dissenting.
The majority speaks approvingly of the “community caretaking function” doctrine. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 483, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). Apparently believing, however, that several opinions of the Court of Criminal Appeals limit this Court’s power to act in the present case, the majority stops short of adopting the doctrine.
I do not believe the Court of Criminal Appeals opinions cited by the majority control the disposition of this appeal. None of those cases dealt with the community care-taking function. Rather, all addressed situations in which law enforcement officers sought to justify a stop based on suspicions of criminal activity. Thus, it is not surprising that the opinions in those cases use broad language requiring relatively concrete indications of “criminal activity” before an officer can detain a person on less than probable cause. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 829 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (“A stop is justified if the officer, based upon specific and articulable facts, reasonably surmises that the detained person may be associated with a crime.”); Viveros v. State, 828 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). I believe those cases are distinguishable from the present one because they were specifically addressing the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), i.e., whether a detention by an officer can be justified by indications of criminal activity that do not rise to the level of probable cause. In the present case, on the other hand, we are faced with a different legal issue: is a detention justified when a local officer, based on specific and articulable facts, reasonably believes a motorist is in need of assistance as a result of illness, a malfunctioning vehicle, or some other impairment?
The Terry doctrine does not govern all warrantless searches and seizures. The ultimate, overarching test under both the U.S. and Texas constitutions is that of reasonableness. U.S. Const, amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated-”); Tex. Const, art. I, § 9 (“The people shall be secure ... from all unreasonable seizures or searches_”). The Terry doctrine provides one avenue of establishing reasonableness; it does not preclude the possibility that others exist. For example, consensual searches and searches prompted by emergencies may be constitutional even though they do not meet the requirements of the Terry doctrine. See Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 775-76 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (consensual searches); Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (emergency searches). The present case simply requires consideration of the reasonableness of another category of warrantless searches: searches pursuant to a local law enforcement officer’s “community caretaking” function.
Moreover, the context of a traffic stop may be especially appropriate for the community-caretaking doctrine. Safety on public roads often requires a level of energy and attentiveness beyond mere compliance with traffic regulations, and irregularities or eccentricities falling far short of criminal behavior may pose a serious hazard to other drivérs. Consequently, as members of the driving public, we accept, if not welcome, a level of scrutiny to which we are not accustomed in other areas of life.
For these reasons, I believe we are not precluded by existing Court of Criminal Ap*921peals opinions from adopting the doctrine of community caretaking function. Indeed, at least one Texas court of appeals has already done so. See McDonald v. State, 759 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1988, no pet.) (“[W]e hold that when a police officer has a demonstrable reason to believe that a particular individual may be unfit to drive for medical or other reasons, a temporary stop is justified for the limited purpose of investigating that person’s well-being.”).
I would affirm the conviction.