dissenting.
On four separate occasions the General Assembly of Kentucky has enacted legislation which clearly and in unmistakable terms has provided that proceedings and records of hospital peer review committees and other similar committees shall not be subject to discovery nor admitted into evidence in civil actions. This court has managed to frustrate and circumvent every effort of the General Assembly to protect the confidentiality of such records.
In 1976 in an act entitled, “An Act Relating to Health Care Malpractice and Insurance Claims,” provision was made for immunity “to discovery, subpoena, or introduction into evidence, in any civil action in any court, or in any administrative proceeding before any board, body, or committee, whether federal, state, county or city” of the records and proceedings of professional standards review organizations and other similar committees. In McGuffey v. Hall, Ky., 557 S.W.2d 401 (1977), this court held that act to be unconstitutional because the title of the act did not bear a sufficient relationship to its contents as required by Section 51 of the Kentucky Constitution.
In 1980 the General Assembly again enacted a bill to provide for immunity from discovery and from admissibility into evidence of the records and proceedings of peer review and similar committees. The language of the 1980 act was almost identical to the 1976 act but was enacted under a different title, doubtless in an attempt to escape the ruling of McGuffey v. Hall, supra. The 1980 act was entitled, “An Act Relating to the Establishment of Certificate of Need, Licensing, and Regulation of Health Facilities and Health Services.” This court today holds that the title of the 1980 act does not sufficiently relate to the contents of the act which protects the confidentiality of peer review records and proceedings and again holds that the legislative attempt to immunize the records and proceedings of such committees cannot be enforced.
In an obvious attempt to find a title which would pass muster with this court’s finely tuned sensitivity to Section 51 of the Constitution of Kentucky,1 the General Assembly in 1988 enacted two more statutes to protect the confidentiality of peer review committee records from discovery or admission into evidence.
House Bill 576 was entitled, “An Act Relating to Health Care.” Section 2 of 311.377 provides as follows:
“(2) The proceedings, records, opinions, conclusions and recommendations of any committee, board, commission, professional standards review organization, or other entity, as referred to in subsection (1) of this section shall be confidential and privileged and shall not be subject to *819discovery, subpoena, or introduction into evidence, in any civil action in any court or in any administrative proceeding before any board, body, or committee, whether federal, state, county, or city. This subsection shall not apply to any proceedings or matters governed exclusively by federal law or federal regulation.”
House Bill 551 enacted in 1988 was titled, “An Act Relating to Civil Actions.” Section 22 provided:
“(2) At all times in performing a designated professional review function, the proceedings, records, opinions, conclusions and recommendations of any committee, board, commission, medical staff, professional standards review organization, or other entity, as referred to in subsection (1) of this section shall be confidential and privileged and shall not be subject to discovery, subpoena, or introduction into evidence, in any civil action in any court or in any administrative proceeding before any board, body, or committee, whether federal, state, county, or city, except as specifically provided with regard to the board in KRS 311.-605(2). This subsection shall not apply to any proceedings or matters governed exclusively by federal law or federal regulation.”
The majority opinion makes an end run around the two 1988 enactments on the ground that neither of them was in effect when this case was before the Court of Appeals or were otherwise involved in the decision to grant the writ of prohibition. This, of course, is true, but I do not believe that House Bill 551 and House Bill 576 enacted in the 1988 session of the General Assembly should be dismissed in such cavalier fashion. While House Bill 551 and House Bill 576 may not have been in effect when this case was decided in the trial court or in the Court of Appeals, they are in effect at the present time and will be in effect when this case is returned to the trial court for further proceedings. When the appellants renew their attempts to discover these documents the appellees will be able to claim that these new statutes are now controlling and that they prohibit the discovery of the documents and their introduction into evidence.
If House Bill 551 or House Bill 576 is found to have an acceptable title and if the acts relate to procedural matters, these acts, rather than the 1980 act, would control the discoverability of the documents sought. It is the general rule that remedial statutes which do not take away a vested right are applicable immediately to all proceedings in pending actions. Commonwealth v. Reneer, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 794 at 798 (1987); Murphy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 652 S.W.2d 69 (1983); 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes § 354; 82 CJS, Statutes § 422.
The present relevance of the 1988 enactments was raised in the appellees’ brief and was discussed at oral argument. Since our opinion involves a case where the trial is pending in circuit court, our opinion should advise the trial court of the correct procedure to follow when the case is returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
GANT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.