concurring:
I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to quash the information. I also agree that appellant had notice of the offense for which he was to be tried, for the information charged specifically that his retail theft was a third or subsequent offense. A remand to determine the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence at the preliminary hearing to show a felony of the third degree is unnecessary. The appellant, on appeal, has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at trial and at the sentencing hearing to support a judgment of sentence for retail theft, a felony of the third degree. Because the evidence produced in the trial court was sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a prima facie case at the preliminary hearing is now moot. See: Commonwealth v. Hess, 489 Pa. 580, 590, 414 A.2d 1043, 1048 (1980) (Roberts, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 345 Pa.Super. 211, 215, 497 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1985). See also: Commonwealth v. Krall, 452 Pa. 215, 219, 304 A.2d 488, 490 (1973). Therefore, I agree that the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.