dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. My review of the record persuades me that the sentencing court imposed two concurrent sentences of four (4) to ten (10) years on indictments # 1756 and # 1757. Any ambiguity subsequently created by the colloquy with defense counsel concerning the sentences to be imposed on additional convictions for assault and battery and aggravated assault and battery was removed by the written, signed judgments of sentence entered on the docket following the sentencing hearing. I find no conflict between the oral and written judgments of sentence.
Moreover, this Court has repeatedly held that “ ‘[o]ral statements made by the judge in passing sentence, but not incorporated in the written judgment signed by him, are no part of the judgment of sentence.’ ” Commonwealth v, Hodge, 246 Pa.Super. 71, 82, 369 A.2d 815, 820 (1977), quoting Commonwealth v. Foster, 229 Pa.Super. 269, 271, 324 A.2d 538, 539 (1974). Accord: Commonwealth v. Perkins, 302 Pa.Super. 12, 18-19, 448 A.2d 70, 73 (1982); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 296 Pa.Super. 382, 442 A.2d 820 (1982); Commonwealth v. Evans, 254 Pa.Super. 93, 96, 385 A.2d 540, 542 (1978); Commonwealth v. Green, 232 Pa.Super. 555, 557-558, 335 A.2d 392, 393 (1975); See also: *197Commonwealth v. Thomas, 219 Pa.Super. 22, 28, 280 A.2d 651, 654 (1971).
In the instant case, the sentencing judge initially pronounced concurrent judgments of sentence of imprisonment of four (4) to ten (10) years on all bills. After defense counsel suggested that the sentences as imposed on the convictions for assault and battery and aggravated assault and battery were in excess of the statutory máximums, the sentencing judge agreed to “put [appellant] on probation on the other bills for a period of three years.” The judgments of sentence as entered on the record and signed by the trial judge confirm that sentences of imprisonment of four (4) to ten (10) years were imposed on indictments # 1756 and # 1757, while sentences of probation were imposed on the bills for assault and battery and aggravated assault and battery. Thus, when the sentence on bill # 1756 was found to be illegal and was vacated, the sentence on bill # 1757 remained to be served. Subsequently, the court modified the sentence on bill # 1757 to not less than two and one-half (2V2) nor more than eight (8) years.
Appellant’s argument that the two and one-half (2V2) to eight (8) year sentence on indictment # 1757 violated principles of double jeopardy is based on an assumption that the sentencing judge intended to include the conviction for aggravated robbery (# 1757) among “the other bills” on which sentences of probation were imposed. However, a contrary intent by the sentencing court is evidenced by the sentencing colloquy, the written judgments of sentence as entered on the indictments and recorded by the clerk, and by the opinions filed by the sentencing judge on January 13, 1978 and June 27, 1980.
I would affirm the judgment of sentence.