(dissenting).
I dissent. The majority totally abolishes the cause of action for criminal conversation without any statutory or *285any other authority for doing so other than its own inclinations that the tort is an “anachronism.”1 I cannot agree that the marital relationship — which has been protected in this Commonwealth for more than two centuries — is no longer deserving of the protection of our law.
The majority devotes much of its discussion to the history of this cause of action. Whether a wife was once regarded as the property of her husband is irrelevant. The action is now equally available to a husband or wife. Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537 (1959). Furthermore, the basis of the action is not the protection of property rights, but the protection of conjugal rights. Cf. Karchner v. Mumie, supra; Long v. Booe, 106 Ala. 570, 17 So. 716 (1895).
Respected authorities on the law of torts have noted that “[t]he interests involved in the familial relationship are among the most delicate and most important in our society.” F. Harper & F. James, 1 The Law of Torts (1956 ed.) § 8.1, at 606. Surely an action for criminal conversation is a legitimate remedy for invasion of the familial relationship.
Professor Prosser has articulated what the law of torts embodies:
“So far as there is [a guiding principle], it would seem that liability must be based upon conduct which is socially unreasonable. The common thread woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable interference with the interests of others.”
W. Prosser, Law of Torts (1971 ed.) § 1, at 6. Our society still considers it “socially unreasonable” for one person to have sexual relations with the spouse of another. Nor can it be said that the law is unable to provide a remedy for the invasion of the marital interest.
*286The majority concludes that this cause of action has not been able to “weather the rapid legal and societal changes witnessed over the past fifteen years.” I know of no case during the past fifteen years — or at any time— where this Court has abolished a cause of action in tort. Moreover, in Karchner, supra, this Court effectively expanded the availability of the cause of action. I know of no societal changes since then that support the majority’s conclusion that the familial interest is no longer worthy of protection by the courts of this Commonwealth.
The majority’s reliance on cases where we have abolished immunities to tort actions is inapposite here. Indeed, in those cases we removed immunities so that actions can be brought. In none of these cases did we abolish a cause of action.
Nor is it persuasive that the Legislature omitted adultery from the new Crimes Code. The Legislature deemed it advisable to abolish only the criminal action and not to abolish the correlative tort, as was done in certain other states. Society may not have a sufficient interest in prosecuting this activity but individuals may indeed still have an interest worthy of vindication in a civil action. It may well be that the new Crimes Code creates even greater justification for the tort of criminal conversation, since a wronged spouse now has only a civil remedy and can no longer be vindicated through society’s exercise of the criminal sanction.
Even if, as the majority believes, certain facts should be defenses to the action, there is no justification for abolishing the entire cause of action. First, our legal system is capable of ascertaining, instituting and applying those defenses to an action which are worthy of judicial recognition. But we are not now presented with an argument for enlarging available defenses. Second, mechanisms presently exist which are capable of lessen*287ing the potential harshness of this tort in particular cases.2
In sum, the majority’s conclusion is not supported by its premises. There is no authority for judicially extinguishing a cause of action, and the majority’s discussion of the history of the tort and available defenses is not relevant to the real inquiry involved when an entire cause of action is attacked.
The true inquiry here should be: (1) Is there an interest which society should protect? (2) Has there been an invasion of that interest which cannot be excused or justified? (3) Has the invasion produced an injury for which the law can provide a remedy?
The first inquiry has been answered in the affirmative for more than two hundred years. Whether the interest is no longer worthy of protection is a public policy decision only the Legislature should make. Since a legally protected interest exists and an invasion of that interest has been admitted in this case, the trial court should determine whether the invasion can be excused or justified. Likewise, the trial court should determine whether the injury sustained is one for which the court should provide a remedy.
The judgment on that issue of liability should be affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court for a determination of damages.
POMEROY, Justice (dissenting).*288In its eagerness and haste to do away with the tort of criminal conversation, which “from time immemorial” 1 has been part of the law of this Commonwealth, the Court today ignores well settled principles of appellate jurisprudence. It does so by condoning, instead of setting aside, a decision on its merits by the Superior Court of a purported appeal from an unappealable order. The Court then proceeds to compound the error of the Superior Court by itself entertaining and deciding this case on its merits. I respectfully dissent.
The defendant took his appeal to the Superior Court from a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, sought and obtained by plaintiff under Rule 1035 of our Rulés of Civil Procedure, establishing defendant’s liability for criminal conversation. Rule 1035(b) of the Rules expressly states that a summary judgment rendered on issues of liability alone, as in this case, is “interlocutory in character.” This provision of the rule is consistent with our case law, which has defined a final order as an order which puts one of the parties out of court. See, e. g., Ventura v. Skylark Motel, Inc., 431 Pa. 459, 246 A.2d 353 (1968); Pasternack v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, 421 Pa. 21, 218 A.2d 350 (1966); McGee v. Singley, 382 Pa. 18, 114 A.2d 141 (1955). Appellant, however, has not yet been put out of court, for trial on the issue of damages remains to be had. Although the trial court in the text of its order described it as a “final order,” the order is clearly interlocutory; the court could not imbue it with finality simply by calling it final.
