concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant Galison’s conviction should stand, but I cannot agree that appellant Goldstein’s “conduct was not of the type intended to be prohibited by the Act.” (at 1265). Therefore, I disagree with its conclusion that his conviction should be reversed.
First, let us examine what conduct the so-called Baby Broker Act proscribes. Section 32-785 mandates in pertinent part:
No person other than the parent, guardian, or relative . . and no . agency . . . other than a licensed child-placing agency, may place or arrange or assist in placing or arranging for the placement of a child under sixteen years of age . . . for adoption.
Next, we review the conduct engaged in by appellant Goldstein which undergirds his conviction by the trial court sitting without a jury. The majority concedes (at 1270, 1271), that “both cases [appellant Galison and appellant Goldstein] present evidence of some child-placement activity being conducted by the defendants within the District.”1 The majority specifically describe the child-placement activity of appellant Goldstein as follows:
Dr. Stave advised Goldstein that one of his patients, Miss Doe, was expecting a child and wished to privately place the child for adoption. Goldstein responded he, Goldstein, would be willing to assist in such a placement. [at 1269.] The Norths thereafter retained Goldstein to assist in the proposed adoption.
Goldstein arranged with the staff neonatologist to assure confidentiality of the identity of Baby Doe’s mother by covering the baby’s crib identification with the name “Goldstein.” Similarly, all hospital billing accounts were maintained in Goldstein’s name and paid out of an escrow fund established through him by the Norths. . . (Goldstein had visited Miss Doe and her parents at the hospital for the purpose of obtaining their signatures on various documents related to the Maryland proceedings.) . [at 1269, 1270.]
The second placement also was initiated through Dr. Stave, who advised Gold-stein that his patient, Miss Roe, wished to *1273place her expected child for adoption. . [T]he Wests . . . retained Goldstein to assist in the placement. [H]e [Goldstein] arranged to meet Miss Roe and her mother at the hospital to obtain their signatures on various legal documents. ... [at 1270.] When Baby Roe was able to be released from the hospital, Goldstein was unavailable and therefore sent an associate to the hospital. The hospital bills were paid from an escrow fund established by Gold-stein for the Wests, [at 1270.]
The third placement was initiated by Dr. Rose, whose patient, Miss Poe, desired to privately place her expected child. [H]e recommended Goldstein . . Contacted by the Souths, Gold-stein . . . finally agreed to assist them. . . . Goldstein arranged for the hospital bills to be transferred to his name and paid the bill from an escrow account established by him for the Souths. He met the Souths at the hospital, where they were instructed in the care of the child by the hospital staff. The child was released to its maternal grandfather, Mr. Poe, who gave the child to Goldstein. Goldstein, in turn, gave the child to the Souths, [at 1270.]
Then, we turn to the conclusion by the trial court which rejected the argument by appellant Goldstein that his conduct was not subject to the Baby Broker Act. Judge Belson, who heard the testimony and rendered the guilty verdict, concluded:
. [a codefendant] and Attorney Goldstein [appellant] had substantial contacts with the District of Columbia and . their activities in the District were necessary to the eventual placement of the infants. Although the natural and adopting parents were not domiciled in the District, much of the arranging for placement and the actual transfer of the infants did occur in the District of Columbia. It would be a severe and unwarranted limitation of the statute to hold that it does not prohibit the acts found to have been performed by Attorney Goldstein and [the codefendant]. Such a holding could render the statute a virtual nullity in cases in which natural and adopting parents reside in other jurisdictions. [Emphasis added.]
We re-examine what this court has said concerning the role of an attorney in assisting with adoption proceedings pursuant to the Baby Broker’s Act. Some 30 years ago, in Goodman v. District of Columbia, D.C. Mun.App., 50 A.2d 812 (1947), Chief Judge Cay ton, writing for the court which affirmed the conviction of a practicing lawyer for violation of the Act, stated:
Congress therefore decreed that commercial agents, baby brokers, and even the best-intentioned citizens serving upon a non-commercial basis and from the most humane motives, must none of them be permitted to place children for adoption unless previously investigated, found qualified, and licensed.
To emphasize that purpose Congress in the plainest language made it unlawful for anyone not licensed to “place or arrange or assist in placing or arranging for the placement” of a child.
