dissenting.
Because I believe that genuine issues of material fact exist in Sloas’s individual capacity claims against Hall and Henderson, I respectfully dissent.
Generally, in order to be entitled to immunity, Hall and Henderson were required to make a prima facie showing that they were acting within the scope of their authority in operating the Class D Work Program.1 This “scope of authority” inquiry seems to focus primarily upon whether the official had the legal authority to engage in the conduct in question, rather than the propriety of the manner in which that conduct was performed.
At the time of Sloas’s injuries, KRS 441.125(2) provided that “[p]ursuant to a written policy adopted by the fiscal court on advice of the jailer, the jailer may permit certain prisoners to work on community service related projects. Before a prisoner is permitted to work in this type project, the county judge/executive or his designee shall sign his approval to the prisoner’s participation.” Thus, absent a written policy adopted by the fiscal court and absent the written approval of the county judge/executive (or his designee) of each inmate’s participation in the program, a jailer was not authorized to operate a community service work program. In his deposition, Hall admitted that he had never prepared a written policy concerning community service work by jail inmates, nor was he aware of any such written policy being effectuated before his taking office in 1994. Similarly, Henderson, who had worked at the jail since 1990, testified that he was unaware of any written policy authorizing the community service work project. Neither Hall nor Henderson testified that the county judge/executive had specifically approved Sloas’s participation in the program.
Long ago, we held that a public official who exceeds the limits of his lawful authority “must respond to the party injured like any other wrongdoer.”2 Given the testimony of Hall and Henderson that no written policy had been adopted by the fiscal court authorizing the Class D Work Program; and given their further testimony that they were not aware of the county judge/executive having approved Sloas’s participation in that program, it appears to me that, at a minimum, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Hall and *492Henderson exceeded their statutory authority when they authorized Sloas to participate in the program. Clearly, then, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Hall and Henderson in Sloas’s individual capacity claims.
By concluding that Hall and Henderson are entitled to summary judgment on Sloas’s individual capacity claims against them, despite their possible failure to follow the strictures of KRS 441.125, the majority usurps a jury’s role as the finder of fact. That approach, although perhaps superficially appealing under the facts of this case, ignores the summary judgment standard we set forth in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.3 So I respectfully dissent.
. Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 523 (Ky.2001).
. Cottongim v. Stewart, 283 Ky. 615, 142 S.W.2d 171, 177 (1940) (quoting MECHEN ON PUBLIC OFFICERS, pp. 445, 633, et seq.).
. 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.1991) ("[t]he record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor. Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing the motion may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there is any issue of material fact. The trial judge must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists. It clearly is not the purpose of the summary judgment rule, as we have often declared, to cut litigants off from their right of trial if they have issues to try.”).