dissenting.
In my opinion, the evidence was factually sufficient to show that the $567.00 in currency in Barnes’s possession was probably used in connection with Barnes’s distribution of crack cocaine. Because the majority remands for a new trial when I would affirm, I dissent.
According to the lead officer, Barnes “was distributing large amounts of crack cocaine in the Polk County area.” Barnes apparently got out of prison in late January 2003, and the narcotics division, by utilizing a cooperating individual, “started buying crack cocaine from him on ... [July] 28 of [2003].” According to the officer, the narcotic’s division bought narcotics from Barnes on three occasions in 2003. From the department’s investigation, Barnes “showed no other source of income other than the crack cocaine dealing.” After his arrest, Barnes “could show no source of other income.” The officer testified that in his opinion, the $567.00 came from “the proceeds of Mr. Barnes’ illegal activity dealing crack cocaine here in Polk County.”
Barnes did not claim that he had earned the currency. Asked when he was last legally employed, Barnes responded: “I was locked up — I had been locked up for 13 years.” According to Barnes, the money had come out of a joint bank account Barnes had with his friend, Kenneth Davis. According to Barnes, he could withdraw money from the joint account “when I get ready.” Barnes testified that before his name was added to the account, Davis had given him $1,700.00. Although Barnes served Davis with a subpoena, Davis did not appear during the forfeiture trial.
Barnes was known to the sheriffs department as a drug dealer. He had no legitimate means of support. Barnes of*251fered nothing to explain why Davis would bestow large gifts of cash on him, and the finder of fact, on this record, was entitled to reject Barnes’s rather incredible claim that Davis gave him such a large gift. It was a reasonable inference for the finder of fact to conclude the cash probably came from Barnes’s only known occupation. The absence of additional evidentiary links to the currency apparently required by the majority does not overcome the inference on the record before us that the money was probably used to facilitate Barnes’s dealing in drugs.
In conclusion, as provided by section 59.05(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the State carried its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the cash was used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony under the Texas Controlled Substances Act. See Tex.Code CRIm. PROC. Ann. art. 59.01(2)(B) (Vernon Supp.2008), art. 59.05(b) (Vernon 2006).