dissenting.
The deed of trust, from which the trustee derived his power of sale, expressly required notice of the foreclosure sale “as provided by the Texas Property Code.” I would hold the trustee’s notice insufficient for failing to comply with the statutory requirement that the notice “include a statement of the earliest time at which the sale will begin.” Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 51.002(b). The trustee’s failure to comply with section 51.002(b) of the Code renders the sale void in my view as a matter of law. See Houston First Am. Sav. v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex.1983); Slaughter v. Qualls, 139 Tex. 340, 162 S.W.2d 671, 674-75 (1942).
WHY THE NOTICE WAS INSUFFICIENT UNDER SECTION 51.002(b)
Before and after 1988 a statute has required that a trustee’s sale “be a public sale at auction held between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. of the first Tuesday of a month” and that “notice” of the sale be posted in three public places for three consecutive weeks before the sale. See Revised Statutes, 39th Leg., R.S., § 1, art. 3810, 1925 Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. 1, 1022-23 (since repealed and amended). Under this statute the posted notices sufficiently identified the time of the proposed sale merely by stating the sale would take place on a specified Tuesday between the authorized hours of ten o’clock a.m. and four o’clock p.m.; and “[i]t was not necessary that the trustee’s notice of sale specify an exact hour when the sale would be held.” Mabry v. Abbott, 471 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Effective January 1, 1976, written notice was required to be furnished the debtor in addition to the notices posted in three public places. See Act of June 21, 1975, 64th Leg. R.S., ch. 723, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 2354 (Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3810, since repealed and codified at Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 51.002). These provisions were incorporated without substantial change in the Texas Property Code. See Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 51.002(a), (b).
The Code was amended, effective January 1, 1988, however, by the addition of two new requirements: The first pertained to the contents of the notice of the proposed sale; thenceforth the trustee’s notice “must include *729a statement of the earliest time at which the sale will begin.” The second requirement pertained to the trustee’s conduct of the sale between the hours of ten o’clock and four o’clock p.m.: thenceforth “[t]he sale must begin at the time stated in the notice of sale or not later than three hours after that time.” Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 51.002(b), (c). The controlling issue before us is whether the trustee’s notice complied with the first requirement.
Section 51.002(b) comes to us with a presumption: the legislature intended that section 51.002(b) change the trustee’s existing legal obligation with regard to the contents of his notice of sale, a presumption that may be overcome only by persuasive considerations explaining why the legislature did not intend such a change. See American Sur. Co. of New York v. Axtell, 120 Tex. 166, 36 S.W.2d 715, 719 (1931); 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.30 (5th ed.1993). Unless such persuasive considerations are forthcoming, the presumption stands that the contents of the notice validated in Mabry v. Abbott would no longer suffice. Specifically, after January 1, 1988, the trustee must include in his notice of sale “a statement of the earliest time at which the sale will begin;” and under the requisite presumption his notice will no longer be sufficient (as it was in Mabry) if it states only that the property will be sold between the legally authorized hours of ten o’clock a.m. and four o’clock p.m. No persuasive considerations have been offered to explain why the legislature did not intend this change in the trustee’s legal obligations respecting his notice of sale.
The trustee’s notice in the present ease stated only that he intended to sell the property “between the hours of ten o’clock a.m. and four o’clock p.m. on the first Tuesday in January next.” The notice contains no express “statement of the earliest time at which the sale will begin,” in compliance with section 51.002(b). Shelton contends, however, that the trustee’s notice complied with section 51.002(b) because the notice did state “the earliest time at which the sale will begin.” He reasons as follows: By stating that the sale would be held between the authorized hours of ten o’clock a.m. and four o’clock p.m., the notice implied that the earliest time the sale would begin was ten o’clock a.m.
I find Shelton’s theory the opposite of persuasive. He asks us to believe the trustee actually had the idea to sell the property at ten o’clock a.m. or within three hours of that time, as section 51.002(c) required; but the trustee consciously decided not to say as much in his notice. Being thrifty in his language, the trustee wished it to be implied that the earliest time the sale would begin was ten o’clock a.m. — an implication he intended the reader to draw from the trustee’s statement that he would sell the property “between the hours of ten o’clock a.m. and four o’clock p.m.” I take an opposite view. It is obvious to me that the trustee never composed his notice with the idea that his words implied what Shelton now attributes to them. The trustee’s notice states nothing more than what the law has required in trustees’ notices since 1889: a statement that the property would be sold during the legally authori2ied period between ten o’clock a.m. and four o’clock p.m. More was required by section 51.002(b) if the statute means anything at all. Shelton’s theory originated in the press of litigation, not in the trustee’s mind when he prepared his notice of sale. The theory is no more than a device to retrieve the trustee’s chestnuts from the fire after he patently failed to comply with what section 51.002 so plainly required.
On a more prosaic ground, Shelton’s theory is impermissible. The trustee stated in his notice that he would sell the property “between the hours of ten o’clock a.m. and four o’clock p.m.” (emphasis added). Legal and ordinary usage correspond as to the meaning of the preposition “between.” It implies that the sale “will begin,” in the words of the statute, at some unspecified point in the interval between ten o’clock a.m. and four o’clock p.m. That is the very meaning of the word “between.” Indeed, the word “between” excludes any implication that the sale might begin at ten o’clock a.m. See “between,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 209 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1986) (“Between” refers to the time interval that separates); Black’s Law Dictionary 621 *730(6th ed. 1990) (“Between” excludes each extremity unless expressly included); cf. Shelton v. Jackson, 20 Tex.Civ.App. 443, 49 S.W. 415, 416 (Fort Worth 1899, writ ref'd) (“Between” excludes first and last day unless expressly included).
