DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge PELLEGRINI.At issue before this court is which factors should be used in determining whether the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense so as to make it unconstitutional under The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which provides that “[ejxcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
In a previous decision, Commonwealth v. Real Property & Improvements Commonly Known as 5444 Spruce Street, 574 Pa. 423, 832 A.2d 396 (2003), our Supreme Court explained the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Bajakajian 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998), to determine whether a fine was excessive under The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
[BJajakajian, however, requires that in cases where a punitive forfeiture is involved, the court “compare the amount of the forfeiture to the gravity of the defendant’s offense. If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense, it is unconstitutional.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336-37, 118 S.Ct. 2028.
The Court enumerated factors by which a court may measure the gravity of the offense, each of which is limited to the conduct of the defendant: the penalty imposed as compared to the maximum penalty available; whether the violation was isolated or part of a pattern of misbehavior; and the harm resulting from the crime charged. Id. at 338-39, 118 S.Ct. 2028.(FN7).
Spruce Street, 832 A.2d at 402.
Spruce Street then reiterated that to determine whether a forfeiture constituted an excessive fine under the Eight Amendment,1 which protections are co-extensive with the Eighth Amendment, that a comparison of the value of the item forfeited must be measured against the “gravity of the offense.” If the amount is grossly disproportional to the “gravity of the offense,” then it is unconstitutional. The method of determining the gravity of the offense is what is at issue in this case.
In Spruce Street, at footnote seven, our Supreme Court listed the various other methods that other courts have used to determine the “gravity of the offense” as follows:
Three jurisdictions have applied a multifaceted measuring of the property forfeited “to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314. See e.g. United States v. 3814 NW Thurman Street, Portland, Or., A Tract of Real Property, 164 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.1999) (considering the culpability of the offender, other penalties and the extent of the harm caused); Wilson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 656 N.W.2d 547, 555 (Minn.2003) (same); United States v. Wagoner County Real Estate, 278 F.3d 1091, 1101 (10th Cir.2002) (considering the benefit to the defendant, the value of the forfeiture and the connection to the crime).
*42Other jurisdictions compare the value of the property to a subjective estimation of the gravity of the offense. See e.g. Ex parte Kelley, 766 So.2d 837, 840 (Ala.1999) (forfeiting a $30,000 Pontiac Grand Prix excessive under the Bajakajian standard when four tablets of the controlled substance aminorex and 6.2 grams of marijuana had been found in the automobile); State ex rel. Utah Air Quality Bd. v. Truman Mortensen Family Trust, 8 P.3d 266, 274 (Utah 2000) (fine of $23,000 not grossly disproportionate to violations of air quality regulations regarding asbestos removal); State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 518 (Iowa 2000) ($150,000 fine for victim restitution was not excessive in an involuntary manslaughter case); United States v. Wyly, 193 F.3d 289, 303 (5th Cir.1999) (forfeiting $4 million in assets of a company which bribed the highest ranking law enforcement officer in the parish, manipulated financial accounts, and laundered money was not grossly disproportionate); United States v. Real Property Known and Numbered as 415 East Mitchell Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio, 149 F.3d 472, 478 (6th Cir.1998) (forfeiting a home valued at $220,000 was not disproportionate for a significant marijuana cultivation operation).
A more objective standard is found in the jurisdictions which look first to the legislative body which has specified the maximum permissible fine for a given offense, holding that if the value of forfeited property is within the range of fines prescribed by Congress, a strong presumption arises that the forfeiture is constitutional. United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, Wilton Manors, Fla., 175 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir.1999) (upholding fine of $500,000 for dishonest mortgage brokers); United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 342 (4th Cir.2003) (upholding a restitution order of almost $250,000 when the fine could have been twice as large); United States v. Sherman, 262 F.3d 784, 795 (8th Cir.2001)(forfeiting a $750,000 property is not excessive when the potential fine was $4 million); United States v. Moyer, 313 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir.2002) (forfeiture of half the amount of the permissible fine is “presumptively not excessive.”); United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1292 (11th Cir.1999) (same). A minority of jurisdictions, to date, have considered the effect of the forfeiture on the defendant. See e.g. State v. Real Property at 638 East 640 North, Orem, Utah, 994 P.2d 1254, 1257-59 (Utah 2000). That approach has been specifically rejected in State v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Iowa 2000), and 817 N.E. 29th Drive, Wilton Manors, 175 F.3d at 1311.
