dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Mitchell Miller sustained an injury while performing a necessary work-related task. He should receive workers’ compensation benefits.
To receive workers’ compensation benefits, there must be an “accident.” As the principal opinion notes, an “accident” requires proof of an “unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain” caused by a specific event at work. Section 287.020.2. Miller, an experienced highway worker, elected to walk “briskly” to facilitate the completion of ongoing highway repair work. There is no indication that Miller’s actions were anything other than an attempt to accomplish the task at hand diligently and efficiently. As a direct result of his efforts on behalf his employer, Miller suffered a sudden, unexpected injury. Although the amended definition of the term “accident” provides that an injury is not compensable “because work was a triggering or precipitating factor,” this language does nothing more than establish that an injury is not compensable solely because it is work-related. This language simply emphasizes the requirement that the worker must establish the existence of a specific and unexpected or unusual event that caused a work-related injury. Miller has established that there was an “accident.”
Having established that there was an “accident,” Miller also must establish that the accident resulted in a compensable “injury.” A compensable “injury” is “an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment” and is the “prevailing factor” in causing the medical condition or disability. Section 287.020.3. An injury is not deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment if the worker would have equally been exposed to the hazard or risk in normal non-employment life. Section 287.020.3(1).
The injury was sustained while performing a necessary work-related task. The medical testimony at the hearing established that the prevailing factor in Miller’s injury was the specific incident in which Miller injured his knee while working. The dispositive issue then becomes whether Miller’s performance of necessary, work-related duties is a risk to which he would have equally been exposed in normal non-employment life.
The phrase “equally exposed” in the statute does not mean “similar to” or “analogous.” The statute means what it says, and it says that the risks must be equal. The fact that Miller occasionally walks “briskly” while not at work does not necessarily mean that he is “equally exposed” to the risks of walking while not at work. The physical and mental fatigue caused by a hard day of physical work usually does not accompany a recreational walk around the neighborhood. Common experience teaches that one is far more likely to sustain injury when fatigued than when rested. There is no obvious equality between Miller’s physical labor while working on highways and a recreational walk around the neighborhood. Consequently, I would hold that the equal exposure rule of section 287.020.3(1) does not apply.
The commission’s decision should be reversed. Miller should receive workers’ compensation benefits.