The offense is procuring; the punishment, 2 months in jail and a fine of $100.00.
Officers Woodall and Turrigiano of the vice squad of the Dallas city police testified that on the night in question, while-dressed in civilian clothes, they went to the motel where appellant was employed as a porter and that Officer Turrigiano had a conversation with the appellant in the office. Turrigiano told the appellant that he was from San Antonio, and we quote from his testimony as follows:
“Well, to the best of my knowledge, I asked him if he had a girl available, one or two. He said he didn’t know, then after some other conversation which I don’t recall right now — he finally agreed to get us a girl.”
Following this, a woman presented herself at a cabin in which the officer was waiting and discussed the price she charged for various forms of sexual intercourse, whereupon she was arrested. The appellant was then found and arrested.
The appellant, testifying in his own behalf, stated that before going to work at the motel four days before the offense herein charged he had worked as a porter at Merchants Delicatessen *626and that during those four days of employment at the motel no one had approached him in an effort to get him to secure women for illicit purposes. He stated that when the officers arrived at the motel on the night in question he told Officer Turrigiano that he had no girls and didn’t know any. He testified further that the officer gave him fifty cents and suggested that he call some porters at other hotels and find out from them where to get a girl; that he did so and, after calling several hotels, he finally reached his friend Washington, who worked at the St. George, and told him that he had two men in a certain numbered cabin at his motel who wanted a date. He stated that he did not know the girl or talk to her over the telephone and did not see her when she got to the motel until after she was arrested. He testified that he quit his job at the motel following his arrest and had not followed that line of employment since.
The sole question presented for review is the failure of the trial court to charge on the defense of entrapment.
Recently, in Brown v. State, (page 85 this volume), 282 S.W. 2d 224, we held that the testimony of Brown did not raise the issue of entrapment. In that case, Brown testified that he “called Joyce from a list of girls’ phone numbers which he had.” His defense was that he was taking orders from an officer of the law when he called the prostitute.
But do we have such a case here? We think not.
In Peery, v. State, 138 Tex. Cr. R. 155, 134 S. W. 2d 283, 285, we said:
“The word ‘entrapment’ has been defined legally as ‘the seduction or improper inducement to commit a crime, and not the testing by trap, trickiness, or deceit of one suspected.’ U. S. v. Wray, D.C., 8F. 2d 429. Mr. Webster defines the word ‘entrap’ as ‘to catch as in a trap by artifice.’ The ‘entrapment’ as used in a legal sense carries with it the presumption that the officer or agent manufactures the offense and then incites accused to commit the offense for the purpose of prosecution.”
Entrapment has also been defined as “ ‘the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him for the mere purpose of instituting criminal prosecution against him.’ ” State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A. 2d 219, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1206; Sorrells v. U. S., 287 U. S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. ed. 413, 423, 86 A. L. R. 249; U. S. v. Wray, D. C., 8 F. 2d 429, 430.
*627It is the general rule that where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused the fact that the officers furnish the opportunity for or to aid the accused in the commission of a crime constitutes no defense to such a prosecution. Stevens v. State, 133 Tex. Cr. R. 333, 110 S. W. 2d 906; Sorrels v. U. S. supra; State v. Marquardt, supra; 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, sec. 45, p. 99. However, if the criminal design originates in the mind of the officer and he induces a person to commit a crime which he would not otherwise have committed except for such inducement, this is entrapment, and in law may constitute a. defense to such crime. Sorrells v. U. S., supra; State v. Marquardt, supra; Butts v. U. S., 8 Cir., 273 F. 35, 18 A. L. R. 143; O’Brien v. U. S., 7 Cir., 51 F. 2d 674; Morei v. U. S., 6 Cir., 127 F. 2d 827; 9 Texas Law Review 276; 41 Yale Law Journal 1249; 15 Am. Juris. 25; 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, sec. 45, p. 99.
Where the evidence raises an issue as to whether the intent to commit a particular crime originated in the accused’s mind or in the mind of the officer and whether the accused was induced to act in a manner in which he would not otherwise have except for such inducement, then the question of entrapment is one of fact and should be submitted to the jury. Sorrells v. U. S., supra; State v. Marquardt, supra; People v. Kozakis, 102 Cal. App. 662, 228 P. 2d 58; People v. Gallagher, 107 Cal. App. 425 290 P. 504; United States v. Sawyer, 3 Cir., 210 F. 2d 169. According to the appellant’s testimony, he was not in the business of procuring, knew no prostitutes, and the arresting officers were the first persons to mention the subject to him. If this were true, then the officers were not by artifice catching the appellant in his established business but by their inducement caused him to commit a criminal act which he would not have committed except for such inducement.
We have concluded that the testimony of the appellant raised the issue of entrapment which should have been submitted to th jury under appropriate instructions.
Upon another trial, the state will no doubt file a new information so that it will follow the wording of the complaint.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.