(dissenting). Contributory negligence was a defense developed from and fashioned for negligence cases. The defense operated neatly. If a plaintiff had breached his duty of ordinary care, he would be barred from recovering from a defendant who had breached a similar duty.
The doctrine of strict liability in tort, however, as embodied in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and as adopted by this court, is not grounded in concepts of negligence, and “is not affected by the presence or absence of negligence.” Prokolkin v. General Motors Corporation, 170 Conn. 289, 301, 365 A.2d 1180. To establish a prima facie case under § 402A, a plaintiff must show that (1) a product was defective, (2) it was unreasonably dangerous to the consumer, (3) it thereby caused injury, (4) the seller of the product was engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (5) the product reached the user without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. *512“The crucial difference between strict liability and negligence is that the existence of due care, whether on the part of seller or consumer, is irrelevant. The seller is responsible for injury caused by his defective product even if he ‘has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.’ Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (2) (a).” Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corporation, 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893.
The doctrine of strict liability is a response to our society’s concern with the protection of the consumer from the damage which the products of an industrialized society can cause. Implicitly, the doctrine recognizes that in an imperfect world defective products may result from complex manufacturing processes despite the absence of any conduct falling below that of a reasonable man. The doctrine represents a policy decision that the burden of injuries brought about by a defective product should not be placed upon the individual who uses the product but, rather, should be borne by the manufacturer or supplier, and thus eventually be spread among the consuming public. Restatement (Second), 2 Torts § 402A, comment c.
Logically, defenses in a strict products liability action should be related to that theory of recovery and the policy considerations which prompted its adoption, rather than the policy considerations inherent in a negligence ease. In comment n to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts the position is taken that: “Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a *513defense when snch negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.”
A majority of the courts which have considered the issue have followed the Restatement position. They have recognized that contributory negligence of a plaintiff consisting merely of a failure to discover or guard against the possible existence of a defect does not bar recovery. Note, 46 A.L.R.3d 240 § 4 [a]; see, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas.); O. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248; Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306; Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Ore. 300, 509 P.2d 28; Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn.); see also Noel, “Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk,” 25 Vand. L. Rev. 93, 113. On the other hand, contributory negligence consisting of voluntarily and unreasonably encountering a known danger (assumption of risk) has been held to bar recovery in virtually all jurisdictions which recognize strict liability in tort. Note, 46 A.L.R.3d 240 § 5; see, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, supra; Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163; Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421; Devaney v. Sarno, 125 N.J. Super. 414, 311 A.2d *514208. But a majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue have determined that the “reasonable man” standard in evaluating the plaintiff’s conduct should be rejected in strict liability cases.
In Bachner v. Pearson, supra, 329, it was stated: “[T]he fact the plaintiff’s negligent conduct may have concurred with the defect to cause his injury should have no bearing on the validity of the initial policies calling for the application of strict liability.” In Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corporation, supra, 900, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: “We hold today that the ‘reasonable man’ standard in any form has no place in a strict liability case. The salutary purpose of the ‘unreasonably dangerous’ qualification is to preclude the seller’s liability where it cannot be said that the product is defective; this purpose can be met by requiring proof of a defect. To charge the jury or permit argument concerning the reasonableness of a consumer’s or seller’s actions and knowledge, even if merely to define ‘defective condition’ undermines the policy considerations that have led us to hold in [Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903] that the manufacturer is effectively the guarantor of his product’s safety. The plaintiff must still prove that there was a defect in the product and that the defect caused his injury; but if he sustains this burden, he will have proved that as to him the product was unreasonably dangerous.”
In Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 426, 261 N.E.2d 305, the Supreme Court of Illinois indicated: “We are persuaded that the policy considerations which led us to adopt strict tort liability in [Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182] compel the elimination of *515‘contributory negligence’ as a bar to recovery. We also note that all other jurisdictions which have adopted the theory of strict liability have reached substantially the same conclusion, for, even though some of the opinions speak in terms of ‘contributory negligence’ (see, e.g., . . . [Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278; Maiorino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18]) the actual conduct there held to bar recovery would by us be classified as misuse or assumption of risk.” The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in rejecting the applicability of the defense of contributory negligence in a strict liability case has expressed a similar opinion: “The reasons for this rule are two-fold: First, allowing ordinary negligence to bar strict liability would defeat the purposes for which the theory of strict liability was created. . . . Second, Tennessee courts have never allowed contributory negligence as a defense to conduct amounting to gross negligence, or to conduct which is culpable regardless of the care exercised by the defendant.” Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tenn.). In Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., supra, 305, it was held: “A user who neither mishandles the product nor voluntarily and unreasonably uses it after learning of its dangerous condition should not be deprived of this protection on account of incidental carelessness, even though it plays some part in the accident, if in fact a defect in the product is a proximate cause of his injuries.” To a similar effect are: O. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, supra; McCarthy v. F. C. Kingston Co., 22 Ariz. App. 17, 522 P.2d 778; Luque v. McLean, supra; Kirkland v. General Motors Corporation, 521 P.2d 1353, 1365 (Okla.); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.). See also Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir., *516applying Montana law); Downey v. Moore’s Time-Saving Equipment, Inc., 432 F.2d 1088 (7th Cir., applying Illinois law); Hastings v. Dis Tran Products, Inc., 389 F. Sup. 1352 (D. La.); Parzini v. Center Chemical Co., 134 Ga. App. 414, 214 S.E.2d 700; Gregory v. White Truck & Equipment Co., Inc., Ind. App., 323 N.E.2d 280; Keener v. Dayton Electric Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo.).
In Connecticut, there are additional reasons why “contributory negligence” is an inappropriate defense to a strict product liability action. Prior to 1973, the contributory negligence doctrine was rejected: (1) where the defendant’s negligence was willful or reckless; Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 139 A. 698; (2) where the defendant was engaged in an ultrahazardous activity; Starkel v. Edward Balf Co., 142 Conn. 336, 114 A.2d 199; (3) where the defendant created an absolute nuisance; Carahetta v. Meriden, 145 Conn. 338, 142 A.2d 727; and (4) by the application of the last clear chance doctrine; Childs v. Blesso, 158 Conn. 389, 260 A.2d 582; Saden, “Comparative Negligence Adopted in Connecticut,” 47 Conn. B.J. 416, 420. In 1973, the legislature abolished contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery in ordinary negligence actions where the plaintiff’s negligence is not greater than the combined negligence of the persons against whom recovery is sought. General Statutes ^ 52-572h. The decision of the majority cannot be reconciled with the legislative rejection of the contributory negligence defense. From this day on, the term “strict liability” must be considered a misnomer in Connecticut. Tort liability which can be defeated by conduct which could not defeat simple negligence liability cannot be properly denominated “strict.”
*517This is not to suggest, however, that strict liability is absolute liability. The same risk-spreading policy considerations which contributed to the adoption of the doctrine demand that limits be placed upon a seller’s responsibility. Thus, “[i]n determining where the loss should fall as between the nonnegligent manufacturer, distributor or retailer and the less than careful plaintiff, it has generally been recognized that plaintiffs who ‘misuse’ a product—use it for a purpose neither intended nor ‘foreseeable’ ... by the defendant—may be barred from recovery. (Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comment (h); Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff’s Conduct, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 267, 270; Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co. (N.D. Ind. 1965), 237 F. Supp. 427, 429; O. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller (1968), 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248, 253; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1962), 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, 377 P.2d 897, 901; Preston v. Up-Right, Inc. (1966), 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679, 683 & nn. 3 & 4; see also Neusus v. Sponholtz (7th Cir. 1966), 369 F.2d 259.)” Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., supra, 425-26.
“Contributory negligence” focuses upon the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct as measured by a “reasonable man” standard. “Abnormal use” focuses upon whether the product was used in a manner which should have been foreseen by the defendant. By his requests to charge, the plaintiff advanced the view that only conduct which constituted an abnormal use or misuse would bar recovery, and equated normal use with the foreseeable, intended or anticipated use, to be measured *518from the standpoint of the defendant.1 He argued that evidence of that standard was contained within the Pirelli pamphlet which described the tire in question as follows: “A remarkable snow tire. . . . Step on the accelerator, change gears, take a curve or hit the brakes—Pirelli Invernos grip . . . and hold. . . . When using studded tires sustained speeds should not exceed 70 MPH . . . .” It thus appears that the jury could have found that the foreseeable, intended and anticipated use of the tires was at sustained speeds of up to seventy miles per hour, and at intermittent speeds of over seventy miles per hour, rather than at the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour.
