Dissenting.
As the majority notes, our Supreme Court has recently stated:
The right to equal protection under the law does not absolutely prohibit the Commonwealth from classifying individuals for the purpose of receiving different treatment, and does not require equal treatment of people having different needs. The prohibition against treating people differently under the law does not preclude the Commonwealth from resorting to legislative classifications, provided that those classifications are reasonable rather than arbitrary and *239bear a reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation.
DeFazio v. Civil Service Comm’n, 562 Pa. 431, 436, 756 A.2d 1103, 1106 (2000).
Moreover:
[Tjhe underlying purpose of [Pa. Constitution Art. 3, § 32] is analogous to the equal protection clause of the federal constitution and [] our analysis and interpretation of the clause should be guided by the same principles that apply in interpretation of federal equal protection.
Id. at 436, 756 A.2d at 1105.
Applying these principles to the case at hand, I find no denial of equal protection, and thus no violation of Article III, § 32. It is beyond dispute that the General Assembly enacted the Education Empowerment Act in response to a significant pattern of failure among many of the Commonwealth’s public schools. The challenged provision of the EEA, the Act 91 Amendment, provides a specialized remedy for the Harrisburg School District which is specifically tailored both to the educational problems of the district and to the particular form of government of the City and the district. It is modeled after programs in other states which have shown promising results, and is frankly designated as a pilot program.
Because I believe Act 91 represents a rational legislative response to a serious erosion of our consistency in providing “a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth,” Pa Const., Art. Ill, § 14, I would sustain the preliminary objections to Counts I and II. Further, I agree with respondents that, “Pa. Const. art. IX, § 3, by its own terms, only requires voter referendum when an optional form of government is adopted or repealed.... The provision thus speaks only to a wholesale change of municipal government, not to amendments of municipal powers which may be made from time to time by the General Assembly.” Therefore, I would also sustain the preliminary objections to Count III. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s decision overruling those preliminary objections.