dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority of this panel is convinced that so long as there is no proof that a carriage house existed in the original Gid-dings-Stone Mansion building, it was somehow illegal for the city to issue a special use permit for the construction of a carriage house. However, whether there was an original carriage house is not an issue in this appeal.
The only way the majority opinion can affirm the trial court’s reversal of the Board of Adjustments is to find that the Board can review and revoke the issuance of a special use permit. This is precisely *567what the city fathers sought to prevent by the enactment of Brenham Code § 15.02(5), which provides:
The Board of Adjustment shall not have jurisdiction to hear, review, reverse, or modify any decision, determination, or ruling with respect to the granting, extension, ramification, modification or any other action taken relative to such special use permit. (Emphasis added).
The City of Brenham could not have been more precise or unambiguous in removing from the Board of Adjustments any power with respect to the “granting, extension, revocation, modification or any other action taken relating to such special use permit.” This court does not have the power to circumvent the clear language, intent and purpose of this code.
The Supreme Court of Texas has clearly established the principles for construing a statute, and these principles should apply equally to an ordinance or code. “Unless a statute is ambiguous, we must follow the clear language of the statute.” Republic-bank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.1985). As far back as 1920, the supreme court held:
Courts must take statutes as they find them. More than that, they should be willing to take them as they find them. They should search out carefully the in-tentment of a statute, giving full effect to all of its terms. But they must find its intent and its language and not elsewhere ... They are not responsible for omissions in legislation. They are responsible for a true and fair interpretation of the written law. It must be an interpretation which expresses only the will of the makers of the law, not forced nor strained, but simply such as the words of the law in their plain sense fairly sanction and will clearly sustain.
Simmons v. Arnim, 110 Tex. 309, 220 S.W. 66 (1920). In cases too numerous to list, the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals of Texas have consistently followed this principle of interpretation.
In the Interkal case, the appeal revolved around the construction of Tex.Rev.Civ. StatAnn. art. 5472e, (Vernon 1958) (now codified in part at Tex.Prop.Code Ann. § 162.004 (Vernon 1984)), the relevant portion of which stated:
Section 4 This action shall have no application to any bank, savings and loan associations or other lender or to any title company or other closing agent in connection to any transaction to which this act is applicable. (Emphasis added).
That article is remarkably similar to Bren-ham Code § 15.02(5). The code deals with any action taken relative to any special use permit and Article 5472e deals with any transaction involving any bank, etc. Interkal argued that this section of the act means only that a bank cannot be subject to liability for using trust funds over which a bank already had some form of control. However, the supreme court held that: “Language supporting such a qualification or limitation upon Section 4 of the act cannot be found in the statute.” Interkal, 691 S.W.2d at 607. Likewise, the revoking of the special use permit by the majority cannot be supported by any language of the Brenham Code. The majority opinion, in an attempt to justify its avoidance of the building code, says that this was not an action taken relative to a special use permit, but was instead the result of an appeal of a city building inspectors issuance of the building permit. The majority contends that this is proper because the Brenham Code provides for such an appeal in Bren-ham Code § 19.03(2) which states as follows:
Appeals based on error: the Board [of Adjustment] shall have the power to hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is error of law in any order, requirement, decision or determination made by the building inspector in the enforcement of this ordinance. (Emphasis added).
However, the majority fails to show how the issuance of the special use permit was an error of law. Unless it is shown to be an error of law, the entire reasoning of the majority opinion fails. In fact, appellee’s trial pleadings do not allege an error of law but point out that appellants have totally failed to prove the existence of an original *568carriage house, and they pray that “this court enter its order declaring the special use permit as it pertains to the reconstruction of the original carriage house null and void and of no force in effect and rescind the herein above described building permit.” Yet, pursuant to Code § 15.02(5), the board has no power to revoke (rescind) any special use permit.
The majority opinion also cites Brenham Code § 19.03(2) as authoritative for the board to “hear and decide an appeal that alleges error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official ... ”. However, the majority ignores the right of the local government to limit any appeal which may be heard by their Board of Adjustment. This is precisely what the city of Brenham did in enacting Brenham Code § 15.02(5). The majority further cites a case involving the city of Dallas for the right of the Board of Adjustments to hear an appeal claiming nonconforming use under zoning ordinances. However, there is no showing that the city of Dallas had a provision in their code similar to Brenham Code § 15.02(5). Therefore, any analogy or comparison by any other city is of no probative effect unless that city also removed from their Board of Adjustments any power to review or revoke any action relating to any special use permit.
In dealing with the second point of error, the majority opinion merely holds that they are limited to an abuse of discretion standard on review and that they must review the legality of the board’s action in affirming the issuance of the building permit. However, there is no discussion by the majority opinion, nor indeed is there any evidence offered to show the illegality of the board’s action. In fact, the proper legal standard for review is to presume that such decisions are legal, and that any party complaining of such action must establish illegality by a “very clear showing of abuse of discretion.” Currey v. Kimple, 577 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
In finding an abuse of discretion, the majority opinion discusses only the fact that there was no proof of the existence of an original carriage house. However, there is no showing of a requirement that there be a previously existing carriage house in order to construct a carriage house on this property. It is clear that the Board of Adjustments heard and believed the testimony of expert witnesses to the effect that all mansions of that stature and in that era had carriage houses, as well as the uncontroverted opinion testimony that this mansion had a carriage house. Based on this evidence, the Board upheld the issuance of the special case permit. Clearly, this falls far short of any abuse of discretion standard that has ever been applied by this court. Simply put, the majority feels that without absolute proof of a pre-existing carriage house, there can be no special use permit. I believe reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the Board. However, that is not the issue before us. The issue is simply: 1) does the Board of Adjustments have the power to review the issuance of a special use permit, and if so, 2) does the district court have the power to reverse the decision of the Board in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion by the Board of Adjustments?
I would uphold the clear language of the Brenham Building Code § 15.02(5) and hold that the Board of Adjustments does not have authority to review the issuance of any special use permit. Further, I would find that the Board of Adjustments did not abuse their discretion, that there was no error of law committed by the building inspector issuing the permit, and that the district court erred in reversing the decision of the Board of Adjustments.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment for appellant.