OPINION ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
W.C. DAVIS, Judge.Appellant was convicted of capital murder. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.03. The jury answered the special issues in the affirmative and appellant was sentenced to death. Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On direct appeal, appellant brought fourteen points of error.1 In points one *228through five in his brief on original appeal to this Court, appellant claimed the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Grigson to examine him and testify as to appellant’s future dangerousness at the penalty stage of the trial in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as in violation of the Texas Constitution and state statutory law. We agreed with appellant that the trial court erred under state law; however, we found such error to be harmless under Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2).2 Accordingly, we affirmed appellant’s conviction. Bennett v. State, 742 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).
Appellant then filed his petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court claiming that the testimony of Dr. Grigson at the penalty phase violated his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself and denied appellant his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). Appellant further argued this Court’s holding that the admission of Dr. Grigson’s testimony was harmless error conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The United States Supreme Court granted appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari3 and without analysis or particular instructions vacated and remanded the cause to this Court4 “for further consideration in light of Satterwhite v. Texas,” 486 U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988). We will now examine appellant’s point of error on remand5 in light of Estelle v. Smith, and Satterwhite v. Texas, both supra.
In Estelle v. Smith, supra, the Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment6 dictates a defendant must be warned prior to an in-custody psychiatric examination that he has the right to remain silent and his statements can be used against him on the crucial issue of future dangerousness at a sentencing proceeding. Id. at 468-69, 101 S.Ct. at 1875-76. Admission of a psy*229chiatrist’s damaging testimony on the crucial issue of future dangerousness without proper warnings violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination because of a lack of appraisal of rights and a knowing waiver thereof. Id. See also Ex Parte Woods, 745 S.W.2d 21 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
The court held further that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is also violated where defense counsel is not notified in advance that a psychiatric examination will encompass the issue of future dangerousness and there is no affirmative waiver of the right to counsel. The court reasoned that once adversary proceedings have been instituted, a psychiatric interview is a critical stage of the aggregate proceedings against a criminal defendant. Id. 451 U.S. at 470-71, 101 S.Ct. at 1876-77.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Satterwhite v. Texas, supra, clarified that a violation of Smith v. Estelle, supra, as well as other federal constitutional error, is subject to a harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California, supra.
In the Chapman case the court held that the test for proving such error to be harmless is that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such federal constitutional error did not contribute to the verdict.7
In the instant case, appellant claims that the examination by Dr. Grigson violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and the mandate of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Estelle, supra. A brief recitation of the pertinent facts are necessary for disposition of this point.8 The record shows that appellant’s attorney filed a pre-trial motion in which he requested that the trial court grant a psychiatric examination for appellant to determine his competency to stand trial. On July 22, 1985, Dr. J.A. Hunter, M.D., of the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, completed his examination and reported that appellant was sane and competent to stand trial.
Shortly before the trial began, the State filed a motion requesting the trial court to order appellant to be re-examined due to the fact that the State had been notified by Dr. Hunter that he would not be available to testify because of a prior commitment in Houston. A hearing was held on the State’s motion.
At the hearing, defense counsel strenuously objected, arguing that a doctor had already performed the examination, found appellant competent and filed a report to that effect. Defense counsel argued further that there was no adequate cause to seek a second opinion or to have another doctor come in and examine appellant simply in order to enable the State to have a witness at the trial. The State’s motion was granted, and pursuant to this motion, the trial court entered an order, which stated in pertinent part:
It is therefore ORDERED that the Defendant, BABY RAY BENNETT, be examined by DR. JAMES P. GRIGSON, 6116 North Central Expressway, Dallas, Texas, phone # 214-363-3015, a qualified expert in the field of Psychiatry, to determine if the said Defendant is mentally competent to stand trial, his sanity, his mental disease or defects, if any, his dangerousness, his propensity and probability to commit criminal acts of violence that constitute a continuing threat to society.... (Emphasis added)
In our original opinion on direct appeal in this cause, we stated that no issues were raised which would have provided a basis for the trial court’s order under Arts. 46.02 or 46.03, V.A.C.C.P. since appellant was examined by a psychiatrist and found to be sane and competent to stand trial. Moreover, the State failed to establish that a new examination was necessary, alleging only that the previous psychiatrist would *230be unavailable for trial on the date set. We stated:
The trial court does not, however, have the authority to appoint a psychiatrist for the purpose of examining a defendant for evidence relating solely to his future dangerousness. McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).... Without a statutory basis for the appointment, the trial judge effectively ordered appellant to submit to a psychiatric examination solely for the purpose of determining appellant’s future dangerousness. As such, the trial court erred.
Bennett v. State, supra, at 671. However, even though we found that the trial court erred in ordering the examination, we also held the error to be harmless given the circumstances of the case. We will now examine appellant’s claims of constitutional error.
ESTELLE V. SMITH ERROR
Appellant claims that the warnings given by Dr. Grigson prior to his psychiatric examination were insufficient under Estelle v. Smith, supra, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and thus violated his Fifth Amendment rights.
Dr. Grigson testified at trial in regard to the warnings he gave appellant prior to his examination. The doctor testified to the following:
Q All right. Were — Prior to asking him any questions, or anything of that nature, did you give him any warnings?
A Yes, sir, I did. I first introduced myself, explained to him that I was a psychiatrist, then I read him the court order that requested the examination, the purpose of the examination, then told him that it was not privilege (sic) or confidential because I would be sending back reports and discussing the case.
