dissenting.
I dissent.
The majority holds the trial court committed reversible error when it sustained objections to expert witness testimony to the effect that the defendant’s training program was in violation of a particular OSHA regulation.
A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit expert testimony, and its decision will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion. Lopez v. City Towing Assoc., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 254, 260 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1988, writ denied); Herrera v. FMC Corp., 672 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.). Expert opinion testimony should be admitted only when it will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact issue. Story Serv., Inc. v. Ramirez, 863 S.W.2d 491, 499 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, writ denied); Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 702 (Vernon Pamph.1994). When the jury is equally competent to form an opinion regarding the ultimate fact issues, there is no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the expert’s testimony. Ramirez, 863 S.W.2d at 499; Lopez, 754 S.W.2d at 260; Herrera, 672 S.W.2d at 7.
In the present case, the relevant portion of the jury question is the following:
Question No. 1
To what extent, if any, did the negligence, if any, of Fluor Daniel, Inc. proximately cause the occurrence in question ?
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The law ... provides that an employer shall instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury. Failure to comply with such laws is negligence in itself.
The jury had before it evidence that defendant Fluor Daniel conducted an orientation program for new employees that included a section on fall protection measures; defendant provided an employee handbook with safety guidelines about fall protection; every Monday “gang box safety meetings” were held; additionally, employees interacted with supervisors and foremen on-the-job. Details about the orientation program and meetings were provided to the jury. The jury also knew the details of how the involved employee got hurt on the job. The jury heard the defendant’s expert witness say defendant’s training program was one of the better safety programs around; the jury also heard the plaintiffs expert witness say defendant’s training was inadequate and below the indus*557try standard. The only evidence the trial court excluded, upon defendant’s objection, was the opinion of plaintiffs expert that the defendant’s training program was in violation of a particular OSHA regulation.1 The trial judge expressed his reason for excluding the evidence:
I’m not going to let myself and the jury listen to a bunch of experts’ opinions about the law. If you explain to me any OSHA standard that is not clear, that needs custom and industry to understand the standard, I’ll be happy to consider it. But, every OSHA standard I’ve seen so far, doesn’t need expert testimony to explain it to the jury.
The trial judge sustained every objection to questions asking whether the defendant’s training program was in violation of the law.
In my opinion, in light of the jury question the jury was required to answer, the jury was equally as competent as the expert witnesses to form an opinion regarding whether the defendant complied with the law that “provides that an employer shall instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury.” Accordingly, I find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Additionally, I note the plaintiffs argue that, even assuming the expert witness testimony was properly excludable generally, once plaintiffs introduced adverse expert testimony, the trial court had to allow plaintiffs to put on rehabilitating evidence, even in the face of a valid objection.
The plaintiffs, on direct examination of an expert witness plaintiffs called, elicited testimony that the defendant’s training program did not violate a specific OSHA standard; naturally, the defendant did not object to the question, because the answer benefitted the defendant. In the absence of an objection, the trial court had no reason to make a ruling on the admissibility of the expert opinion.
Later, the plaintiffs asked the same question of another expert witness that plaintiffs had called; the defendant objected to the question, and the trial court sustained the objection. Plaintiffs argue that, even assuming the defendant’s objection was a good one, the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the objection. According to plaintiffs’ reasoning, once the plaintiffs presented evidence to the jury that defendant’s training program did not violate section 1926.21(b)(2), then plaintiffs were entitled to counter that testimony by eliciting other, contrary expert testimony that the training program did violate section 1926.21(b)(2).
Although Texas trial courts may have the authority to exclude improper evidence sua sponte,2, the trial court in this case certainly had no duty to do so. The trial court ruled on all objections raised to this type of testimony, and the trial court was consistent in its rulings on objections regarding this type of testimony. I can find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Accordingly, I would overrule point of error one, and I would address the plaintiffs’ remaining points of error.
. It is important to note that the jury was never asked if the defendant’s training program "violated an OSHA regulation.” Rather, the portion of jury question one set out above is exactly what the jury was required to answer in connection with the training program.
. Anderson v. McDonald, 486 S.W.2d 123, 124-25 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1972, no writ); Schafer v. Stevens, 352 S.W.2d 471, 482 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1961, writ dism’d).