dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In this case, the majority acknowledges that compliance with rule 306a is jurisdictional, cites the authority that says it is, and then proceeds to ignore it completely in its result-oriented opinion.
In Butts v. Capitol City Nursing Home, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.1986) (per curiam), Butts filed a motion to reinstate that did not comply with rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure because it was not verified. The supreme court noted that because Butts’ motion was unverified, there was “no proper motion filed with the [trial] court within thirty (30) days of the signing of the order of dismissal....” Butts, 705 S.W.2d at 697. The Supreme Court concluded that “the time for perfecting appeal was not extended and the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction.” Butts, 705 S.W.2d at 697. Despite this language, the majority reads Butts as if it were only a no-evidence case.
In Memorial Hospital v. Gillis, 741 S.W. 2d 364 (Tex.1987) (per curiam), Gillis filed a late motion to reinstate under rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Because it was late, she also attempted to invoke rule 306a. Her motion was unverified. The trial court heard the motion and reinstated Gillis’ action. The supreme court, as the majority points out, acknowledge that the record did not reflect what happened at that hearing and that the order of reinstatement did not recite the trial court’s findings. Nonetheless, the supreme court concluded: Gillis, 741 S.W.2d at 365 (citation omitted). Despite this language, the majority reads 011118 as if [t were only a defective-record case.
Unless a party establishes in the manner prescribed by the rule that he had no notice or knowledge of the judgment, the general rule prevails: a trial court’s power to reinstate a cause after dismissal expires thirty days after the order of dismissal is signed.
The clear language of these two cases when taken together means that when a rule of civil procedure requires a post-judgment motion to be verified, the verification is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Absent verification, the trial court is without jurisdiction to render a decision, and the appellate timetable is not extended. Gillis, 741 S.W.2d at 366.
The majority reasons that although Ther-mex did not verify its motion as required by rule 306a, Thermex still managed to present its case in chief to the trial court in a timely fashion. In my view, in order to prevail on a rule 306a motion, the proponent must undergo a two-step process. The first step is to make out a prima facie case by a sworn motion as required by rule 306a. Thermex failed to accomplish the first step, and it did not invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction to make further inquiry as the second step of the required procedure. Consequently, the trial court was without jurisdiction to hold the hearing and make the findings of fact that it made. See Malik v. Hidden Valley Civic Club, 601 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981). I would hold that Thermex cannot now rely upon that finding to show that its appeal was timely perfected.
The majority makes a valiant effort to distinguish the cases cited from the instant case by suggesting that the Supreme Court’s language is broader than the Supreme Court could have intended. The majority’s struggle to save Thermex’s appeal by a liberal construction of the rule is generous. It may be, as the majority implies, that Thermex has certain equities on its side. Equitable considerations, however, cannot expand our jurisdiction. Sifuentes v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 754 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no writ). The majority’s rationale is not sufficient to lead one to believe that the *408Supreme Court meant anything other than what it said.
I conclude that the law is clear that where a postjudgment motion is required by rule to be verified, that verification is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and Thermex simply did not meet the jurisdictional prerequisite to bring this appeal. I would hold that Thermex did not timely perfect this appeal and that it should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.