dissenting. I dissent. N. J. S. A. 2A-.48-4 is part of a comprehensive legislative plan specifically designed to equitably apportion the expenses associated with general riots among counties, municipalities and individual property owners. Notwithstanding, the majority today construes that statute so that its provisions will not be applicable when a general riot — as opposed to an isolated instance of propery damage - — • occurs. The majority’s intimation that reimbursement may be conditioned upon receipt by municipal officials of “actual” notice with respect to particular properties defeats a primary purpose of the Act. Such a reading of N. J. S. A. 2A :48-4 contravenes the intention of the Legislature and the sound public policy underlying the passage of the Act. Consequently, it cannot be accepted.
I
In A & B Auto Stores v. Newark, 59 N. J. 5 (1971), this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Weintraub, reviewed both the history and workings of N. J. S. A. 2A :48-l et seq. Initially adopted by the Legislature in 1864, the statute was a direct response to “ ‘the draft riots of New York in 1863, when an entire army corps was withdrawn from the front * * * to hold in check the rebellious elements of that city.’ ” Id. at 12 (quoting from County of Allegheny v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397, 418 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1879)). As Chief Justice Weintraub noted, the main objective of the Act “was to spread the burden of [the damage ensuing from riots and mob action] among the citizens of a municipality * * * and this *150upon a policy decision that it is just to spread the losses [caused by] mob and riot disorders.” Id. at 15. As such, the A & B Auto Stores Court deemed the Act’s provisions applicable to property damage caused by the many tumultuous disturbances of the peace in the 'Central, South, West and North Wards of the City of Newark which occurred between July 12 and 17, 1967.
A & B Auto Stores also establishes that a property owner will not be denied reimbursement for the damage to his property merely because he fails to give the appropriate official prior notice of a threat to that property. Instead, we recognized that the purpose of the notice provision is solely that of alerting the city that a riot is threatened so that preventive steps may be taken before property is actually destroyed. Consequently, we held that lack of notice would constitute a defense to reimbursement only if a municipality “succeeded in showing that [the property owner] knew something material which [the municipality] did not know or that notice from a [property owner] . . . [would] have had [an] impact upon” the municipality’s ability to prevent damage to the property. 59 N. J. at 29. Thus, we clearly realized that to precondition recovery upon the giving of notice where notice would serve no useful function would elevate form over substance. Courts in other jurisdictions construing similar statutory schemes have agreed. See, e. g., Roy v. Hampton, 108 N. H. 51, 226 A. 2d 870 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Feinstein v. City of New York, 157 Misc. 157, 283 N. Y. S. 335 (Mun. Ct. N. Y. C. 1935); Newberry v. Mayor of New York, 31 N. Y. Super. Ct. (1 Sweeny) 369 (1869); County of Allegheny v. Gibson, supra, 90 Pa. 397, 35 Am. Rep. 670 (Sup. Ct. 1879). See generally Note, “Compensation for Victims of Urban Riots,” 68 Colum. L. Bev. 57, 70 (1968); 18 McQuillin, “Municipal Corporations,” § 55.149 at 539 (3d Ed. 1977); Annot., “Municipal Liability for Property Damage Under Mob Violence Statutes,” 26 A. L. R. 3d 1198, 1238-1240 (1969).
*151Although A & B Auto Stores focused on the issue of municipal liability for property damage, its reasoning is equally applicable in settings such as the present where municipalities seek reimbursement from the county for extra expenses incurred in order to prevent that property damage. The two sections are part of a unified act and must be read in conjunction. Indeed, the majority admits as much. See ante at 147-148. Consequently, Newark is entitled to the reimbursement it how seeks.
The very wording of the statute supports this result. N. J. S. A. 2A:48-4 provides that the expenses incurred by a municipality “in the performance of any duty hereby imposed shall be paid by the county treasurer. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.) It would make no sense to read this language as being confined solely to the duty arising when a property owner gives notice of a threat to his property and the-municipality responds thereto. The discharge of such a duty relative to individual property owners is assuredly included in the larger responsibility owed to all residents confronted with a riotous situation. Under A & B Auto Stores, supra, Newark clearly has a governmental responsibility in the exercise of its police powers to protect its citizenry and to prevent damage to all properties located within the city. Inasmuch as the expenses it incurred were in the fulfillment of that broad and all encompassing duty, the statute by its clear language entitles the municipality to recover from the county.
The majority avoids reaching such a logical conclusion by noting that “there is a complete failure of proof that expenses were devoted to the protection of any particular property.” See ante at 148 (emphasis supplied). It thus ignores the primary consideration, discussed above, that the municipality had a duty to protect all threatened property once it was aware of the widespread nature of the riot. Moreover, the majority’s construction of the statute is unworkable. By reading the statute to allow reimbursement only for the protection of specific, individual properties, the majority *152apparently envisions that police officers sent to combat riots will be equipped with a notebook and pencil so that they can jot down the addresses of the particular pieces of property that they are protecting. A statutory construction which leads to unworkable results must be avoided.
