of a defendant who has entered a plea of not criminally responsible).
It will be observed that in each of the above cases the duty in question was to be performed by a court or some other tribunal. Under these circumstances and in the absence of an express sanction, we have consistently indicated that “any sanction should not impact on one of the parties.” Harford County v. Edgewater, 316 Md. 389, 401, 558 A.2d 1219, 1225 (1989). That is largely because when a court or other tribunal is directed to perform some duty, the litigants ordinarily have no control over that action. In re Dewayne H, 290 Md. at 407, 430 A.2d at 80. It would, therefore, be unfair to penalize one of the litigants for the tribunal’s failure to perform the duty. Brodak v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 24-25, 447 A.2d 847, 854 (1982); In re James S., 286 Md. at 707-708, 410 A.2d at 588-589.
In the case before us, however, it is otherwise. Here, the duty is imposed on the employer; the employer has control over the filing of a § 26(b) report once the employer learns that one of its employees has suffered a disability due to an occupational disease. Under similar circumstances, we have attached sanctions to the nonperformance of a duty, even when no express sanction is provided.
Thus, in In re James S., when the State failed to submit a petition alleging the delinquency of the juvenile defendant within the period provided for by statute, we dismissed the petition, notwithstanding that no such penalty was in the provision. 286 Md. at 713, 410 A.2d at 591. Similarly, in United States Coin & Currency v. Dir., 279 Md. 185, 367 A.2d 1243 (1977), the petition of the Director of Finance of Baltimore City to secure forfeiture of cash obtained in a gambling raid which resulted in a conviction was dismissed as untimely. 279 Md. at 188, 367 A.2d at 1244. A statute provided that the petition to obtain cash seized in connection with illegal gambling “shall” be filed within 90 days from the date of conviction. The petition was filed 119 days after *490conviction. Noting that “shall” ordinarily is presumed mandatory, we dismissed the petition, concluding that the General Assembly intended that the procedure for obtaining seized contraband be strictly adhered to. Id. at 187-188, 367 A.2d at 1244-1245.
In Bright v. Unsat. C. & J. Fund Bd., 275 Md. 165, 338 A.2d 248 (1975), we held that a claimant seeking damages from the predecessor to the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund must comply with a provision requiring that notice “shall” be provided to the Fund of any action instituted to enforce a claim against the tortfeasor. 275 Md. at 169-170, 338 A.2d at 251. We held that failure to provide the notice resulted in the loss of the claimant’s right to collect from the Fund—that the notice was a condition precedent to collection. Id. Other decisions reached by this Court are consistent with this approach. See, e.g., In re Patrick A., supra (dismissal of delinquency petition because State failed to wait until intake procedures were completed by Juvenile Services Administration); State v. Hicks, supra (failure to comply with speedy trial rule results in dismissal of case); Johnson v. State, supra (failure to comply with rule requiring that prisoner be brought before a judicial officer within a specified time results in dismissal).
What sanction, if any, is appropriate to apply to an employer who fails to perform the duty imposed by § 26(b)? To answer that question, we first must look to the purpose of the reporting requirement. What is now § 26(b) (originally codified as § 32F) was enacted by Ch. 465, Laws of 1939. Chapter 465 embodied the initial adoption of Maryland’s workers’ compensation law relating to occupational diseases. See generally Shriver, The Maryland Occupational Disease Law, 4 Md.L.Rev. 133 (1940). In 1939, what is now § 38(b), the accidental injury reporting provision, had been part of the law for 25 years. See Ch. 800, Laws of 1914 (originally codified as § 37). While we have no documented clue to the purpose of the occupational disease reporting requirement, it is not unreasonable to assume *491that it was intended to serve the same purpose as the pre-existing accidental injury provision. See Brooks v. State, 314 Md. 585, 599-600, 552 A.2d 872, 879-880 (1989) (appropriate to consider relationship of statute to earlier legislation dealing with similar topic). We have identified the purpose of § 38(b). It “is to assure that the Commission receives information that the Legislature deems to be relevant and necessary.” Howard Co. Ass’n Retard. Cit. v. Walls, 288 Md. at 531, 418 A.2d at 1214. I believe that the legislature had in mind a similar purpose with respect to occupational disease reporting.
