Commonwealth v. Khorey

DEL SOLE, Judge,

dissenting:

I must respectfully dissent.

In the companion case to this one, Commonwealth v. Carsia, 341 Pa.Super. 232, 491 A.2d 237 (1985), this Court was presented with a situation where an attorney was charged with Bribery, Obstructing the Administration of the Law, etc., and where the entire investigation and prose*182cution was conducted by representatives of the Attorney General’s Office. Under a non-grand jury indictment, the charges were filed and Information signed by the Office of the Attorney General through the Executive Deputy Attorney General, Robert L. Keuch. The same office assumed full responsibility for the prosecution of the case as well. In Carsia, this Court noted the significance of the signature requirement for the filing of criminal informations. Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(a), “in counties in which the indicting grand jury has been abolished, after the defendant has been held for court, the Commonwealth either shall move to nolle presequi the charges or shall proceed by preparing an information and filing it with the Court of Common Pleas.” Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 225(b) mandates that: “The information shall be signed by the attorney for the Commonwealth and shall be valid and sufficient in law if it contains: 1) a caption showing that the prosecution is carried on in the name and by the authority of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” The reasoning underlying the requirement was drawn from Commonwealth v. Emanuel, 501 Pa. 581, 462 A.2d 653 (1983):

Basically, the interest sought to be protected by the signature requirement of Pa.R.Crim.P. 225 is the right of a citizen to be free from unjust or unduly oppressive government interference. In the context of filing of a criminal information, this interest is protected in part, by our requirement in Pa.R.Crim.P. 225 that the information be signed by the government official authorizing the filing of the information ... Thus, due process requires that when the Commonwealth elects to file a criminal information against an individual, a particular identifiable government official must be named on the information, that person must sign the information by manual or fascimile signature, and the signatory must be prepared to establish that the information meets all legal requirements should he be called upon to do that by a court of competent jurisdiction.

*183Id., 501 Pa. at 587-88, 462 A.2d at 656. This Court then determined that “[i]t is axiomatic that in establishing that the information meets all legal requirements the person signing that information must show that he is authorized to conduct the prosecution. Otherwise, the information cannot meet the requirement that the prosecution is carried on in the name of and by the authority of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.’ Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b)(1).” 341 Pa.Superior Ct. at 239, 491 A.2d at 240.

After a thorough analysis of the Commonwealth Attorney’s Act provision, 71 Pa.C.S. § 732-101, our Court concluded that the Attorney General had no authority to investigate or prosecute Carsia’s case and held “that the information signed by the Deputy Attorney General is defective on its face because it was signed by a person who had no authority to prosecute the case.” 341 Pa.Superior Ct. at 256-57, 491 A.2d at 250. The trial court’s dismissal of the information was affirmed.

Appellant was the police officer charged along with Car-sia. The information was brought in the identical manner as Carsia. No Grand Jury indictment took place. The Appellant filed a Motion to Quash the Information/Request for Habeas Corpus Relief in which he made the identical challenge to the Attorney General’s authority to investigate and prosecute under the Act. On the day of trial, however, Khorey withdrew the petition when offered a plea bargain by the Office of the Attorney General. The court accepted the plea and issued the judgment of sentence. After sentencing, Appellant sought to withdraw his plea, and the court denied the motion.

I would find that the criminal information filed against Khorey was facially defective and, therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept his plea.1

*184Appellant made several arguments as to why the acceptance of his plea constituted a manifest injustice and warranted the withdrawal of that plea after sentencing.2 The focus of my dissent is on Khorey’s argument that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept a plea based on invalid information and could not, therefore, impose sentence.

The majority and I agree with the rule that: “[A] plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses ...” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 485 Pa. 110, 114, 401 A.2d 318, 319 (1979). In my opinion, the majority incorrectly concludes tht the trial court had jurisdiction to accept Khorey’s plea. Judge Spaeth, in his concurring opinion, correctly notes that the jurisdiction here challenged does not rest on any limitations the Commonwealth Attorney’s act, supra, imposes on the courts to decide criminal cases. Instead, the issue becomes whether the court had the ability to accept a plea and impose sentence based on fatally defective criminal information. I believe that it does not.

Judge Spaeth’s concurrence analogizes this most unusual situation to that in Commonwealth v. Diaz, 235 Pa.Super. 352, 340 A.2d 559 (1975), rev’d, 477 Pa. 122, 383 A.2d 852 (1978). In Diaz, the defendant entered a guilty plea to Attempted Rape and simultaneously waived a Grand Jury indictment. The trial court ultimately determined that because there was no indictment or waiver prior to acceptance of the plea, subject matter jurisdiction did not attach and the acceptance of the guilty plea was unauthorized. After a new complaint was filed and defendant rearrested, the trial court vacated the first judgment of sentence. The defendant petitioned to Dismiss the complaint (which was denied), and then motioned to dismiss the indictment based on double jeopardy prohibitions. This court found that the *185invalid indictment deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction to accept the plea. Therefore, the second prosecution was not barred by Double Jeopardy. Our Supreme Court reversed, relying on the purpose of an indictment as giving formal notice of the charges, which was afforded the defendant in the case. The Court ruled that even the defective indictment gave the trial court jurisdiction to proceed.