Spruce Street, 832 A.2d at 403.
However, while Spruce Street provided some guidance, it refused to choose one of those methods to determine the gravity of the offense because, in part, this issue had not “undergone the sharpening and annealing process of litigation in the lower courts.” Spruce Street, 832 A.2d at 403. With that legal background set forth, we can now turn to whether the forfeiture in this case was constitutional.
Because of the two reversals and remands by the Supreme Court of the decision to affirm the trial courts and reversals to either apply the correct standard of review or to determine the value of the property, the procedural history is a bit complicated, but the underlying facts are not. On February 20, 1995, police made an undercover buy of crack cocaine and marijuana at 5444 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, which was owned by Elizabeth Lewis (Lewis), who had lived in the house since 1962. The next day, police executed a search warrant at the first floor apartment *43at 5444 Spruce Street and found five packets of crack cocaine in a purse in the living room and 11 packets of marijuana and $20 cash in a cup in the kitchen. Lewis was arrested and charged with delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance in violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Controlled Substances Act), Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 23B, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 780-101 — 180-179. On October 3, 1995, Lewis pled guilty to a single charge of possession with intent to deliver and was sentenced to two years probation and a fine of $185. The value of the drugs involved in Lewis’s guilty plea was less than $80. None of the usual trappings of drug dealing — scales, paper, cutting agents, sales records — were found during the search of Lewis’s home. This was her first offense.
Evidence was offered at several forfeiture hearings from the police officers who conducted the search of 5444 Spruce; Tar-ik Chapman, who testified that as a juvenile, he and others purchased drugs at 5444 Spruce Street; a juvenile case worker who testified that no deal had been made with Chapman in return for his testimony; and Lewis, who testified that she pled guilty solely to protect her daughter who was the actual drug dealer and real estate broker about the value of 5444 Spruce Street. Accepting the Commonwealth’s valuation of $25,000 over that of Lewis’s valuation, the trial court found that on February 20, 1995, Lewis sold drugs to undercover Philadelphia Police Officer Willie Jones, and that the search conducted the next day turned up five packets of crack cocaine and 11 packets of marijuana in the residence after locating her in a neighborhood bar. It also found that the property was only worth $25,000.
Based on that evidence, the trial court found that the forfeiture did not violate the Eight Amendment because the amount forfeited was not grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense. Rejecting Lewis’s argument that the gravity of the offense should be determined by the sentence imposed, the trial court instead judged the “gravity of the offense on the possible fines for the offense committed, include those never charged such as selling crack to an undercover officer is punishable by a sentence of up to 10 years and a $100,000 fine, selling cocaine to a minor by a sentence of up to 20 years and $100,000 fine, and sale of marijuana by a sentence of up to 5 years and a $15,000 fine.” It also found that the violation was part of a pattern of misbehavior and not an isolated incident, and that there was obvious harm resulting from Lewis selling drugs to neighborhood teenagers. It ordered the property forfeited and, as a result, Lewis, her daughter and her granddaughter had to move to a homeless shelter.
Agreeing with the trial court’s expansive definition of “offense” to include all that Lewis was charged with or could have been charged with, in finding the “gravity of the offense” proportional to the forfeiture, the majority states:
Although the trial court found that the amount of drugs and their value were comparatively small, it gave greater weight to the duration of the illegal activity, having found a continuous pattern and practice of selling drugs to minors based on the credited testimony of Tarik Chapman. The court noted Chapman’s testimony that Lewis’ house was known as the neighborhood crack house. The court’s finding that Lewis willfully and repeatedly sold drugs from the house, that she subjected her young grandchild to an unsafe and unhealthy environment, and that she purposely sold drugs to juveniles without consideration for the ill *44effects on her neighbors and community. Those findings are supported by the credited evidence. The trial court’s focus comports with Bajakajian’s placement of the primary emphasis on the culpability of the defendant.
(Majority opinion at 40.)