*5192 The court instructed the jury to compare the plaintiff’s conduct with that of a reasonably prudent person.2 Because the court rejected the requested charge, and adopted the “reasonable man” standard, the defendant manufacturer may have been able to escape liability for the sale of a defective product where the conduct of the user, although perhaps negligent, may have been the very use which was intended for the product by the manufacturer. If such a user is barred as against a manufacturer, we are left with a rule which permits the negligent user *520to recover in warranty or negligence, but not in strict tort liability, despite the fact that all elements of that tort are present. Clearly, such a result could not have been intended by this court when in Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 560, 227 A.2d 418, we expressed our approval of the principles enunciated in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The trial court should have adopted the written requests submitted by the plaintiff.
I would, therefore, find error, set aside the judgment and order a new trial.
The plaintiff requested the court to charge as follows:
“(a.) Contributory negligence, in the ordinary sense, will not bar recovery from an injury resulting from a cause of action based on strict tort liability.
(b.) A plaintiff is barred from recovery in an action based on the strict tort liability of others only when the nature of the plaintiff’s misconduct has reached the point at which he is guilty of an abnormal use of the product or has assumed the risk of its use.
(c.) In this case, ... by their allegations of ‘excessive’ speed, the defendants have put in issue the question of whether the plaintiff made an abnormal use of the studded snow tires. It is for you to determine, under all of the evidence presented, at what speed the plaintiff was proceeding and whether at that speed he was making an abnormal use of the product.
(d.) However, on the issue of abnormal use, you are to consider the anticipated and expected use of the studded tires on a 1964 MGB automobile. If the plaintiff used the studded snow tires at a speed and in a manner which was foreseeable and which the defendants could have reasonably intended and anticipated, then the plaintiff would not be guilty of having abnormally used the studded snow tires.
(e.) I charge you that even if the speed of the motor vehicle in combination with and in conjunction with the condition of the studded snow tires were together the proximate cause of the ‘fishtail,’ then this would still not bar the plaintiff from recovery under the Second and Third Counts of his Complaint, relating to strict tort liability, unless you also find that plaintiff was making an abnormal use of the studded snow tires at the speed and in the manner in which he operated the motor vehicle just prior to the ‘fishtail.’ ”
The court charged as follows: “Now, turning to the counts dealing with strict liability against each defendant, it is the law . . . that contributory negligence is a defense in strict liability when the conduct of the person claimed to have been injured by the alleged defective product has to do with use of that particular product. . . . Now, Mr. Hoelter had the duty not to misuse the studded tires or to use them in an abnormal way. . . . [I]f you find that he was using the tires by driving at a speed greater than the reasonably prudent person would operate the car, then, you would find him negligent in that regard. . . . Now, as far as the control of the car is concerned, ... by determining under what control a reasonably prudent person would have operated the car and under what control Mr. Hoelter, in fact, operated the car, you can find whether or not Mr. Hoelter was negligent in regard to control.”
The plaintiff excepted as follows: “I . . . take exception to your charge on contributory negligence. ... I think you are saying it’s a breach of duty under strict tort liability to put out a defective product, but then you are applying a test of negligence, of a reasonably prudent person in the use of that very defective product. . . . You are introducing a question of negligence of reasonably prudent behavior into a strict liability situation, . . . and contributory negligence is not a defense to that. ... I think we were entitled to some reference to . . . the concept of a reasonably foreseeable intended use. Your Honor gave the jury no instruction on that whatsoever.”
During their deliberation, the jury requested the court to explain “strict liability, contributory negligence and causation as they apply” to the Hoelter case. The court reaffirmed its earlier charge and reiterated that “the claims of contributory negligence . . . had to be considered . . . under the test of a reasonably prudent person . . . .” The plaintiff again excepted and stated that: “You must explain to them what the foreseeable and intended use of the product was . . . and it seems to me that the Pirelli specifications in and of themselves spell out the intended and foreseeable use of this product.”