(concurring and dissenting).
I agree with the Majority that the procedure followed by the lower court substantially complied with the requirements of Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. Magaziner, 434 Pa. 1, 253 A.2d 263 (1969), and that appellant suffered no prejudice from any technical disparities. See also Simmons v. Simmons, 232 Pa.Super. 365, 335 A.2d 764 (1975). I also agree that we must remand for a hearing as to whether appellant “willfully” refused to pay the arrearages. See Commonwealth ex rel. Wright v. Hendrick, 455 Pa. 36, 312 A.2d 402 (1973). However, I do not agree that appellant may be committed to prison for civil contempt if he is presently unable to pay the arrearages specified by court order.
The Supreme Court in In Re Martorano, 464 Pa. 66, 78, 346 A.2d 22, 28 (1975), stated the test for distinguishing civil contempt from indirect criminal contempt as follows: “If the dominant purpose is to prospectively coerce the contemnor to comply with an order of the court, the adjudication of contempt is civil. If, however, the dominant purpose is to punish the contemnor for disobedience of the court’s order or some other contemptuous act, the adjudication of contempt is criminal.” See also Knaus v. Knaus, 387 Pa. 370, 127 A.2d 669 (1956). If appellant cannot presently comply with the lower court’s order, then he no longer “carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket” and the court cannot coerce the *358contemnor to use the keys. Knaus v. Knaus, supra, at 379, 127 A.2d at 673. The court’s purpose could only be to punish the contemnor for past disobedience of the court’s order. Such a purpose requires adherence to the safeguards employed in criminal contempt cases. See Act of June 23,1931, P.L. 925, § 1; 17 P.S. § 2047.
Therefore, I would remand for a hearing as to whether appellant “willfully” refused to pay the arrearages and whether he has the present ability to pay the arrearages specified by the court order.