From the above, the majority did not choose any particular approach but seems to have aggregated all the parts of the suggested approaches that would not make the forfeiture grossly disproportional without taking into consideration the mitigating factors that our Supreme Court suggested were available in these approaches.
I would, however, take a more objective approach in determining the “gravity of the offense” by examining the actions of the district attorney when exercising his or her discretion in deciding what offenses it will prosecute, the district attorney in agreeing to punishment in the plea, and the trial court in deciding what type of penalty to impose. My approach would consist of two simple factors:
1. The “gravity of the offense” measured against the fine that could be imposed by offense with which the actor is convicted.
Based on the information received, the district attorney makes a judgment on whether that information warrants bringing charges on that information either because he cannot make out the crime beyond a reasonable doubt or because the “gravity of the offense” does not warrant the expenditure of its resources. In other words, this assumes that the district attorneys reasonably carry out their responsibilities and are not derelict in their duty in determining the “gravity of the offense.”2
2. The maximum fine that could be imposed is tempered by the sentence actually imposed.
Again, when a trial judge imposes a sentence or a district attorney accepts a plea, both are making a judgment about the gravity of the offense. To assume that either imposed a fine not appropriate to the “gravity of the offense” would suggest that they either made a grievous mistake or were derelict in their duties.3
This two-prong test approximates what the district attorney and the courts think of the “gravity of the offense” to the particular defendant, as well as giving due consideration to the General Assembly’s judgment of the harm this type of crime causes when it sets a maximum fine but allows discretion to those officials of whether any fine should be imposed at all. It also considers how the district attorney views the offense when he or she is carrying out his or her primary responsibility to *45protect the public by prosecuting crimes, untainted by the desire to forfeit money or property to supplement their budgets that could lead to the “hyping” of an offense or by adding offenses in civil forfeiture cases he or she chooses not to bring as not being sufficiently serious.4 See generally E. Blumenson & E. Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35 (1998).
Applying this two prong test to this case inescapably leads to the conclusion that the forfeiture in this case is excessive: Lewis was charged with a single count of possession with intent to deliver, 35 P.S. § 780 — 113(a)(1), which is punishable by paying a fine not exceeding $5,000. In comparison to that maximum fine, the $25,000 forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the “gravity of the offense” on that measure alone.
While in this case, we do not even have to go on to the second prong to determine whether the fine imposed by the sentencing court tempers the maximum fine; were we to do so, we could use as an example a possible fine of $200,000. Because the district attorney agreed to and the sentencing court imposed a sentence of two years probation and a fine of $185, the insignificance of the sentence imposed simply shows that both the district attorney and the sentencing court did not believe the offense to be grave but rather insignificant.
Based on this test, measured against the gravity of the offensive, the forfeiture of Lewis’s house worth $25,000 is an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Aceord-ingly, because I would reverse the trial court, I respectfully dissent.
. Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution also provides that: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.” Pa. Const, art. I, § 13.
. In Spruce Street, the Supreme Court held that the "gravity of the offense,” as stated in Bajakajian, is to be primarily based on the culpability of the defendant rather than on the crime in the abstract. The Court went on to say that this does not mean that the excessiveness of the fine may be weighed against the cost to society of the traffic in illegal drugs. Spruce Street, 832 A.2d at 402. These statements instruct us to weigh the amount of the forfeiture only against that for which a defendant is specifically guilty, hence, the use of the term "culpability.”
. Bajakajian does, in fact, state that the penalty imposed as compared to the maximum penalty is a relevant factor in the proportionality standard. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 338-339. In Bajakajian, it was the large discrepancy between the actual and maximum penalty that caused the United States Supreme Court to find the defendant’s culpability to be relatively small and the forfeiture to be unconstitutional. As noted above, our Supreme Court in Spruce Street has recognized the significance of Bajakajian’s holding to be that the gravity of the offense is determined, first and foremost, by the specific culpability rather that the maximum penalty available.
. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(f) provides: Cash or proceeds of forfeited property transferred to the custody of the district attorney ... shall be placed in the operating fund of the county in which the district attorney is elected. The appropriate county authority shall immediately release from the operating fund, without restriction, a like amount for the use of the district attorney enforcing the provisions of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. The entity having budgetary control shall not anticipate future forfeitures or proceeds therefrom in adoption and approval of the budget for the district attorney.