This appeal arises from an action to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage arising from an automobile accident which occurred June 18, 1971, at the intersection of Routes 30 and 48 in North Versailles Township, Allegheny County. Route 30 is a four lane highway running in an easterly and westerly direction at its intersection with Route 48, while the latter is an intersecting north-south highway. The intersection is controlled by a traffic light which did not have left turn arrows. At the time of the accident, the signal was green for traffic proceeding east and west on Route 30.
Both cars were on Route 30, one driven by Agnes Stokan headed west and the other driven by James Turnbull headed east. Agnes Stokan was in the process of making a left-hand turn from Route 30 onto Route 48 when her car was struck by the approaching vehicle operated by James Turnbull.
Both cars were damaged and two passengers in the Stokan car, Jean and Maryann Stokan, younger sisters of Agnes Stokan, were injured. Maryann Stokan suffered a severe concussion which rendered her unconscious for ten days and lacerations and contusions of the face, right shoulder, right hip, right hand and left knee. Jean Stokan sustained abrasions of the arms, legs and forehead in addition to cervical pain.
According to the Stokan testimony, their car stopped at the intersection for several seconds before making its left-hand turn, the left-hand turn signal of their car *443turned on. Agnes Stokan, the driver, observed the oncoming Turnbull car some 75 to 100 yards away, but noted that it was in the left-hand lane and signaling a left-hand turn. On that assurance, the Stokan car made its left-hand turn and was struck by the oncoming Turnbull car.
The Turnbull account of the accident is that as their car approached the intersection, it was being driven in the right rather than the left-hand lane and was not signaling for a left-hand turn. Turnbull testified that he was driving 40 to 42 miles an hour. Another eyewitness estimated his speed at 35 miles an hour; the legal limit was 40. Turnbull did not see the Stokan car until he was about 25 feet from the intersection. At that point in time, the Stokan car made its left-hand turn and pulled in front of the Turnbull vehicle, but Turnbull was not able to avoid the collision due to his close proximity to the Stokan car when he first observed it.
In the litigation which resulted, (a) the injured Stokan girls, by Michael R. Stokan as their parent and guardian, sued James Turnbull, driver of the oncoming car, for compensation for their injuries; (b) the parents sued Turnbull for reimbursement for medical expenses and damages; and (c) Catherine M. Stokan, the mother, sued him for damages to the Stokan car. James Turn-bull named Agnes Stokan as an additional defendant and claimed reimbursement from her for damages to his car.
The jury returned verdicts (a) in favor of the parents for the exact amount of the medical bills incurred on behalf of their minor daughters ($1,735 and $45) and (b) in favor of Catherine Stokan for the property damage done to the Stokan vehicle ($800), (c) but a verdict of nothing was returned for the pain, suffering and inconvenience of the minor daughters, all awards against Agnes Stokan, but no verdict against James Turnbull. Turnbull, in turn, was awarded a verdict against Agnes Stokan for damage to his car ($966.10).
*444Post-trial motions followed, presented on behalf of the Stokan minor girls, their parents and Agnes Stokan, each seeking a new trial and Agnes Stokan a judgment N.O.V. as well. The court below awarded Jean and Maryann Stokan, acting by their father-guardian, a new trial against Agnes Stokan but not Turnbull, and limited the new trial solely to the issue of damages. Agnes Stokan’s motions for a new trial and judgment N.O.V. were denied. Agnes Stokan appeals, seeking a new trial on all issues and against all parties.
It is clear that there must be a new trial. A verdict against Agnes Stokan in favor of her parents for the exact amount of the medical bills incurred on behalf of her minor sisters, but with a verdict of nothing for their pain, suffering and inconvenience is both inadequate and inconsistent. Whether the verdict is a compromise between liability and damage we have no way of knowing. It is clear, however, that there was no rational basis for a determination that the injuries were inconsequential and, consequently, not compensable. There is no testimony or contention that either of the injured girls was negligent in any way. Consequently, Jean and Maryann Stokan, acting by their father and guardian, are entitled to a new trial.
In a similar situation, it was ruled in Pascarella v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 389 Pa. 8, 13, 131 A.2d 445, 447 (1957);
“Since the jury found that the parents of Joyce Long and Mary Pascarella were entitled to reimbursement for monies expended for medical bills incurred on account of injuries sustained by their daughters, there can be no reasonable explanation for denying a return to the girls themselves for those same injuries. Once a jury imposes legal liability on a responsible party they may not wilfully or capriciously withhold payment of an item which is inextricably interwoven in the pattern of the liability.”
*445The trial court has granted a new trial but has limited it to one against Agnes Stokan and to the single issue of damages suffered by her minor sisters. We believe the court erred in both limitations.
It is the normal practice in granting a new trial to grant it generally against all parties on all issues. This court stated in Mains v. Moore, 189 Pa.Super. 430, 434, 150 A.2d 549, 551 (1959):
“Ordinarily the grant of a new trial means a new trial generally; it restores a case to the status it had before the trial took place and is fully open to be tried de novo as to all parties and all issues: Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Lynch, 308 Pa. 23, 28, 162 A. 157; Iwankow v. Colonial Ins. Co., 120 Pa.Super. 114, 120, 181 A. 870.”
