The appellant, Charles C. Owen, a resident and taxpayer of Little Rock, brought suit against the appellee and its city manager to enjoin implementation of Little Rock Ordinance No. 15.311, primarily on the grounds that the Act pursuant to which the ordinance was adopted constituted special or local legislation in violation of Amendment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution. The ordinance provides for a change in the method of election of Little Rock’s seven member board of directors and was adopted pursuant to Act 808 of 1977, as amended by Act 840 of 1987. The only issue on appeal is the correctness of the trial court’s determination that Act 808, as amended, was not special or local legislation.
As we are unable to discover a purpose for the legislation, as written, which would bear some reasonable relationship to certain exemptions contained in the Act, we conclude that the legislation violates Amendment 14 and is therefore unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse.
The stated purpose of the legislation was to strengthen municipal government in this state by requiring that a majority of the members of the governing boards of cities of the first and second class be elected from single member districts having a substantially equal population. Section 2 of Act 808 generally provides that if the governing board of a city consists, for example, of seven members, four members shall be elected by ward or district, and three members shall be elected at large with the candidate in “position one” becoming mayor.
Prior to the suit by Owen, the seven member board of directors of Little Rock had been elected at large. In an effort to change the method of election for directors in Little Rock to that provided for by the Act, the board, pursuant to section 5 of Act 808, as amended by Act 840 of 1987, adopted an ordinance whereby a majority of the members of the board would be elected by ward or district; the remaining members were to be elected at large with position one being reserved for the mayoral candidate.
The pivotal part of the amended Act 808 is section 5, which provides:
The provisions of [this Act] shall not be applicable to any city in the state having a manager form of government and having a population of thirty thousand (30,000) or more persons, unless the city by ordinance of the governing body thereof chooses to be subject to this section. However, any such city may, by ordinance of the governing body thereof approved by a majority of the qualified electors of the city voting on the question, choose to elect all of the members of the governing body of the city from single member districts. [Emphasis ours.]
Prior to Act 840, section 5 did not provide for the adoption of an ordinance whereby the governing body of a particular city could choose to become subject to the Act, and the relevant population figure was 100,000 or more persons.
At the trial level, Owen’s efforts to enjoin implementation of the city’s new ordinance were based in large part upon the argument that Act 808, as amended, constitutes special or local legislation by virtue of “exemptions” such as the one created by section 5. We agree with the argument.
The Act carves out so many exceptions that its general purpose has become an empty statement. First, all cities with a population of less than 15,000 are excluded; that means most cities in Arkansas. The Act is then made applicable to all cities between 15,000 and 15,999, but not to cities with populations between 16,000 and 16,700. Cities located in counties with less than 34,000 people are excluded, as are cities whose form of government was established pursuant to Act 498 of 1973. As it stands after the amendment in 1987, two cities for certain, Little Rock and Hot Springs, with a city manager form of government and populations of over 30,000 have the option of being exempt from the Act or passing an ordinance like the one in question.
Amendment 14 provides that the “General Assembly shall not pass any local or special act.” An act is special if by some inherent limitation or classification it arbitrarily separates some person, place, or thing from those upon which, but for such separation, it would operate, and the legislation is local if it applies to any division or subdivision of the state less than the whole. Board of Trustees for Little Rock Police Pension Fund v. City of Little Rock, 295 Ark. 585, 750 S.W.2d 950 (1988).
While it is true that “statutes are presumed to be framed in accordance with the Constitution, and should not be held invalid for repugnance thereto unless such conflict is clear and unmistakable,” Board of Trustees of Municipal Judges and Clerks Fund, City of Little Rock v. Beard, 273 Ark. 423, 620 S.W.2d 295 (1981), we have made it clear that we are not bound by the form of the legislation. That is, simply because the legislature states that an act is general in application, we are not bound by that statement. Rather, we look to the operation and effect of the legislation. If that operation and effect is necessarily local, then the act is local regardless of its form. Ark-Ash Lumber Co. v. Pride, 162 Ark. 235, 258 S.W. 335 (1924). As we said in Simpson v. Matthews, 184 Ark. 213, 40 S.W.2d 991 (1931), if the legislature is to decide whether an act is local or special legislation, then Amendment 14 serves no purpose, and it might just as well not have been adopted.
The controlling question before us is whether the limitations or classifications in Act 808, as amended, bear a reasonable relation to the purpose of the law. Lovell v. Democratic Central Committee, 230 Ark. 811, 327 S.W.2d 387 (1959). In that regard, if the classifications are such that the legislation applies only to political subdivisions of a certain population, the legislation is local if relative population has nothing to do with the subject-matter of the law. Mankin v. Dean, 228 Ark. 752, 310 S.W.2d 477 (1958); State ex rel. Burrow v. Jolly, 207 Ark. 515, 181 S.W.2d 479 (1944). A review of some of our previous opinions sheds ample light on the subject.
