In re N.L. CA5

Filed 8/21/23 In re N.L. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re N.L. et al., Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN F085845
SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. Nos. JD142610-00,
Plaintiff and Respondent, JD142611-00)

v.
OPINION
T.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Kern County. Christie Canales
Norris, Judge.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Elizabeth M. Giesick, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and Snauffer, J.
 INTRODUCTION
J.M. (mother) and T.L. (father) are the parents of daughter N.L. (born
February 2016) and T.L.J. (born November 2018) (collectively, the children). Father
appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating his parental rights pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 He contends the Kern County
Department of Human Services (department) and the court failed to comply with the
inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA)
and related California law because ICWA notice was defective as it identified father by
the wrong last name.2 The department concedes error occurred and agrees to a limited
remand.
For the reasons discussed herein, we accept the department’s concession of ICWA
error. Consistent with our decisions in In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 (K.H.) and
In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123 (E.C.), we conclude “the error is prejudicial
because neither the [department] nor the court gathered information sufficient to ensure a
reliable finding that ICWA does not apply and remanding for an adequate inquiry in the
first instance is the only meaningful way to safeguard the rights at issue. ([In re] A.R.
[(2021)] 11 Cal.5th [234,] 252–254 [(A.R.)].) Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion, as set forth herein.” (K.H., at p. 591; accord, E.C., at
pp. 157–158.)

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

2.
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
On October 22, 2021, the department filed petitions on behalf of the children
pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). The petitions contained an “Indian Child
Inquiry Attachment” (ICWA-010(A)) for each child stating mother gave no reason to
believe the children were or could be Indian children. However, the day before the
petition was filed, mother was asked if she had Indian ancestry and she stated she heard
the family had “ ‘Indian in them,’ ” but could not provide further information.
On October 25, 2021, mother filed a “Parental Notification of Indian Status”
(ICWA-020) form stating she was or could be a member of, or eligible for membership in
a federally recognized Indian tribe, but wrote “unsure” in the line designated for the
tribe’s name. That same day the juvenile court held a detention hearing in which mother
was present. The court stated it received mother’s ICWA-020 form and conducted an
inquiry. Mother stated she believed she could have Indian ancestry. The court asked if
anyone in her family was enrolled or eligible for enrollment in a tribe and mother
responded, “I don’t think so honestly.” She heard she had Cherokee and Blackfoot
ancestry from maternal grandfather and maternal great-grandfather. She said maternal
grandfather was still alive and provided his name. She said she could try to get a hold of
him, but she did not speak to him much. She did not have his address or phone number
but said she could try to obtain it. The court directed her to gather the information and
provide it to her social worker. As far as maternal great-grandfather, she said she did not
speak to him at all. She said maternal grandmother might have information and provided
her name and phone number. The court told her to provide maternal grandmother’s
address to the social worker. She clarified she believed she had Cherokee ancestry
through her father’s side and Blackfoot ancestry through her mother’s side. The court

3 Because the sole issue on appeal concerns ICWA, we restrict our facts to those
bearing on that issue or helpful for clarity.

3.
reserved as to ICWA. The court found a prima facie case had been established and
ordered the children detained from mother.
Jurisdiction and Disposition
The jurisdiction report stated a paralegal was assigned to complete an ICWA
inquiry with mother. When the paralegal spoke to mother, she reported she did not know
anything about her possible Cherokee and Blackfoot ancestry and that the paralegal
would need to speak to maternal grandmother. She provided her name and phone
number. She also provided maternal grandfather’s name but did not have his contact
information. The paralegal then attempted to make telephone contact with maternal
grandmother, but was unsuccessful. She left a voicemail requesting a call back and sent a
text message stating the same.
On December 7, 2021, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing where father made his first appearance. The court conducted an
ICWA inquiry with father. It acknowledged receiving father’s ICWA-020 form in which
father reported he believed he had Indian ancestry with the Cherokee and Choctaw tribes.
He informed the court that his great-grandmother on his mother’s side (i.e., paternal
great-great-grandmother) told him “she was half Cherokee half Choctaw.” He provided
paternal grandmother and paternal great-great-grandmother’s names. However, paternal
great-great-grandmother had passed away. The court asked if paternal grandmother
would have more information and father reported she would not because she is an
alcoholic and there was no one else who would have “too much” of that information. He
said paternal cousin T.W. would have a little more information and provided her phone
number. He could not provide contact information for paternal grandmother because she
did not own a cell phone and was homeless. The court reserved making an ICWA
finding as to father. The court found the allegations in the petition true and continued the
disposition hearing.