A new trial limited to the issue of damages is the exception, not the general rule. It should not be so limited unless the issue of liability is free from doubt. In the case before us, the liability of appellant Agnes Stokan is very much contested.
In Friedman v. Matovich, 191 Pa.Super. 275, 280-281, 156 A.2d 608, 611 (1959), this court well summarized the limited circumstances which justify limiting a new trial to the issue of damages as follows:
“But these situations [a new trial limited to the issue of damages] are rare. To draw the line so that limiting new trials to the amount of damages becomes the general rule instead of the exception will not aid, but hinder the administration of justice. .
“To limit the new trial is to assume that the verdict conclusively settled the liability of the defendant. Regardless of what we may believe because of personal familiarity with similar circumstances, the fact remains that there is a direct conflict in the testimony of the parties concerning the liability of the defendant which makes the fact a disputed jury question. In the *446case of a verdict of $1 it is not realistic to assume that the jury deliberately and conclusively settled the question of liability and was confused only concerning the amount involved.
“ ‘The court should never permit a party to an action to select for retrial the issues decided against him and upon the rehearing treat those decided in his favor as settled, when the issues are interwoven and cannot be separated without injustice to the other party.’ Reay v. Beasley, 1937, 49 Ariz. 362, 66 P.2d 1043, 1044.
“ ‘The instances in which a new trial upon the issue of damages alone may be proper are comparatively infrequent. Where it appears that the verdict was the result of a compromise, such error taints the entire verdict and requires a new trial as to all of the issues in the case.’ 39 Am.Jur., p. 48, § 24.”
The issue of liability being a contested one, the new trial must include both issues, liability and damages.
The new trial must also include both parties defendant, appellee Turnbull as well as appellant Agnes Stokan. It will be impossible on a retrial to determine whether appellant Agnes Stokan is liable for the injuries to her sisters without determining the responsibility of Turn-bull. While he appears to have been exonerated by the jury, we have no way of knowing whether there was a relationship between the exoneration of Turnbull and the inadequacy of the award to the Stokan sisters. To attempt to analyze the several facets of the jury’s verdict and determine which are right and which are wrong is akin to unscrambling an egg.
A jury verdict is not put together with the logic of a lawyer’s argument. It commonly and appropriately represents an overview of a layman’s sense of justice. One item may be traded off for another, not necessarily in compromise but in a search for what is sensed to be *447an equitable result. Consequently, a jury verdict of several components should not be taken apart item by item, some sustained and some reversed like a governor’s item veto. The component parts of a multiple verdict are almost necessarily interrelated. This fact of life was well expressed in Friedman, supra, at pages 279-80, 156 A.2d at page 611:
“Ordinarily a jury does not apply with meticulous care a logician’s syllogism to the evidence nor proceed from point to point in the fashion of a lawyer. It is unrealistic to assume that the judge’s charge, filled with technical rules for the jury to follow in arriving at its verdict, is never dimmed in the jury room by the guiding light of a layman’s sense of right. The jury seldom examines the evidence piecemeal with the discerning eye of a scientist, nor does it climb a logical ladder, step by step to a mathematically perfect conclusion. Jurors are more likely to view the evidence as a whole and apply their accumulated experience and combined sense of justice to arrive at a result they think fair to all the parties under all the circumstances. This is not a fault but a virtue of the jury system; it is one of the system’s blessings, not one of its evils. This humanizes and tempers the cold logic which accepts no compromises and recognizes no grays. That the jury requires court supervision and its product occasionally requires judicial revision does not detract from the value of this ancient right of free people to have their disputes submitted to their peers. If the jury took a panoramic view of this case to determine the result it believed just, then limiting the retrial to a single point is unlikely to bring about a just result.”
We conclude that it is impossible and inappropriate to exclude appellee Turnbull from the retrial of this case. He was one of two parties to the accident and the *448situation cannot be reconstructed for a second jury without his involvement.
We note the argument that in Amati v. Williams, 211 Pa.Super. 398, 236 A.2d 551 (1967), a case quite similar factually to the one at bar, a new trial was limited to a determination of damages and to a single defendant. However, both cases are primarily factual situations and Amati lays down no rule of law for other cases that a new trial should be restricted as to issues or parties.
Such limitations would clearly be inappropriate in this case. We are dealing with what appears to have been a compromise verdict between the elements of liability and damage but we are without knowledge as to the interplay which took place between the two issues. Only a new trial involving all parties and all issues can cure the inadequacy of the multiple verdict under review.
The order of the court below granting a limited retrial is modified, and a new trial ordered against both appellant Agnes Stokan and appellee Turnbull on all issues.
JACOBS, J., files a dissenting opinion in which HOFFMAN, J., joins.