In Simpson, supra, an act applied only to counties with a population of over 75,000. At the time that could only apply to Pulaski County, and we quickly pointed out to the legislature that Amendment 14 could not be circumvented merely by classification on the basis of population. We said:
Judging from much recent legislation in this State, it would seem that the impression is prevalent that because classification on the basis of population may be proper for the purposes of legislation on certain subjects, therefore any classification on the basis of population is appropriate for the purposes of legislation on any subject. The sooner the minds of legislators and others are disabused of this erroneous impression, the better; for under any such rule the provisions of the Constitution against special legislation would become wholly nugatory. If it is permissible to adopt for any and all purposes a classification founded upon any and every arbitrary and illusive basis of population, we might have as many acts, general in form, but special in fact, as there are counties, cities, villages, townships, wards, and school districts in the State.
In Knoop v. City of Little Rock, 277 Ark. 13, 638 S.W.2d 670 (1982), this court held that Act 539 of 1981 constituted special legislation which contravened Amendment 14. Act 539 basically provided that in the 1982 general election cities having a population of 100,000 or more and a city manager form of government must directly elect the mayor by a majority vote. The Act further provided that each director in such cities would be elected by a majority vote with runoff elections, if necessary, held two weeks after the general election. Act 539 clearly would have applied only to the city of Little Rock.
The Act was special legislation because in the absence of some reasonable statutory difference in the powers or functions of the mayors of cities of different sizes, we could not, although the act was accorded presumptive validity, find any reasonable basis for granting to one city but not others the power of directly electing its mayor and holding runoff elections for the positions of mayor and city directors two weeks after the general election.
In Knoop, we found significant the following language from our decision in Street Improvement Districts Nos. 481 and 485 v. Hadfield, 184 Ark. 598, 43 S.W.2d 62 (1931):
The general rule is that classification is properly based on population when reasonably adapted to the subject of the statute. Otherwise the classification by population is special legislation ....
The authorities generally hold that classification of cities and towns by population can not be arbitrarily adopted as a ground for granting some of them powers denied others if, although there be a difference in population, there is no difference in situation or circumstances of the municipalities placed in the different classes, and the difference in population has no reasonable relation to the purposes and object to be attained by the statute.
In the case at bar, we are offered no rational basis for the plethora of classifications. Fair and adequate representation, if that is the concern of the Act, by district rather than by election at large, is not different merely because a city reaches a population of 30,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, the Act is a passel of contradictions and typical of legislation that is based purely on selective application. Act 808 mandates compliance by certain classes of cities, exempts others, and gives several cities the option to either come under the Act or to remain exempt. Even though the theme of the Act may be to provide fair and adequate representation, arbitrariness remains.
It is strongly argued that the legislature may well have concluded that fair and adequate representation of inevitably divergent views in cities with a manager form of government and populations in excess of 30,000 could best be accomplished by vesting these cities with the options now embodied in section 5. However, we find the distinction and treatment between cities of less than 30,000 and those above that figure to be wholly untenable, especially in light of the remaining classifications contained in the Act. The fact that the legislation on its face exempts cities such as Little Rock from the operations of the Act refutes any alleged purpose of fair representation where larger cities are concerned. Notwithstanding the legislature’s obvious attempt to amend the deficiencies contained in the original Act by permitting larger cities various options, a rational basis cannot be found for treating cities so differently on such a fundamental matter as the election of directors.
In this case we began with the presumption that the legislation at issue was framed in accordance with the constitution. In the past, when an act contained classifications such that the legislation applied only to political subdivisions of a certain population, we diligently attempted to discover whether relative population had anything to do with the subject-matter of the law, i.e., whether there was a rational relationship between the purpose of the legislation and the population based classifications or exemptions. We have undertaken the same search here but to no avail.
It would have been helpful in making this determination if the legislation, Act 808, contained any information reflecting such a relationship or if we had evidence available to prove that fact — such as legislative history. However, such is not the case. Despite our diligent attempt to determine if a rational basis exists as to the legislation before us, we find none.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Act 808 of 1977, as amended by Act 840 of 1987, violates Amendment 14 and is therefore unconstitutional. In accordance with the provisions of Rule 22 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the mandate is ordered to be issued at the time this opinion is handed down.
Reversed.
Purtle and Glaze, JJ., concur. Dudley, Hays, and Newbern, JJ., dissent.