4.
 In December 2021 and January 2022, the department’s paralegal contacted, or
attempted to make contact with, several family members to conduct ICWA inquiries,
including maternal grandmother, paternal grandfather, and paternal great-grandparents.
The paralegal was able to speak with maternal grandmother and paternal grandfather who
both provided familial information.
On January 11, 2022, the department sent “Notice of Child Custody Proceeding
for Indian Child” (ICWA-030) forms on behalf of the children to the Blackfeet,
Cherokee, and Choctaw tribes. The notices listed father’s name incorrectly by listing his
middle name as his last name. The department subsequently received responses from the
tribes stating the children were not enrolled members or eligible for membership.
On February 28, 2022, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing and found
there was no reason to believe or know the children were Indian children and, therefore,
ICWA did not apply. The court ordered the children detained, ordered the parents
participate in reunification services, and set a six-month status review hearing.
Six-Month Status Review
The status review report stated the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply, and
no new information had been provided. On September 28, 2022, at the six-month status
review hearing, the court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26
hearing.
Section 366.26
The section 366.26 report stated no new ICWA information had been received.
On January 26, 2023, the juvenile court terminated parental rights. Father subsequently
filed a timely notice of appeal.

5.
 DISCUSSION
I. ICWA
A. Legal Principles
“ ‘ICWA is a federal law giving Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state
court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation’
[citations], in furtherance of ‘federal policy “ ‘that, where possible, an Indian child should
remain in the Indian community’ ” ’ [citations]. ‘ICWA establishes minimum federal
standards, both procedural and substantive, governing the removal of Indian children
from their families’ [citations], and ‘[w]hen ICWA applies, the Indian tribe has a right to
intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding.’ ” (K.H., supra,
84 Cal.App.5th 566, 594, fn. omitted; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 138,
fn. omitted.)
“ ‘In 2006, California adopted various procedural and substantive provisions of
ICWA.’ [Citations.] The Legislature’s ‘primary objective … was to increase
compliance with ICWA. California Indian Legal Services (CILS), a proponent of the
bill, observed that courts and county agencies still had difficulty complying with ICWA
25 years after its enactment, and CILS believed codification of [ICWA’s] requirements
into state law would help alleviate the problem. [Citation.]’ ” (K.H., supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 595; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 138–139.)
“ ‘In 2016, new federal regulations were adopted concerning ICWA compliance.
[Citation.] Following the enactment of the federal regulations, California made
conforming amendments to its statutes, including portions of the Welfare and Institutions
Code related to ICWA notice and inquiry requirements. [Citations.] Those changes
became effective January 1, 2019 .…’ [Citation.] Subsequently, the Legislature
amended section 224.2, subdivision (e), to define ‘reason to believe,’ effective
September 18, 2020.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 595–596, fn. omitted; accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.)

6.
 1. Summary of Duties of Inquiry and Notice
“[W]hether a child is a member, or is eligible for membership, in a particular tribe
is a determination that rests exclusively with the tribe, and neither the [department] nor
the court plays any role in making that determination. [Citations.] ‘ “Because it typically
is not self-evident whether a child is an Indian child, both federal and state law mandate
certain inquiries to be made in each case.” ’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 596;
accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.)
“In California, section 224.2 ‘codifies and elaborates on ICWA’s requirements of
notice to a child’s parents or legal guardian, Indian custodian, and Indian tribe, and to the
[Bureau of Indian Affairs].’ ” (In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 204.) California
law imposes “an affirmative and continuing duty [on the court and the county welfare
department] to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under [s]ection 300 … may be
or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
“The [state law] duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not
limited to, asking the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any
information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “If a child is
placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to
[s]ection 306[,] … the county welfare department … has a duty to inquire whether that
child is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents,
legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may
be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Additionally, “[a]t the first appearance in court of each party, the
court shall ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or
has reason to know that the child is an Indian child. The court shall instruct the parties to
inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know
the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)

7.
 “If the initial inquiry provides ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian child is involved
in a proceeding—that is, if the court or social worker ‘has information suggesting that
either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe’—then the court or social worker ‘shall make further inquiry’ regarding
the child’s possible Indian status as soon as practicable.” (In re Ezequiel G. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 984, 999 (Ezequiel G.), citing § 224.2, subd. (e).) “Further inquiry
‘includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: [¶] (A) Interviewing the parents,
Indian custodian, and extended family members[;] [¶] (B) Contacting the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services[; and] [¶] (C) Contacting the
tribe or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to have information
regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.’ ” (Ezequiel G., at
p. 999.)
“If there is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child, the [department] shall
provide notice to the relevant tribes and agencies in accordance with section 224.3,
subdivision (a)(5).” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 999, citing § 224.2,
subd. (f).) “There is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child if any one of six statutory
criteria is met—i.e., if the court is advised that the child ‘is an Indian child,’ the child’s or
parent’s residence is on a reservation, the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court, or
either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating membership or
citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (Ezequiel G., at p. 999, citing § 224.2, subd. (d).)
County welfare departments “must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a
detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all
information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as evidence of how
and when this information was provided to the relevant tribes. Whenever new

