dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority states, in addressing point of error one, that the new language in Tex.Code CRIM. PROC.Ann. art. 37.07, sec. 3(a) (Vernon Supp.1992), “any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing,” means that any unadjudicated offenses may be admissible during the punishment phase as long as it is in conformance with Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 401 and 403. I disagree. I would follow the reasoning in Grunsfeld v. State, 813 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, pet. granted) that the legislature did not intend to enlarge the meaning of article 37.07 with these words to include admissibility of unadjudicated extraneous offenses in a noncapital case.
Further, I would hold that article 37.07, sec. 3(a) as amended does not allow the State to introduce evidence of unadjudicat-ed extraneous offenses because this article as amended retains the exact same language of its predecessor defining “prior criminal record”. Both articles define “pri- or criminal record” as: a final conviction in a court of record, or a probated or suspended sentence that has occurred prior to trial, or any final conviction material to the offense charged. The significance of the Legislature’s decision is that it must therefore be presumed that by not deleting the definition of “prior criminal record” from the amended article, it did not intend to allow evidence of unadjudicated criminal behavior on the part of the accused.
Focusing upon this error, I would conclude that the trial court’s error in allowing the jury to hear testimony from Officers D.B. Alexander and Dennis Nelius about appellant’s two unadjudicated cocaine charges prejudiced the jury’s decision-making process.
*472Appellant was eligible for probation, but received eighty five (85) years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. I therefore, cannot determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the punishment assessed. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2). I would sustain appellant’s first point of error and reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for a new trial as to punishment only. Article 44.-29(b) of the Tex.Code Crim.PROC.