filed a concurring opinion.
I concur in the majority opinion and write only to note my disagreement with the majority’s holding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury with language that tracks section 49.10 of the Texas Penal Code. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that language in a jury charge that follows the law as it is set out by the Texas Legislature shall not be deemed error on the part of the trial court.1 Because we are bound by the deci*752sions of the court of criminal appeals,2 I would hold that the trial court did not err by submitting an instruction on section 49.10 that tracks the language of the statute. I agree with the majority in all other respects.
. E.g., Martinez v. State, 924 S.W.2d 693, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (holding that ”[f]ollow-ing the law as it is set out by the Texas Legislature will not be deemed error on the part of a trial judge”); Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (holding that "[a] jury charge which tracks the language of a particular statute is a proper charge on the statutory issue”), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1068, 115 S.Ct. 1701, 131 L.Ed.2d 563 (1995); Duffy v. State, 567 S.W.2d 197, 204 (Tex.Crim.App.) (finding no error where charge tracked the language of the statute, despite appellant’s argument that the word “whether” made the charge ambiguous and *752the word “that” should have been substituted), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991, 99 S.Ct. 593, 58 L.Ed.2d 666 (1978).
. Wiley v. State, 112 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd).