dissenting.
I dissent. Whether sufficient articulable facts justified the police officers’ temporary detention of appellant depends upon the totality of the circumstances. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Applying this standard, I agree with the trial judge’s implied finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly intrude upon appellant’s freedom through an investigatory stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The record shows that the officers, dressed in police uniforms, were patrolling an apartment complex which they knew from prior experience to be a high crime area where drug sales often took place in the open. While unobserved, the officers overheard enough of a drug related conversation to make them suspect that those doing the talking probably were armed and engaging in criminal activity. When the officers suddenly made their presence known, appellant and two other males in the vicinity immediately fled, appellant carrying an unidentifiable “purplish” object. Appellant had to be twice ordered to stop.
While flight from a law enforcement officer cannot alone support a determination of probable cause, flight can provide, in appropriate circumstances, the key ingredient justifying a decision of a law enforcement officer to take action. See United States v. Vasquez, 534 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1976); Starks v. State, 661 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1983, no pet.). In my judgment, the circumstances shown in this record are adequate to invoke this principle. See Washington v. State, 660 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Simpson v. State, 668 S.W.2d 915, 917-18 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.); Starks, 661 S.W.2d at 757. Accordingly, I would overrule appellant’s first point of error.
I would also overrule appellant’s second point of error complaining that the sentence is constitutionally excessive. The sentence is well within the statutory range, and on this basis we rejected a similar challenge in Fielding v. State, 719 S.W.2d 361, 366 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d).
I would affirm the conviction.