dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. While this issue was mentioned in Justice Mauzy’s dissenting opinion in Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex.1991), it was not addressed by the majority opinion.
Article I, section 18 of the Texas Constitution of 1876 states clearly and plainly: “No person shall ever be imprisoned for debt”. This provision of our state Bill of Rights is not “means tested”. The constitutional protection applies regardless of ability. The analysis starts and stops with the definition of “debt”, not with any factual determination of ability or inability to pay. As noted in Ex Parte Britton, 127 Tex. 85, 92 S.W.2d 224, 227 (1936), “It is not the policy of the law to enforce the collection of mere civil debts by contempt proceedings.” The legislature, by allowing enforcement of the Texas turnover statute through contempt proceedings, Tex.Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 31.002 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.1992) has violated this constitutional guarantee.
This action is one to enforce a judgment. However, one must look to the origin of the obligation to determine its nature. See Ex Parte Shaver, 597 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ). The order of the trial court did not direct that Ms. Buller deliver a specific identified fund-in-being or a certificate of deposit but only to turn over $97,661.24 in cash to the sheriff to satisfy the judgment. This is nothing more than telling her to pay the debt. Accord: Currie v. Drake, 550 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The majority rewrites the constitution when they state: “This constitutional prohibition then simply does not apply ‘unless the con-temner demonstrates inability to pay.’ ” Had the framers of the 1876 constitution wanted this provision, they could have written it that way. In fact, according to Justice Mauzy’s research, section 12 of the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas had an inability to pay requirement. 806 *628S.W.2d at 229. Reasonable analysis of “original intent” would indicate that the framers rejected the 1836 approach and adopted instead an absolute prohibition against imprisonment for debt without consideration to inability to pay.
In view of Ms. Buller’s courtroom behavior and attitude, she may not be deserving of any mercy or equity. However, she does not have to invoke either. She is entitled to the guarantee of Article 1, section 18. The majority denies her that; consequently I dissent.