concurring and dissenting.
I join the Court’s holding that the appeal of Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) at No. 626 should be quashed, but, unlike the majority, I would quash also the appeal of the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission (the Commission) at No. 618. Although I happen to agree fully with the majority’s treatment of the Commission’s appeal on the merits, I am obliged to say that in my view this question should not be entertained by this Court at this time.
In insisting upon a final order as the normal prerequisite to an appeal, we have time and again indicated our disfavor of piecemeal litigation in the appellate courts “ ‘and the consequent protraction of litigation.’ ” Piltzer v. Independence Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n, 456 Pa. 402, 406, 319 A.2d 677, 678 (1974), quoting Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 649, 107 A.2d 854, 855 (1954). Accord, Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa.-,-, 394 A.2d 542,545-546 (1978); McGee v. Singley, 382 Pa. 18, 22, 114 A.2d 141, 143 (1955). “We have variously defined a final order as one which ends the litigation, or alternatively disposes of the entire case. Conversely phrased, an order is interlocutory and not final unless it effectively puts the litigant ‘out of court.’ ” T. C. R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 337, 372 A.2d 721, 724 *622(1977) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also, e. g., Pugar v. Greco, supra, 483 Pa. at -, 394 A.2d at 542; Brown Estate, 446 Pa. 401, 406-07 & n.5, 289 A.2d 77 (1972), and cases cited therein; Stadler v. Mount Oliver Borough, 373 Pa. 316, 317-18, 95 A.2d 776 (1953), and cases cited therein.
The majority acknowledges that the order of the Commonwealth Court (the trial court in this case), which sustained ARCO’s statute of limitations defense to all claims over six years old, does not dispose of the entire case. But it is said that the order of the lower court precludes determination of a large part of the cause of action asserted by the Commission — i. e., that portion of the claim relating to the period more than six years prior to the date of commencement of the action. I cannot agree that this is dispositive.1 *623The Commission’s complaint in assumpsit is for breach of certain lease agreements in that, allegedly, ARCO underpaid the rent due under the lease. That rent is based in part upon a percentage of certain of the lessee’s gross receipts. ARCO’s answer makes it clear that the dispute is over what exact percentage of the receipts is due as rent under the leases. The complaint avers that the asserted deficiency in rental payments has been continuous since the beginning of the terms of the leases over twenty years ago. But we have no idea at this stage whether the Commission can prevail on the merits of the suit, f. e., what percentage of gross receipts is owed as rent under the leases. Our resolution of the statute of limitations question at this point is thus essentially a premature determination of the measure of damages. See Safety Tire Corp. v. Hoffman Tire Co., 458 Pa. 102, 329 A.2d 834 (1974). Such a determination, of course, could not be dispositive of the merits even if we were to decide the statute of limitations issue in the Commission’s favor. Since the Commission has not been precluded from proving the merits of its claim, it is not — at least not yet — out of court, and the lower court order before us is therefore interlocutory. See Pugar v. Creco, supra; Safety Tire Corp. v. Hoffman Tire Co., supra; Marino Estate, 440 Pa. 492, 269 A.2d 645 (1970); Ventura v. Skylark Motel, Inc., 431 Pa. 459, 463, 246 A.2d 353, 355 (1968).2
*624We indicated in Marshall v. Powers, supra, that immediate appellate review of orders of the kind here involved can be secured pursuant to a certification by the trial court and a petition for allowance of an interlocutory appeal to the appellate court. Judicial Code § 702(b), 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b) (Special Pamphlet, 1978).3 Since the order appealed from is interlocutory, and since such certification by the lower court is absent here, I would quash the Commission’s appeal at No. 618, and therefore respectfully dissent in part.
. This case is not controlled by Commonwealth v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 473 Pa. 432, 375 A.2d 320 (1977), and Posternack v. American Casualty Ins. Co. of Reading, 421 Pa. 21, 218 A.2d 350 (1966), upon which the majority relies. In those cases, trial court orders precluded the pleading of defenses which might be a complete defense to the entire lawsuit. See Commonwealth v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., supra, 473 Pa. at 437, 375 A.2d 320 (validity of administrative agency order and the regulations upon which the order was based); Posternack v. American Casualty Co., supra, 421 Pa. at 25, 218 A.2d 350 (collateral estoppel by reason of prior suit in federal court). In this case, however, only part of the suit is involved. Moreover, the defense of the statute of limitations has already been pleaded, and hence the waiver problem deemed important in Wheeling-Pittsburgh and Posternack does not obtain here.
The jurisdictional question presented here is instead similar to those presented in Marshall v. Powers, 477 Pa. 306, 383 A.2d 946 (1978), and Adcox v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Casualty Ins. Co., 419 Pa. 170, 213 A.2d 366 (1965). In both Marshall and Adcox, orders striking previously pleaded legal defenses were held interlocutory. In the instant case, the previously pleaded statute of limitations defense also involves undisputed facts and a pure question of the application of law to those facts. In addition, since the issue has been pleaded and was decided at the summary judgment stage, it is “preserved and will be considered should the occasion arise for an appeal to be taken in the ordinary course of this litigation.” Adcox, supra, 419 Pa. at 174, 213 A.2d at 368. Stated another way, the Commonwealth Court’s holding on the statute of limitations question can be reviewed again by that court after trial and can be reviewed by this Court should an appeal from final judgment be taken pursuant to Section 723(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 723(a) (Special Pamphlet, 1978). Thus, as in Pugar v. Greco, supra, 483 Pa. *623at-, 394 A.2d at 542, the Commonwealth Court’s decision here on the statute of limitations question does not adversely affect a right which will be irreparably lost if appellate review is postponed. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 228, 348 A.2d 734, 735 (1975).
. Today’s decision is also inconsistent with Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035(b), which provides in pertinent part: “A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issues of liability alone even though there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.” (Emphasis added). The Superior Court has quite properly held, pursuant to the plain language of the rule, that an appeal from an entry of summary judgment on liability only is not an appeal from a final order. Newell v. Piccolomini, 228 Pa.Super. 220, 323 A.2d 40 (1974). The viability of this decision is, I fear, rendered suspect by the conceptual basis of the majority’s holding today.
. Section 702(b) codifies Section 501(b) of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. V, 17 P.S. § 211.501(b) (Supp.l978). See also Pa.R.A.P. 1301-1323. This Court has found that this statutory procedure provides a useful means for the decision of substantial, albeit interlocutory, questions. E. g., Commonwealth v. Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 228 & n.7, 382 A.2d 442 (1977) (constitutionality of Pennsylvania death penalty statute of 1974). While one can but guess how the Commonwealth Court, if presented with a certification petition in this case, would have exercised its discretion, I for one would have been willing to allow an appeal had such certification been made.