What the appellant did is very clear. He “arranged” and “assisted” in placing and personally consummated the placement of the child. He was the intermediary who produced the prospective adopters and arranged contact (indirect ■though it was) with the mother. He it was who presented to the mother the document for release of her child and obtained her signature. He it was who arranged for the presence of the adopting parents at the hospital. And he it was who performed the final act of placement by accepting the child from the arms of its mother and physically handing it over to the adopting father. It would be difficult to imagine a more clear-cut infraction of the letter as well as the spirit of the law.
******
We think it plain that so long as the lawyer gives only legal advice; so long as he appears in court in adoption proceedings, representing either relinquishing or adopting parents; so long as he refrains *1274from serving as intermediary, go-between, or placing agent; so long as he leaves or refers the placement of children and the arrangements for their placement to agencies duly licensed, he is within his rights under the statute. If that were all this appellant had done his conviction could not stand. It is plain he has done much more. Blameless though he is by ordinary standards of professional ethics, he has run afoul a statute which declares his actions malum prohibitum. [Id. at 814-15.]
In 1959, this court was called upon in Anderson v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun. App., 154 A.2d 717 (1959), to review the conviction of a lawyer for violating the Baby Broker Act. We entered an affirmance, saying:
[T]he adopting mother called appellant, reciting what had happened, and requested him to handle the matter. Appellant agreed and told her he would pick her up at a street corner near the bank. .
The adopting mother withdrew $150 from her bank account and met appellant as planned. In his car at that time were his wife, a notary public of the State of Maryland, and Mrs. Petro.
The party went to the home of the natural mother, leaving the adopting mother in the automobile. After some conversation, the child was given to Mrs. Petro and the party drove to the doctor’s office. Following a satisfactory examination, they returned to the natural mother’s home, again leaving the adopting mother in the car. Appellant presented the natural mother with a paper identified as a “consent to adoption,” which she and her husband signed and acknowledged in the presence of appellant’s wife, the notary public. The natural mother told appellant she was in financial difficulty and he said, “I’ll contact the adopting mother and see what I can do for you.” He left the house and a short time later returned with $50, obtained from the adopting mother, which he gave the natural mother, remarking, “This is a loan.” The adopting mother was then given the child and the parties returned to their respective homes. [Id. at 717-18.]
Judge Quinn emphasized in his opinion for the court what we had said in Goodman concerning the appropriate role for a lawyer under the Act:
[S]o long as he refrains from serving as an intermediary, go-between or placing agent . . . he is within his rights under the statute. . . . [Goodman v. District of Columbia, supra at 815.]
Again, in 1963, a practicing lawyer appealed his conviction for violating the Act and this court affirmed. Dobkin v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 194 A.2d 657 (1963). We stated:
The evidence against appellant was that a woman expecting a child contacted him and asked for help in placing the child for adoption; that appellant later called the expectant mother informing her that a couple from New York, who were interested in adopting her baby, would be in town and he arranged a meeting between them; that the New York couple gave him money to be used in supporting the expectant mother; that when the baby was born the mother contacted appellant who went to the hospital and had her sign adoption papers he had prepared; that appellant and the couple escorted the mother and the baby from the hospital, and the couple then took the child with them and the mother went home. . . . It is apparent that appellant’s course of dealing showed him to be in violation of the statute and justified a conviction. [Id. at 658.]
Finally, we look at the reason the majority employs for holding the Baby Broker Act inapplicable to what it concedes was child-placement activity by appellant Goldstein:
Since the mothers were not residing in the District and no coercive activity was employed in an attempt to persuade them to relinquish their children, the District interests which were offended by Galison are not threatened here [and] no other District interest [is] threatened by Gold-stein’s conduct, [at 1271.]
*1275I submit that Judge Belson’s rejection of appellant Goldstein’s argument, embraced now by the majority, was required by the Act and consistent with our prior decisions. The reversal of his conviction is that very action Chief Judge Cayton urged this court to eschew: “the process of erosion by judicial construction” which “before long . would be complete and the Act ineffective.” Goodman v. District of Columbia, supra at 814. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
. The applicable statute forbids maintaining a child-placing agency in the District unless licensed, D.C. Code 1973, § 32-782, which appellants were concededly not.