Prompt notice of potential claims relating to occupational diseases will assist the Commission and apprise it of information which may be otherwise difficult to obtain if not quickly gathered. Further, as the Court of Special Appeals pointed out, “the Commission may observe the industrial conduct, [and] be alert to emerging patterns of diseases,” McDonald, 77 Md.App. at 160, 549 A.2d at 769, and the Commission may take precautionary measures if it becomes aware of any potential health or safety threats not recognized by an employer. See also Art. 101, § 55 (regarding the Commission’s right to inspect and investigate premises of employment and duty to bring to the attention of employers any law or rule relating to work safety). Thus, the importance of the notice provided to the Commission by an employer is substantial and should not be lightly disregarded.2
*492Until 1957 the occupational disease and accidental injury reporting requirements remained very similar, and to neither one was attached an express sanction for failure to report. Chapter 814, Laws of 1957, changed this situation by adding the tolling provision that now appears as § 38(c). No similar provision was added to what is now § 26.
This does not mean, however, that the General Assembly made a deliberate choice that there should be no sanction if an employer improperly failed to file an occupational disease report. The accidental injury tolling provision was part of a package of legislation recommended in the Second Report of the Commission to Study Maryland’s Workmen’s Compensation Laws and the Operation of the State Industrial Accident Commission (1957). The Second Report does not explain in detail why the Study Commission thought it desirable to add to the law what is now § 38(c), but it does suggest why no similar recommendation was made with respect to occupational diseases. The Commission advised that, although it had intended otherwise, “it has been found to be impossible to make an objective report as to all facets of the [Workers’ Compensation] law.” Second Report at 1. And it expressly listed “Occupational Diseases” among the areas reserved for future study. Id. at 28. Consistent with that approach, the Second Report dealt chiefly with the structure and organization of the Commission, procedural matters, and various issues pertaining to accidental injuries. The occupational disease portions of Article 101 were not addressed by the Second Report.
In 1980 the Governor’s Study Commission on Workmen’s Compensation Coverage filed its report. That Study Commission was created in 1978 “to consider the problem of industrial health and the adequacy of Workmen’s Compensation coverage, and ... to report to the Governor ... with *493recommendations as to areas where legislation may be necessary.” Joint Resolution No. 5, Laws of 1978 [emphasis in original]. The Study Commission agreed “that the occupational disease provisions in Maryland’s workmen’s compensation law need[ed] review and revision.” Report of the Governor’s Study Commission on Workmen’s Compensation Coverage at 2 (1980). One of its recommendations was that a tolling provision, like that in § 38(c), be added to § 26 because “[limitations should not begin to run against a claimant ... who has given notice to his employer until the employer has submitted a report of the employee’s ... disability due to an occupational disease to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.” Id. at 16.
That and other Study Commission recommendations were embodied in Senate Bill 973 of 1980, a departmental bill sponsored by Senator McGuirk. Also introduced at the 1980 session was SB 396, sponsored by Senator Stone. Both bills dealt extensively with the occupational disease area of the law. Senate Bill 396, heavily amended, was enacted as Ch. 706, Laws of 1980. It did not contain (and in no form ever contained) a tolling provision for § 26. Senate Bill 973 was not enacted.
The available legislative history does not explain why SB 396 and not SB 973 was chosen as the vehicle for making changes in the occupational disease law. Nor does it contain any express statement as to why the § 26 tolling provision was not adopted.3 It may be that the General *494Assembly thought that the § 38(c) tolling applied to § 26 because of the similar purpose embodied within the two reporting provisions; that a judicially prescribed sanction would be applied under § 26; or that § 38(c)’s specific wording that “the limitations prescribed by this article shall not begin to run ... until such report shall have been furnished” made § 38(c) applicable to § 26 [emphasis supplied]. Under any of these assumptions, the legislature might have thought the addition of an express tolling provision to § 26 to be unnecessary.
It may also be, of course, that the 1980 General Assembly did not add the tolling provision to § 26 because the legislative body did not wish to impose any sanction for failure to file an occupational disease report. The failure of an amendment or a bill is “not an infallible indication of legislative intent,” but may be taken into account. NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 313 Md. 118, 125, 544 A.2d 764, 767 (1988); Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Spitz, 300 Md. 466, 478-480, 479 A.2d 363, 369-370 (1984); Cohen v. Goldstein, 58 Md.App. 699, 716-717, 474 A.2d 229, 237-238, cert. denied, 301 Md. 41, 481 A.2d 801 (1984).
In any event, the majority concedes that the “legislative history does not explicate why there is a tolling provision in accidental injury cases and none in occupational disease cases____” At 475, 564 A.2d at 802. It recognizes that rejection of “the departmental bill, containing a tolling provision, ... is not of particular significance____” Id. at 477, 564 A.2d at 803. Nor is it apparent that “the Legislature deliberately chose to extend the time for notice to an employer from thirty days to one year in lieu of a tolling provision[]” when it adopted SB 396 in 1980. Id. at 478, 564 A.2d at 803.