I also told him that the Supreme Court of the United States states that you got (sic) the right to refuse the examination, remain silent, stop it any time you want to, that it can be used against you, and he should have thoroughly discussed it with his attorney to have a full understanding of the possible consequences of it.
Q Did he seem to understand what you were saying? Far as you could tell?
A Yes, sir. I asked him if there was any part of that that he did not understand, or any part of it that he wanted me to repeat, but he appeared to understand it.
Q Did he give any reluctance or any— any hesitation in talking with you and submitting himself to be examined, and so on and so forth?
A No, sir, he did not.
Counsel for the defense questioned Dr. Grigson further about the warnings given to appellant prior to the psychiatric examination:
Q Would you state again, as best you can recollect, the warnings that you gave Mr. Bennett?
A I first introduced myself and explained who I was, and then read the court order itself to Mr. Bennett. Then, I stated that it was not privilege (sic) nor confidential because the report would be sent back and the case would be discussed, and that under that situation the Supreme Court of the United States (sic) that he did have a right to refuse the examination, to remain silent, to stop it any time he wished to do so, that it could be used against him, and that he should’ve thoroughly discussed it with his attorney to have a full understanding of the possible consequences of it.
Q And is that pretty much the warning you gave him as best you can recall?
A Yes, sir, it is.
Defense counsel objected to Dr. Grigson being allowed to testify, arguing that he had requested to be present at the initial examination and his request had been denied. He then argued that Dr. Grigson’s warning was inadequate. The trial court overruled the objection.
The standard to be applied in determining whether warnings are adequate is whether the warnings “substantially com*231ply” with Art. 38.22 V.A.C.C.P. and Miranda. See Hardesty v. State, 667 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). We hold that Dr. Grigson’s warnings substantially complied with Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and Art. 38.22, V.A.C.C.P. Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1073, 106 S.Ct. 834, 88 L.Ed.2d 805 (1986), cert. granted — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2896, 101 L.Ed.2d 930 (1988); (on unrelated grounds); Green v. State, 682 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). We hold that there has been no violation of appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Smith, supra.
Appellant also claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because counsel was not notified of the time or place of the examination and did not have an adequate opportunity to consult with and advise his client.
The language of the court order which directed appellant to be examined by Dr. Grigson included the doctor’s address in Dallas. The order also stated for what purposes appellant was to be examined. Although the exact time of the examination was not given, we find that counsel had sufficient notice of the examination and its scope, in order to properly consult with his client. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987).
It appears that appellant is also arguing that he should have had the benefit of counsel being present at or during the psychiatric examination. It is axiomatic that defendants do not possess the right to have counsel present during a psychiatric examination under either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment. See Stultz v. State, 500 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). “Because of the intimate, personal and highly subjective nature of a psychiatric examination, the presence of a third party in a legal and non-medical capacity would severely limit the efficacy of the examination.” Id. at 855. See also Parker v. State, 594 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied 464 U.S. 997, 104 S.Ct. 496, 78 L.Ed.2d 689 (1983); Von Byrd v. State, 569 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), reh. denied 444 U.S. 888, 100 S.Ct. 190, 62 L.Ed.2d 123 (1979). We hold that there has been no violation of appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Estelle v. Smith, supra.
Having found no violation of appellant’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights, we will therefore not undertake harmless error analysis regarding alleged constitutional error under Satterwhite v. Texas, supra.
The original judgment of this Court is reaffirmed.
WHITE, J., concurs in the result.. We will discuss only those points of error pertinent to the remand from the United States *228Supreme Court and the facts pertaining to those points of error. For a complete discussion of all points of error brought on direct appeal and all the facts in this cause see Bennett v. State, 742 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).
. Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 81(b)(2) provides: "Criminal cases. If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.”
. Bennett v. Texas, 486 U.S.-, 108 S.Ct. 2815, 100 L.Ed.2d 917 (1988).
. There appears to be no substantive difference between the Supreme Court reversing a judgment and ordering a remand, and the court vacating a judgment and ordering a remand. "The [c]ourt seems to have abandoned the task of deciding whether one of its recent precedents requires reversal or affirmance of the lower court judgments rendered prior to the new precedent and involving identical or similar issues. The court now prefers to delegate the task to the lower courts, remanding the cases to them for reconsideration in light of the new court precedent." Ex Parte May, 717 S.W.2d 84, 91, fn. 5 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) citing R.L. Stem, E. Gressman & S.M. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice (Sixth Edition) at 279.
. This Court allowed the State and appellant to file briefs upon remand. Appellant’s point of error is taken from his brief on remand.
We interpret the remand from the Supreme Court as a request to re-examine our original opinion in light of Estelle v. Smith, supra, as well as renewing an examination of our harmless error analysis. In Powell v. State, 767 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), this Court had found on original submission that any Smith error had been waived. Therefore, it would have been redundant for this Court on remand in Powell to examine whether Smith error existed in the case. Consequently, upon remand from the Supreme Court, we were concerned only with the harmless error analysis. The instant case is distinguishable in that although appellant raised Smith error and federal constitutional error in points one through five on direct appeal, our previous opinion in this cause discussed appellant’s claims in the context of State grounds only. Due to the posture of this cause, this Court is being given the opportunity to reexamine appellant's claims in the context of the federal constitution. We accept the opportunity to do so.
. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).
. See and cf. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2) at fn. 2, supra. See also Barber v. State, 757 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Mallory v. State, 752 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (Ride 81[b][2] is the codified progeny of the Chapman v. California harmless error analysis.)
. This statement of facts is taken from our original opinion on direct appeal. Bennett v. State, 742 S.W.2d 664, 669-670 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).