More importantly, Shelton’s theory nullifies the effect and purpose of the January 1, 1988 amendment. The new requirement means absolutely nothing if we hold, as the majority do, that a bare statement of the legally permissible hours of sale always implies as a matter of law that the sale will begin at ten o’clock a.m. — the earliest possible legal hour. Nothing new has been required of the trustee by that reasoning: the old required statement satisfies as a matter of law the new statement required by the amendment of section 51.002(b). That amendment makes no change at all in the trustee’s legal obligations touching the contents of his notice; the amendment is nothing more than an ornament on the statute books. I cannot accept that the legislature intended as much.
THE MAJORITY VIEW
The appeal puts in issue a very important question of statutory construction that will govern in all instances where a trustee purports to exercise a power of sale under a deed of trust that requires compliance with the provisions of the Texas Property Code. Our opinion appears to be the first construing section 51.002(b). Those affected should have, it seems to me, a clear-cut exposition of what the statute means and what is necessary to satisfy it, if it requires anything at all of a trustee.
Section 51.002(b) of the Code, added by the 1988 amendment, declares that the trustee’s notice “must include a statement of the earliest time at which the sale will begin.” (Emphasis added.) I find in the majority discussion two contrary themes regarding the statute. The first is that section 51.002(b) is directory and not mandatory, as indicated by the majority’s reasoning that “[a] cautious trustee might” wish to comply literally with what the section facially requires, but no adverse legal consequences follow from omitting “a statement of the earliest time at which the sale will begin.” The majority have not stated why they find section 51.002(b) merely directory and not mandatory. The ordinary meaning of the word “must” is mandatory in effect and should be construed accordingly unless a contrary construction is necessary to effectuate the legislative purpose. Inwood North Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Meier, 625 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). I believe section 51.002(b) is patently mandatory. If I am right, then the majority’s decision violates the basic rule of statutory construction that we must give effect to every part of a statute if reasonably possible and we may not adopt a construction that will render any part of the statute inoperative, superfluous, or without legal effect. See Ex parte Pruitt, 551 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex.1977); Perkins v. State, 367 S.W.2d 140, 146 (Tex.1963); Spence v. Fenchler, 107 Tex. 443, 180 S.W. 597, 601 (1915); 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06 (5th ed.1993). If I am wrong, then we should state plainly the legislative purpose that requires a construction that section 51.002(b) is merely directory notwithstanding the meaning of the word “must” in ordinary usage.
The second theme in the majority opinion apparently assumes that section 51.002(b) is mandatory but the trustee’s notice did include the statement required by that statute. In this connection, the majority adopt Shelton’s theory: by stating the sale would take place between ten o’clock a.m. and four o’clock p.m., the trustee impliedly stated that ten o’clock a.m. was “the earliest time at which the sale will begin.” I have given above my reasons for rejecting the implication and the theory that it satisfies section 51.002(b). I should add that it is immaterial in my view that the sale actually took place within three hours of ten o’clock a.m. If the trustee’s notice was insufficient under section 51.002(b), for failing to include an express statement of “the earliest time at which the sale will begin,” then the sale was void ab initio.1
*731I should also add that I do not understand the majority’s concentration on Code section 51.002(e) and their statement that the trustee’s sale satisfied the purpose of section 51.002(b) by selling the property within the three-hour “window” required by section 51.002(c). The majority’s rationale depends on the statutory premise: that the trustee’s notice actually contained a statement of “the earliest time at which the sale will begin,” the starting time of the three-hour “window.” Thus one must return inevitably to the controlling issue of whether the notice did contain such a statement. I believe it did not for the reasons given previously.
I confess that I have interpreted “literally,” as the majority contend, the provisions of section 51.002(b). The language of that statute, standing alone and in context, is easy to understand and free of ambiguity. The majority have not suggested, and I cannot imagine, how the literal meaning of section 51.002(b) leads to absurd or other consequences destructive of the legislature’s manifest intention and purpose in its enactment of section 51.002(b) — a purpose of requiring more specific notice of when the sale might begin within the ten o’clock a.m. to four o’clock p.m. period legally authorized for such sales. We may not speculate or assume the legislature did not intend what it stated so plainly in section 51.002(b). It is our duty in such circumstances to adopt and enforce the literal meaning. See McKinney v. Blankenship, 154 Tex. 632, 282 S.W.2d 691, 698 (1955); 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.07 (1991).
I respectfully dissent.
. A trustee has no power to sell the debtor's property except in strict compliance with the *731deed of trust. See Houston First Am. Sav. v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 769 (Tex.1983); Slaughter v. Qualls, 139 Tex. 340, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (1942) (where trustee fails to comply strictly with terms of deed of trust, foreclosure sale is void). Thus, it has long been said that "A purchaser under a power [of trust] purchases at his peril....” Bowman v. Oakley, 212 S.W. 549, 552 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1919, writ ref'd), cited with approval in Slaughter v. Qualls, 162 S.W.2d at 675.