concurring. I concur with the majority opinion that affirms the trial court’s disposition of this case. However, I do so only because we are limited to the argument made by the appellant.
The trial court held that appellant was the general contractor and was not entided to a lien on appellee’s property because it failed to provide notice to appellee as required under § 18-44-115(c) (Supp. 2001), as well as the notice required by § 18-44-115(e)(2)(A)-(C). Appellant argues on appeal that, because appellant was a material supplier, pursuant to § 18-44-115(e)(l) it was exempt from the § 18-44-115(c) notice requirement inasmuch as the subject property either involved commercial property or was a residential improvement project involving more than four units. As to the notice requirement of§ 18-44-115(e) (2) (A)-(C), appellant contends that appellee was not prejudiced by the untimely notice because appellee never claimed her certified mail containing the notice.
The majority holds that even if the subject property was commercial and appellant were exempt from giving appellee the § 18-44-115(c) notice, appellant failed to satisfy § 18-44-115 (e)(2) by giving appellee timely notice as provided in § 18-44-115(e)(2)(C). What I believe is of material significance, but which appellant does not raise, is whether as a general contractor appellant would have been exempt from the notice provision of § 18-44-115(e)(2)(C).
The title to Act 1298 of 1995, which added subsection (e) to § 18-44-115, expressly stated that it was amending the “Arkansas Code by Incorporating the Recommendations of the Arkansas Task Force on Materialmen’s Lien and Bonding Notice Requirements.” The final report of the Task Force dated November 1994 spoke to the need of an additional notice to the property owner after materials had been furnished to a project; and stated that “this notice should be required of all possible lien claimants (including laborers and subcontractors) except the general contractor.” (Emphasis added.) Consistent with this observation and recommendation, Act 1298 provides that “No material supplier or laborer shall be entitled to a lien unless the material supplier or laborer notifies the owner of the commercial real estate being improved, in writing, that such material supplier or laborer is currently entitled to payment, but has not been paid.” See § 18-44-115(e)(2)(A). The omission of “contractor” in this sentence is particularly significant in light of the Task Force’s report, which Act 1298 implemented. Consequently, as a contractor, appellant was probably not required to give the § 18-44-115(e)(2)(C) notice. However, appellant did not argue this, but rather, contended that it had satisfied the notice requirement. The majority opinion appropriately addresses and rejects that argument.
I write separately to emphasize that our majority opinion should not be interpreted to address any more than what appellant has argued on appeal.