As a general rule, the appellate courts of Pennsylvania have jurisdiction of appeals only from final orders of the courts below.2 Thus, as we have often said, interlocutory *289orders or judgments are appealable only if made so by statute or general rule.3 P. Agnes, Inc. v. Philadelphia Police Home Ass’n, 439 Pa. 448, 266 A.2d 696 (1970); Ventura v. Skylark Motel, Inc., supra; Adcox v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Casualty Insurance Co., 419 Pa. 170, 213 A.2d 366 (1965). Since there is no statute or general rule which authorizes appeals from the granting of partial summary judgment, the order of the court of common pleas is not appealable, and appellant’s appeal to the Superior Court should have been quashed. See Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976).4
By requiring that all issues arising from a single law suit be reviewed in a single appeal, the rule of non-appealability of interlocutory orders and judgments serves the salutary purposes of promoting judicial economy in our appellate courts and of avoiding the protraction of litigation in our trial courts which would result from the allowance of multiple appeals. See Adcox v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Casualty Insurance Co., supra; Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 107 A.2d 854 (1954). It is recognized, however, that there can occasionally be cases in which the considerations supporting the general rule of nonappealability are outweighed by the need for a speedy determination of a legal issue the resolution of which is in doubt and upon which the *290course of the proceedings in the trial court depends. Accordingly, provision is made for permissive appeals in such cases by Section 501(b) of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. V, § 501(b), 17 P.S. § 211.501(b) (Supp.1976), which provides in pertinent part:
“When a court or administrative agency, in making an interlocutory order in a matter in which its final order would be within the jurisdiction of an appellate court, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter, it shall so state in such order. The appellate court may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order.” 5
Footnote 1 of the majority opinion notwithstanding the order granting the appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability does not meet the requirements of Section 501(b). The trial court did not certify that determination of the issue of liability “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion” or that “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter”; it made no certification of any sort. Moreover, the appellant did not petition the Superior Court for a discretionary allowance of appeal, and the Superior Court never entered an order allowing the appeal. See Superior Court Rule 53. Appellant and the courts below have at all times treated the order of the court of common pleas as a “final order” from which appellant was entitled, to appeal as a matter of right. In so doing, they were plainly mistaken, and I *291cannot agree that this Court should ignore the error by pretending that an order which clearly does not comply with Section 501(b) of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, supra, does in fact do so. (See footnote 1 of the opinion of the court, ante at 148).
Because under the circumstances the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction in the premises, I would vacate the order of that court and quash the appeal as having been brought from an interlocutory order.
. The majority’s reliance on cases in other jurisdictions where the cause of action was abolished by the Legislature lends no support for judicially abolishing the cause of action in this Commonwealth.
. The majority itself points out that evidence that plaintiff’s spouse consented to the relationship or that the spouse was the aggressor and seducer is admissible with reference to mitigating damages. The jury, then, through its award of damages can be expected to ensure that defendant’s liability corresponds to the degree of his culpability.
Furthermore, indemnification should be available where the spouse misrepresents her marital status to the liable party. Cf., Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 44, 886B(2)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 18,1972).
. Cornelius v. Hambay, 150 Pa. 359, 362, 24 A. 515 (1892).
. See, e. g., Sections 202, 203, 204(a), 302, and 402 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. II, §§ 202, 203, and 204(a), art. Ill, § 302, and art. IV § 402, 17 P.S. §§ 211.202, 211.203, 211.204(a), 211.302, and 211.402 (Supp.1976).
. See, e. g., the Act of February 14, 1866, P.L. 28, § 1, 12 P.S. § 1101, which permits appeals from orders granting preliminary injunctions; the Act of June 12, 1879, P.L. 177, § 1, 12 P.S. § 1102, which allows appeals from orders denying preliminary injunctions; and the Act of March 5, 1925, P.L. 23, § 1, 12 P.S. § 672, which provides that orders determining questions of the lower court’s jurisdiction are appealable. See also the statutes listed in Note to Rule 311, of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, adopted November 5,1975, effective July 1,1976.
. In Wetzel the Supreme Court of the United States held that an order granting partial summary judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b), upon which Rule 1035(b) of our rules is based, is not a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1201.
. Procedure under this section is now set forth in Chapter 13 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, adopted November 5,1975, effective July 1,1976.