dissenting.
I join sections I, II, and III of the lead opinion. Because I disagree with the conclusion in section IV, I dissent to the judgment. Alternatively, I would reverse because of ineffective assistance of counsel in not requesting a dismissal (issue two discussed in Section V). I do not discuss the issues in sections VI or VII.
Federal Precedent
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is a “congressionally sanctioned interstate compact” between forty-eight states, the Federal Government, and the District of Columbia. See U.S. Const, art. 1, § 10, cl. 3; Tex.Code CRIm. Proo. Ann. art. 51.14 (Vernon 1979). As such, it is a federal law subject to federal construction. See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111, 120 S.Ct. 659, 662, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000).
My difference with the lead opinion is not about whether a defendant can waive his rights under Article III of the IAD— he can. The question is: “what must the record show to establish a waiver?” The lead opinion finds waiver from a silent record; I believe that federal law requires that the record affirmatively show a waiver.
Hill, the most recent decision under Article III, turned on the question of whether defendant’s counsel, as opposed to the defendant personally, could effect such a waiver, and the Court held that counsel can. Id. at 114-15, 120 S.Ct. at 664. What suffices for waiver, however, de*854pends on the nature of the right at issue. Id. at 114, 120 S.Ct. at 664. Hill moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the IAD’s time limit had expired, and in denying the motion, the trial court concluded that “defense counsel’s explicit agreement to the trial date constituted a waiver or abandonment of defendant’s rights under the IAD.” Id. at 113, 120 S.Ct. at 663. Thus, unlike the record before us, the record in Hill sufficiently demonstrated a waiver. Applying federal precedent, I would sustain Walker’s issue.
Texas Precedent
In applying Texas precedent, the lead opinion inverts the Marin analysis by saying, in effect, “because it is a right that may be waived by implication, it must be a category three right.” The correct analysis is to determine the category of the right based on the source of the right. Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (rights are of three distinct kinds: absolute requirements and prohibitions; rights of litigants which must be implemented unless waived; and rights to be implemented upon request). Only after determining the nature of the right can one look to Marin to determine the duties of the respective players in the judicial system with respect to the right, ie., the court must implement a category-one right, the litigant must request a category-three right, and the court must implement a category-two right as an independent duty absent an effective waiver, which must be given “plainly, freely, and intelligently, sometimes in writing and always on the record.” Id. at 279-80.
In my view, the right to a dismissal under Article III of the IAD is a category-two right. See Tex.Code Ckim. PROC. Ann. art. 51.14, Art. Ill; Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279. The Act is the source of the right being categorized, and the language of the Act uniformly imposes a strict sanction for failing to meet its requirements — “dismissal with prejudice” — and uniformly prescribes that charging instruments and de-tainers shall, when the time limit expires, cease to be of any further “force or effect.” Tex.Code Cmm. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14, Art. IH(d), Art. V(c). The language of the Act demonstrates statutory requirements under Article III that must be implemented unless waived.
To place the right to a dismissal in category three, the lead opinion also draws an artificial distinction between express waivers and implied waivers. Marin itself is somewhat inconsistent — sometimes it says “express waiver” and sometimes it just says “waiver.”1 Given the statute at issue in Marin, one in which the legislature expressly provided for waiver only “with the consent of the defendant in writing or on the record in open court,” it is easy to understand why the opinion would, at times, refer to express waiver. The court did not, however, discuss the distinction that the lead opinion now makes by plucking “expressly waived” from a single sentence in Marin. Lead opinion at 847. The general language describing the three categories of rights speaks of “waivable rights,” “rights which are waivable only,” and “waivable rights, on the other hand, do not vanish so easily.” Thus whether the waiver must be express or may be implied is not a proper criterion in categorizing rights under Marin.
Furthermore, I believe the lead opinion misconstrues New York v. Hill, to bolster its position. Hill, 528 U.S. at 118, 120 *855S.Ct. at 666. The Supreme Court noted that the “necessary or reasonable continuance” provision is the sole means by which the prosecution can obtain an extension of the time limits over the defendant’s objections. The Act requires that any such continuance be for “good cause,” be granted in open court, and that the defendant or his counsel be present. Distinguishing between such continuances and “agreed-upon extensions,” the Court decided that the action of counsel alone can be sufficient under the act; express assent from the defendant is not required. Reciting the trial court’s finding that “defense counsel’s explicit agreement to the trial date set beyond the 180-day statutory period constituted a waiver or abandonment of defendant’s rights under the IAD,” the Court upheld that court’s denial of a motion to dismiss. Id. at 113, 120 S.Ct. at 663 (emphasis added). Thus, in Hill, there was an express waiver, consistent with the right to a dismissal under Article III as being a category-two right requiring implementation unless waived on the record, even under the lead opinion’s interpretation.
Using Texas precedent, I would hold that the right to a dismissal with prejudice under Article III of the IAD is a category-two right, waivable by the defendant. However, unlike the lead opinion’s determination that the right was forfeited by a silent record, I would examine whether the record adequately establishes that Walker waived his rights under the IAD.
What is required to establish waiver?
As noted above, Marin describes the process: [“The defendant] is never deemed to have done so in fact unless he says so plainly, freely, and intelligently, sometimes in writing and always on the record.” Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 280.
Here, the record is silent. The State concedes that nothing in this record shows whether the continuance was “agreed-upon,” 2 for “good cause,” in open court, or with counsel or Walker present. Thus, no extension of the time limit can be justified by that part of Article III.
Did Walker “plainly, freely, and intelligently” waive this right? We know he did not do so in writing. And the State agrees that the record is silent about it. Thus, I would hold that the record does not establish that Walker waived his category-two right to a dismissal under Article III of the IAD.
Waiver under the IAD is not established. Walker is entitled to a dismissal. I would enter a judgment dismissing the case with prejudice. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
If the right to a dismissal is ultimately determined to be forfeitable as a category-three right, it is self-evident under this record that counsel’s failure to request a dismissal constitutes deficient performance and that such failure prejudiced Walker because the outcome would have been a dismissal. Thus, in the alternative, I would sustain issue two and remand the cause to the trial court for a new trial.
. By my count, the number of times "waiver” alone is used in the opinion exceeds the number of times "express waiver” is used.
. The Court specifically reserved the question of under what circumstances an agreed-upon delay could fit within the good-cause provision. Hill, 528 U.S. at 116 n. 1, 120 S.Ct. at 665 n. 1.