Thus, the majority in this case has successfully rendered the reimbursement provisions of this Act devoid of any practical significance. Moreover, its apparent insistence upon "actual” notice from individual property owners may encourage municipal officials to delay undertaking preventive measures until they are given the necessary notification and even then to concentrate their efforts on the particular pieces of property for which notice is received. Only thus may they be recompensed for their expenses. Because the majority’s formulation renders nugatory the statutory provisions and may, if followed literally, discourage prompt governmental responses to riot contrary to sound public policy, I cannot subscribe to its interpretation.
II
The majority does not reach the second ground for denial of reimbursement asserted by the Appellate Division ■ — ■ that municipalities having a paid police force are not entitled to be recompensed. My learned colleagues do, however, note in dictum that the contention "is persuasively presented and is not without appeal.” See ante at 149. Inasmuch as I conclude that the majority’s analysis of the first issue is flawed, I am impelled to address the second ground.
The Appellate Division, although admitting that its construction of the statute was "not discernible from the * * * language” of the Act, nevertheless concluded that a city such as Newark, which has its own paid police force, "is not encompassed within the class entitled to reimbursement * * City of Newark v. County of Essex, 160 N. J. Super. 105, 111, 113 (App. Div. 1978). It reasoned that because cities with paid police forces are liable for property damage *153resulting from riots, the Legislature must have also intended to impose upon them the expenses incurred in quelling such disturbances.
As a preliminary observation, it should be noted that the Appellate Division’s interpretation of the Act essentially reads the reimbursement provision right out of the statute. Under its formulation, only municipalities having no paid police force are entitled to reimbursement. Yet, such townships will not likely incur any expenses for which reimbursement will be necessary.
More importantly, the very words of the statute contradict the Appellate Division’s conclusion. The reimbursement section provides that
[t]ke mayor or officer or sheriff shall, upon receiving the notice, take all legal means to protect the property attacked or threatened. The expenses incurred by any such officers in the performance of any duty hereby imposed shall be paid by the county treasurer of the county in which the property is situate. * * *
[N. J. 8. A. 2A :48-4]
This provision makes no distinction dependent upon the existence of a paid police force. In contrast, N. J. 8. A. 2A:48-1, imposing liability for property damages, clearly distinguishes between townships having a paid police force and those lacking one. It is difficult to believe that the Legislature, having carefully drawn this dichotomy in one section, could have unintentionally and unartfully omitted it in another.
Moreover, a careful reading of the various provisions of the entire legislative scheme buttresses the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to exclude cities such as Newark from reimbursement. N. J. 8. A. 2A:48-3 requires that notice be given to “the mayor or chief executive officer or chief of police of the municipality or the sheriff of the county, as the case may be. * * *” (emphasis supplied.) This provision clearly envisions that notice will be given to an official of the entity which will he liable for any ensuing *154property damage. Thus, in the case of a municipality lacking a police force, the notice should properly go to the county sheriff rather than a township official. The sheriff, however, would not be in need of reimbursement by the county, as the funds he would be expending would be county monies. Hence, unless the statute is to be rendered meaningless, it must be considered to encompass cases where the municipality does possess a paid police force.
The Appellate Division’s reluctance to accept this natural reading of the reimbursement provision is perhaps due to its inability to perceive a policy basis for distinguishing between a municipality’s liability for property damage and its responsibility for the costs incurred in protecting that property. Consequently, it concluded that the Legislature must have intended townships with paid police forces to bear the burden of both expenses. Contrary to its opinion, however, such a policy basis does indeed exist.
In A & B Auto Stores v. Newark, supra, we noted three justifications for the statutory scheme: (1) “to deter riots by subjecting the rioters and their neighbors * * * to the tax burden ensuing upon a riot,” (2) “to induce vigilance within the community,” and (3) “to spread the burden of those criminal events among the citizens * * * and this upon a policy decision that it is just to spread the losses of the phenomenon of mob and riot disorders.” 59 N. J. at 14-15. These rationales clearly support a distinction between liability for damages and the responsibility for expenses.
As noted, .one of the three justifications for the scheme is to induce municipal vigilance. A municipality which must bear the costs of riot damages will have an added incentive to prevent or reduce them. Only municipalities with paid police forces, however, possess the resources and ability to mitigate or circumscribe property losses attendant upon a riot, and thus only they are subjected to liability for property damages. See A & B Auto Stores, supra, 59 N. J. at 15. However, the Legislature surely recognized that a municipality in containing a riot benefits not only its own inhabi*155tants, but also persons living in nearby areas. It thus ordained that although property damage costs would be borne by the municipality, the expenses associated with quelling the riot should be shared by all inhabitants of the county. While the Legislature could well have required property losses as well as expenses stemming from a riot be borne by the county or even the State, rather than the municipality, it was entirely within the legislative competence to provide reimbursement for one rather than both items.
Practical considerations also underlie the dichotomy. A township’s liability for ensuing property damage will dampen to a certain extent any tendency to be less than vigorous in responding to a riot. However, if the municipality is to be reimbursed for its expenses, it will have even further reason to devote all of its resources and energies toward preventing and containing riots.
Therefore, I would reverse the Appellate Division and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.
Justice Handler joins in this opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Clifford and Schreibbr — 4.
For reversal — Justices Pashman and Handler — 2.