The majority attempts to bolster its reasoning by arguing that occupational disease is different from accidental injury because of the long period of time that may be involved in *495the manifestation of a disease. See, e.g., at 472-475, 564 A.2d at 801. Obviously, this is often true. But it is not always so, as this very case illustrates; the parties have stipulated “that as early as October, 1977, both claimant and Montgomery County ... had actual notice for Section 38(c) purposes that claimant’s heart attack was attributable to stress caused by his employment with Montgomery County____” In any event, however, the possibility of delay in recognizing the onset of an occupational disease would seem to make little difference with respect to the enforcement of a reporting requirement that demands no action by the employer until the employer is aware of disability caused by the disease. See note 3, supra.
The majority also asserts that its holding is supported by “the clear majority rule under which courts decline judicially to toll limitations based on an employer’s failure to report a work-related injury or occupational disease.” At 471, 564 A.2d at 800. I find that statement, as applied to this case, hyperbolic at the very least.
In Part I.D of its opinion, the majority discusses a number of cases that are supposed to support its notion of a vast national consensus in favor of the majority position. Only two of those many cases, however, involve statutory patterns like Maryland’s: that is, a situation in which there is an express tolling provision for failure to file an accidental injury report, but none for failure to file an occupational disease report. Almost all of the cases involve statutes with reporting requirements but no tolling provisions whatsoever.
The two cases that, I concede, give some backing to the majority position are Bainbridge v. Boise Cascade Plywood Mill, 111 Idaho 79, 721 P.2d 179 (1986), and Herod v. Mutual Chem. Co. of America, 115 N.J.L. 369, 180 A. 432 (1935). In the three-two decision in Bainbridge, the majority relied in part on the Idaho provision making only willful failure to file notice a tolling event; it found no willfulness. 111 Idaho at 82-83, 721 P.2d at 182-183.
*496Moreover, in neither Bainbridge nor Herod is there any discussion of the doctrine of implied sanctions for mandatory statutory language. As I have shown, this doctrine is alive and well in Maryland, and should be applied in this case to toll limitations as both Judge Raker and the Court of Special Appeals held.
In short, I am convinced that the employer reporting provisions of §§ 26(b) and 38(b) should be treated identically so far as sanctions are concerned. To do so advances their identical goals; to treat the two provisions differently produces a harsh and unfair result inconsistent with the objectives of the worker compensation law. I would affirm.
Judge ELDRIDGE has authorized me to say that he joins in this dissenting opinion.
. The statutory provisions are quoted in full in the majority opinion. At 467 n. 1, 469 n. 2, 564 A.2d at 798 n. 1, 799 n. 2.
. Montgomery County argues that by virtue of the adoption of the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Law by Ch. 59, Laws of 1973, the need to report occupational diseases to the Commission no longer exists. That statute vests substantial authority regarding safety and health in the workplace in the Division of Labor and Industry and requires record-keeping and reporting by employers, both with respect to accidental injuries and occupational diseases. See Md.Code (1985 Repl.Vol.), Art. 89, § 33. The fact remains, however, that Ch. 59 contains no express repeal of either § 26(b) or § 38(b) of Article 101, nor has the General Assembly seen fit to repeal those provisions since it adopted the Occupational Safety and Health Law. Repeals by implication are not favored. Kg., Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 61, 507 A.2d 172, 178 (1986); Management *492Personnel Serv. v. Sandefur, 300 Md. 332, 341, 478 A.2d 310, 314 (1984). It appears to us that the legislature intended to retain the Article 101 reporting requirements in addition to those imposed by Article 89.
. Montgomery County suggests that this may have been the result of testimony before the legislative committees indicating that occupational diseases may be difficult to detect, and their effects may not manifest themselves until long after exposure to whatever condition produces the disease. See Miller v. Western Electric Co., 310 Md. 173, 185, 528 A.2d 486, 492 (1987). It is argued that under these circumstances, it would be unreasonable to toll limitations until an employer filed a report. The argument is not persuasive. Section 26(b) does not require an employer to report until a disability has occurred to an employee, and until the employer has obtained “knowledge or notice thereof____” The occupational disease reporting requirement demands no more than the accidental injury reporting requirement: *494when an employer knows of disability caused by disease or injury, the employer must report it.