dissenting.
I refused to accept the reasoning of the majority in Commonwealth v. Morales, 458 Pa. 18, 326 A.2d 331 (1974) and in Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 312 A.2d 597 (1973) and will continue to refuse to join in any decision which reverses a plea of guilty solely on super-technical grounds.
Instantly, it is undisputed Ward knew he had the right to have his guilt determined by a jury if he chose and with this knowledge he elected to throw himself on the mercy of the court. When the sentence was more severe than he hoped for, he then decided he might have fared better with a jury and proceeded to interpose a challenge to his guilty plea, which the majority of this Court now sustains.
It should also be noted that Rule 319(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which sets forth the requirements of a valid guilty plea colloquy, does not require that the defendant be informed that if he chooses a jury trial “the verdict which the jury might render would have to be unanimous.” The decision in this case and others of the same ilk are extending the requirements of the Rule. Also, compare the guilty plea colloquy here with that in Commonwealth v. Martin, 445 Pa. 49, 282 A.2d 241 (1971) where the colloquy was ruled adequate and the validity of the plea was sustained.
However, my reading of the record compels serious reservations as to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a forcible rape. I therefore would vacate the judgment of sentence and remand the case to the trial court for a new determination of the degree of guilt.