dissenting.
Appellant was on parole from a seven year sentence for burglary and assault. Having accepted the benefits of parole, Appellant was required to follow the special instructions of his parole officer. Among other conditions, Appellant consented to visits at his home and place of employment, and consented to searches if there was reasonable belief that he had illegal drugs or contraband on his person or property. Under the circumstances of this case, the home visitation and entry was authorized as a condition of parole to which Appellant agreed. Appellant did not have the privacy expectation of an ordinary citizen.
On November 2, 2002, Appellant tested positive for marijuana, which was a violation of the conditions of his parole and which would have warranted his arrest. The officer had not seen Appellant since receiving the report of the positive drug test and had not previously visited his current address. Consequently, on November 6, 2000, the parole officer conducted a residence verification on Appellant. At the residence, the parole officer informed Appellant that she needed to confirm that Appellant actually lived there. Appellant did not object to the visit, but only informed the parole officer that his girlfriend was not clothed.
The parole officer was justified in entering the residence because verification of residence reasonably entailed entering the premises to observe indicia of Appellant’s living there for some time. The record does not reflect that Appellant objected to the visit of his parole officer, but only that he stated that his girlfriend was in a state of undress, which, other than Appellant’s statement, is not confirmed by the record.
Inside the residence, the parole officer noticed the strong smell of marijuana being or having been smoked. Detecting the odor of marijuana furnished a sufficient legal and factual basis for the parole officer to conduct a warrantless search.
Moreover, at the time the parole officer conducted the residence check of Appellant, she was aware that Appellant had, by using marijuana, violated a condition of his parole. That fact alone gave her reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, that: (a) Appellant was violating his conditions of parole; (b) that Appellant may have had contraband (marijuana) in his possession; and (c) that Appellant may have been smoking marijuana at his residence to avoid detection. These facts alone gave the parole officer the reasonable suspicion necessary to enter the residence and conduct a search.
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 8164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that a probation officer could constitutionally search a probationer’s home without a warrant so long as: (1) the search was pursuant to applicable state law; (2) the probationer was in the legal custody of the probation officer; (3) regulations permitted probation officers to search proba*756tioners’ homes without a warrant but with a supervisor’s approval; and (4) there were reasonable grounds to believe that contraband was present. If such factors were present, the search was reasonable. The Court recognized that “[a] state’s operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.” Id. at 873-74, 107 S.Ct. at 3168.
Since Appellant consented to warrant-less searches as a condition of parole, he should have reasonably expected a war-rantless search when he engaged in conduct that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion.
The decision in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001), holds that the government’s interest in preventing crime, combined with a diminished expectation of privacy, requires only reasonable suspicion to make a search of the premises reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. To determine the constitutionality of the search, the Court examined its reasonableness in light of the totality of the circumstances. The fact that the probationer agreed to a search as a condition of parole was a circumstance to be considered. Id. at 119— 120,122 S.Ct. at 591-592.
In recognizing that a probationer is more likely to commit a crime than a non-probationer, the Supreme Court determined that a state may justifiably focus on probationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary citizen:
The recidivism rate of probationers is significantly higher than the general crime rate. See U.S. Dept. Of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Felons on Probation, 1986-89, pp. 1, 6 (Feb. 1992) (reporting that 43% of 79,000 felons placed on probation in 17 states were rearrested for a felony within three years while still on probation); U.S. Dept, of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Violators in State Prison, 1991, p. 3 (Aug.1995) (stating that in 1991, 23% of state prisoners were probation violators). And probationers have even more of an incentive to conceal their criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence than the ordinary criminal because probationers are aware that they may be subject to supervision and face revocation of probation, and possible incarceration, in proceedings in which the trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, do not apply.
Id. at 120,122 S.Ct. at 592.
After holding an evidentiary hearing at which there was no testimony for or by Appellant, the circuit court denied the motion to suppress. The circuit court was correct, and I would affirm the conviction.
LAMBERT, C.J. and WINTERSHEIMER, J., join this dissent.