8.
information is received, that information must be expeditiously provided to the tribes.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).)4
B. Standard of Review
“The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceeding rests on
two elemental determinations, ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the
evidence.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142–143.) First, “[t]he court must find there is ‘no
reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,’ which is dependent upon whether
any of the six circumstances set forth in subdivision (d) of section 224.2 apply.” (K.H., at
p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., at p. 143.) Second, “[t]he juvenile
court must … find a ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence .…’ ” (K.H.,
at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., at p. 143.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, “ ‘a reviewing court should “not reweigh
the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.”
[Citation.] The determinations should “be upheld if … supported by substantial
evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court
might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.” ’ [Citations.] The
standard recognizes that ‘[t]rial courts “generally are in a better position to evaluate and
weigh the evidence” than appellate courts’ [citation], and ‘an appellate court should
accept a trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence in the record’ [citation]. ‘[I]f a court holds an evidentiary hearing, it may make
credibility determinations, to which an appellate court would generally defer.’ ” (K.H.,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.)
The juvenile court’s finding on the second element, however, “is ultimately
discretionary because it requires the juvenile court to ‘engage in a delicate balancing of’

4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

9.
various factors in assessing whether the [department’s] inquiry was proper and adequate
within the context of ICWA and California law, and whether the [department] acted with
due diligence.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 640; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143; Ezequiel G., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1004–1005.) Therefore, we employ a hybrid standard and review
the court’s determination for substantial evidence and abuse of discretion. (K.H., at
p. 601; accord, E.C., at pp. 143–144; Ezequiel G., at pp. 1004–1005.)
“ ‘Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different [from review for substantial
evidence], focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard.
A court abuses its discretion only when “ ‘ “the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ”
[Citation.] But “ ‘ “[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial
court[.]” ’ ” [Citations.] [¶] While each standard here fits a distinct type of
determination under review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to
be very pronounced.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord, E.C., supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 143–144.)
“Review of the juvenile court’s findings under the foregoing standards is
deferential, but ‘ “an appellate court [nevertheless] exercises its independent judgment to
determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” ’ [Citations.] Where the material
facts are undisputed, courts have applied independent review to determine whether
ICWA’s requirements were satisfied.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.)

10.
 C. Analysis
1. Summary of ICWA Inquiry and Notice
In the present case, both the department and the juvenile court conducted ICWA
inquiries with mother and father. Mother claimed Indian ancestry with the Cherokee and
Blackfoot tribes, and father claimed ancestry with the Cherokee and Choctaw tribes. The
department then sought out extended family members whom mother and father had
provided contact information for to conduct inquiries with them. The department spoke
with maternal grandmother and paternal grandfather, who both provided familial
information. Thereafter, the department sent notice to the Blackfeet, Cherokee, and
Choctaw tribes. However, the notice incorrectly listed father’s name by identifying his
middle name as his last name. The tribes sent responses stating the children were not
Indian children. The court found ICWA did not apply. Father argues the defective notice
renders it meaningless and he was prejudiced as a result of the error. The department
concedes it conducted an inadequate inquiry.
In K.H. and E.C., we addressed ICWA error at the inquiry stage. There, we
explained our decision not to follow the approaches articulated by other appellate courts
for determining whether ICWA error requires reversal and concluded that the Supreme
Court’s decision in A.R. supplies the appropriate framework for assessing prejudice in
this context. (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 607–608, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at pp. 252–254; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.) Applying the standards
we articulated in K.H. and E.C., as we will discuss below, we agree with the parties and
conclude the department’s error is prejudicial and remand for the department to conduct a
proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry is necessary.