The applicability of Diaz, II to this case is limited because of the nature of the grand jury indictment. Referring back to the signature requirement for criminal informations, Pa.R.Crim.P. 225, I rely on Commonwealth v. Belcher, 258 Pa.Super. 153, 392 A.2d 730 (1978), rev’d 452 Pa.Super. 784, 452 A.2d 784 (1982), where the issue was whether the District Attorney’s ommission of his signature on the information in a county where Grand Jury indictments had been abolished was a “mere formal defect which may be cured by amendment or does the absence of the signature render the purported information void ab initio. ” Id., 258 Pa.Superior Ct. at 155, 392 A.2d at 730. The Court in Belcher discussed the distinction between Bills of Indictment by Grand Jury and Bills of Information by Petit Jury signed by the District Attorney. We said:

A bill of indictment presented by a grand jury has indicia of reliability not [fjound [sic] in a bill of information. The grand jury has made an independent determination of the sufficiency of the evidence which need merely be ratified by the district attorney. In the case of a bill of information, however, it is the prosecutor alone who must decide whether to bring the defendant to trial. When the vehicle for initiating a criminal trial (i.e. the information) is unsigned, it is not at all apparent that a reasoned evaluation of the advisability of instituting a criminal trial has been made. The signature on the information is, therefore, a vital ingredient which guarantees the authenticity and reliability of the document. The requirement of R. 255(b) that the information be signed *186by the attorney for the Commonwealth must, as a result, be deemed mandatory rather than merely discretionary.

Id., 258 Pa.Superior Ct. at 155, 392 A.2d at 731. See also: Commonwealth v. Contakos, 492 Pa. 465, 470, 424 A.2d 1284, 1287 (1981). The Court determined that because of the policy considerations involved, the lack of a signature by the District Attorney rendered the information void: “Until a validly signed information is issued there is in reality no information to be quashed. In the instant case there were no charges properly before the court at the time the trial was to commence.” Id. 258 Pa.Super. at 155, 392 A.2d at 73.

Subsequent cases dealt with the issue of valid signature on informations and the void/voidable ramifications. In Commonwealth v. Veneri, 306 Pa.Super. 396, 452 A.2d 784 (1982), we reversed Belcher by ruling that the signature requirement in Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b) is directory and not mandatory and that lack of a signature causes the information to be voidable and curable and by amendment if raised in a pre-trial motion to quash. Pa.R.Crim.P. 306. The Court reasoned:

We have already concluded that a signed information is required as a memorial that there has in fact been a reasonable decision to proceed with charges by one who holds a public trust. A defendant has a right to demand that a public official who accuses him of a crime give tangible evidence of his prosecutorial decision; that is to require that the attorney for the Commonwealth or his designee sign the information and thereby assume responsibility for his discretionary and deliberative charging act. Such a demand can be reasonably made only prior to trial so that the Commonwealth can have an opportunity to rectify an unsigned information.

306 Pa.Super. 404-405, 452 A.2d at 788.

The problem with this reasoning when applied to Khorey is that under the Pa.R.Crim.P. 306 providing for amendment of criminal information there could be no proper amend*187ment of the information against Appellant. The entire information is defective.

The Court stated two reasons in Veneri for reversing Belcher:

First, it is clear that the absence of a signature does not prejudice the defendant in his preparation for trial. Secondly, it is unrealistic to assume that Pa.R.Crim.P. 255(b) intended the signature of the attorney for the Commonwealth to be the exclusive deliberative act which charged the defendant and that its absence annuls the validity or integrity of an otherwise untainted prosecution process. If the case had gone to a point where the information has lost any meaning, by proof at trial or the defendant stands convicted, to even require a signature at that stage would be not only meaningless but a mere technical vanity.

Id., 306 Pa.Superior Ct. at 405, 452 A.2d at 788. See also: Commonwealth v. March, 308 Pa.Super. 343, 454 A.2d 567 (1982) (mere rubber stamp facimile of the District Attorney’s signature does not satisfy Pa.R.Crim.P. 255(b)). Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 316 Pa.Super. 167, 174, 462 A.2d 847 (1983) (Assistant District Attorney signature on information satisfied, although not literally, the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 255(b)).

I disagree that our courts, in their efforts to interpret Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b) in such a way as to not “place form over substance”, Commonwealth v. Jenkins, Id., 316 Pa. Superior Ct. at 174, 462 A.2d at 850, intended to preclude Appellant from perfecting a remedy for the wrong that the Rule was intended to prevent. The Court’s reasons in Veneri are inapplicable to Khorey. Khorey’s case had not gone to “a point where the information has lost any meaning,”, 306 Pa.Superior Ct. at 405, 452 A.2d at 788. The court accepted Khorey’s plea based on totally ineffective information. The Attorney General’s Office never had the opportunity to support the charge.

I would find, based on the rationale behind the signature requirement of Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b), that Appellant has in*188deed shown a “manifest injustice” worthy of permitting withdrawal of his guilty plea. I would hold, in this limited and highly unusual case, that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Appellant by drawing a narrow exception to Veneri, where the information is so defective on its face as to be incurable by prompt amendment under Pa.R.Crim.P. 306 and where there was no opportunity to support the information by evidence at trial.

Therefore, I dissent.

. See: Commonwealth v. Chew, 338 Pa.Super. 472, 487 A.2d 1379 (1985). "Appellant argues that the information contained ‘defective and inaccurate information’ and should, therefore, have been quashed. There is no merit to this contention. The face of the information was not defective and to quash it would have been improper.” Id., 338 Pa.Superior Ct. at 480, 487 A.2d at 1383.

. The majority correctly states that "when considering a petition to withdraw a guilty plea submitted to a trial court after sentencing ... it is established that 'a showing of prejudice on the order of manifest injustice’ ... is required before withdrawal is properly justified.” Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 498 Pa. 342, 346, 446 A.2d 591, 593 (1981).