OPINION
DORSEY, Justice.This is a drug forfeiture case commenced under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4476-15 §§ 5.03-5.08 (Vernon 1976) (repealed)1, by which the State seeks forfeiture of a 1979 Ford Welding Truck presently belonging to Rodolfo Rivera. The trial court dismissed the cause for failure to comply with the requirement of section 5.07(a), that a forfeiture hearing be set within thirty days of the defendant’s filing an answer. The State of Texas appeals by three points of error challenging the dismissal.
All three points attack the trial court’s decision to dismiss based on the provision of section 5.07(a) that, “[i]f an answer is filed, a time for hearing on forfeiture shall be set within thirty days of filing the answer and notice of the hearing shall be sent to all parties.”2
Nueces County Sheriff’s Deputies seized Rivera’s truck on April 10, 1989. On April 18th the present forfeiture action was filed, *142and Rivera answered on April 26th. On April 28th the State requested the trial court to set a hearing, but the court refused. On July 6th Rivera moved the court to dismiss the forfeiture action for failure to comply with section 5.07(a). On October 13th the trial court dismissed the action based on Rivera's motion.
By its third point of error the State complains that section 5.07(a) is discretionary and that a dismissal for noncompliance is not the correct remedy. There is some disagreement among the courts of appeals concerning the mandatory or directive nature of section 5.07(a)’s 30 day requirement. The State urges us to follow State v. Boren, 654 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.App.-Waco 1983, no writ). In Boren, the Waco court held that the requirement is merely directive and dismissal is not warranted absent a showing of harm to the defendant. Id. at 548; see also McKee v. State, 318 S.W.2d 113, 116-17 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Rivera, however, urges us to follow more recent and prevalent pronouncements, including our own, that the requirement is mandatory and dismissal is proper when the trial court fails to set a hearing within thirty days following the defendant’s answer. Lopez v. State, 797 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, 1990); State v. One (1) 1986 Nissan Automobile, 792 S.W.2d 577, 578-79 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1990, no writ); Lovelace v. Downey, 783 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 1990, no writ); State v. $4,097 in U.S. Currency, 773 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Clark v. State, 693 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
At issue here is the interpretation of provisions of a forfeiture statute. The law abhors forfeitures and construes them strictly against the forfeiture when they are a matter of contract. See Williams v. Northrup, 649 S.W.2d 740, 746 (Tex.App.Tyler 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Parham v. Glass Club Lake, Inc., 533 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The strict construction against the forfeiture should also be utilized when the forfeiture is to the sovereign and is created by statute. See State v. Young's Market Co., 369 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We therefore follow the more recent, and we believe persuasive, authority and hold the provision that the action be set within 30 days to be mandatory and dismissal to be the correct remedy. The State’s third point of error is overruled.
By its first point of error the State complains that it should not be prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to comply with section 5.07(a). However, regardless of the diligence of the State’s attorneys in requesting a setting, we cannot take it upon ourselves to judicially create a means to allow the State to proceed with the action and circumvent the clear mandate of the statute. See $4,097 in U.S. Currency, 773 S.W.2d at 675-76. The State’s first point of error is overruled.
By its second point of error the State complains that Rivera waived reliance on section 5.07(a) by failing to request a setting or object to the scheduling or trial setting until he filed a July 6th motion to dismiss, long past the 30 day period. However, nowhere in the statute is the burden placed on the defendant to request a setting. Rather, it was the State’s and the trial court’s responsibility under the statute to set the case within 30 days after Rivera’s answer. It is not Rivera’s responsibility to insure that the State and the court comply with mandatory provisions of the law which may preclude their right to proceed with the action. The State’s second point of error is overruled. See id. at 675-76.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NYE, C.J., dissents.
. Now Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. ch. 59 (Vernon Supp.1990).
. We note that the 30-day requirement does not apply to forfeiture cases initiated after the enactment of Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 59.-05(a) & (b) (Vernon Supp.1990), which now provides that the rules of pleading and procedure in forfeiture cases are the same as in other civil cases.