11.
 2. The Department and Juvenile Court Erred
As previously mentioned, “[i]f the court[ or the department] has reason to believe
that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information
to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child, the court [or the
department] shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child,
and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) “There is reason
to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the court, social
worker, or probation officer has information suggesting that either the parent of the child
or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” (Id.,
subd. (e)(1).)
Thereafter, “[i]f there is reason to know … that the child is an Indian child, the
party seeking foster care placement shall provide notice in accordance with
[section 224.3, subdivision (a)(5)].” (§ 224.2, subd. (f).) “If there is reason to know the
child is an Indian child, but the court does not have sufficient evidence to determine that
the child is or is not an Indian child, the court shall confirm, by way of a report,
declaration, or testimony included in the record that the [department] or other party used
due diligence to identify and work with all of the tribes of which there is reason to know
the child may be a member, or eligible for membership, to verify whether the child is in
fact a member or whether a biological parent is a member and the child is eligible for
membership.” (§ 224.2, subd. (g).) “Notices must include the identifying information for
the child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, to the extent known.
(§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).) As a best practice, they should also contain ‘all available
information about the child’s ancestors, especially the ones with the alleged Indian
heritage.’ ” (In re K.T. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 742.)
Here, the department’s notice was defective, a point the department does not
dispute. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply was not

12.
supported by substantial evidence, and its contrary conclusion was an abuse of discretion.
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
3. Prejudice
“Where, as here, the deficiency lies with [the department’s] duty of […] inquiry
and a juvenile court’s related finding of ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due
diligence’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), the error is one of state law ([In re] Benjamin M., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742). Under the California Constitution, ‘[n]o judgment shall be set
aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of
the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of
pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of
the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 606; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 151.)
“ ‘[T]o be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of discretion, it must
clearly appear the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of
justice’ [citations], and California law generally interprets its constitutional miscarriage
of justice requirement ‘as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it
reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but
for the error.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 606–607; accord, E.C., supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 151–152.)
However, in A.R., the Supreme Court “recognized that while we generally apply a
Watson[5] likelihood-of-success test to assess prejudice, a merits-based outcome-focused
test is not always appropriate because it cannot always adequately measure the relevant
harm. [Citation.] In other words, where the injury caused by the error is unrelated to an
outcome on the merits, tethering the showing of prejudice to such an outcome misplaces

5 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.

13.
the measure, at the expense of the rights the law in question was designed to protect.”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609, italics omitted.)
As we explained in K.H., “ ‘ICWA compliance presents a unique situation .…’ ”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 608.) “ICWA is not directed at reaching, or
protecting, a specific outcome on the merits.” (Id. at p. 609; accord, E.C., supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) Rather, “ ‘[t]he purpose of ICWA and related California
statutes is to provide notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it to determine whether the
child is an Indian child, and whether the tribe wishes to intervene in the proceedings’
[citation], and an adequate initial inquiry facilitates the information gathering upon which
the court’s ICWA determination will rest.” (K.H., at p. 608; accord, E.C., at pp. 152–
153.) Yet, “while the appealing party is usually a parent, parents do not bear the burden
of gathering information in compliance with ICWA [citations], and parents may raise the
claim of error for the first time on appeal.” (K.H., at p. 608; accord, E.C., at p. 153.)
Further, the ultimate determination whether a child is an Indian child rests with the tribe,
not with a parent, the department, or the juvenile court. (K.H., at p. 590; accord, E.C., at
pp. 139–140.) “[W]here the opportunity to gather the relevant information critical to
determining whether the child is or may be an Indian child is lost because there has not
been adequate inquiry and due diligence, reversal for correction is generally the only
effective safeguard.” (K.H., at p. 610, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 252–254;
accord, E.C., at p. 155.)
Accordingly, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is
conditionally reversed and the matter is remanded. The court is instructed to ensure the
department conducts “ ‘a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry under section 224.2,
subdivision[s] (b) [and (e)], and document its inquiry in the record in compliance with
rule 5.481(a)(5).’ ” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157, quoting K.H., supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 621.) “ ‘This should not be interpreted as requiring an exhaustive
search for and questioning of every living relative of [the children]’ but ‘[w]e leave that

14.
determination for the juvenile court in the first instance because it is better positioned to
evaluate the evidence provided by the [d]epartment. So long as the court ensures the
inquiry is reasonable and of sufficient reach to accomplish the legislative purpose
underlying ICWA and related California law, the court will have an adequate factual
foundation upon which to make its ICWA finding. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)’ ” (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed,
and the matter is remanded to the court with directions to order the department to comply
with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2, subdivisions (b)
and (e), and rule 5.481(a)(5). If, after determining that an adequate inquiry was made
consistent with the reasoning in this opinion, the court finds that ICWA applies, the court
shall vacate its existing orders and proceed in compliance with ICWA and related
California law. If the court instead finds that ICWA does not apply, its ICWA findings
shall be reinstated. In all other respects, the court’s orders are affirmed.

15.