dissenting:
I agree with the majority on several significant points. First, I concur that the improper initiation of these proceedings by petition and rule was a procedural jurisdictional *485defect which was waived when appellee filed an answer to the petition.
Second, I agree that this proceeding is not analogous to a summary judgment proceeding. Rather, as the majority notes, the trial court’s decision herein is comparable to the disposition of a case, on its merits, by a non-jury trial. Consequently, the same procedure should be adhered to in this case as is followed in the disposition of civil cases after a non-jury trial. Pa.R.C.P. 1038(d) provides:
“Within ten (10) days after notice of the filing of the decision, exceptions may be filed by any party to the decision or any part thereof, to rulings on objections to evidence or to any other matters occurring during the trial. Each exception shall set forth a separate objection precisely and without discussion. Matters not covered by exceptions are deemed waived unless, prior to final judgment, leave is granted to file exceptions raising these matters. No motion for a new trial, for judgment non obstante veredicto, in arrest of judgment or to remove a nonsuit may be filed.” 1
It is at this juncture that I must part with the majority. In their opinion, they excuse appellant’s failure to file exceptions and provide her with an opportunity on remand to mold her position in accordance with clarification of the law which has occurred during the course of her appeal.
I disagree.
As stated above, a proceeding to obtain No Fault benefits which was initiated by petition and rule is analogous to a non-jury trial. Therefore, it should be subject to Pa.R.C.P. 1038, which mandates the filing of exceptions within ten (10) days after notice of the filing of the decision.
The majority relies upon Kennedy v. Frank L. Black, Inc., 271 Pa.Super. 454, 413 A.2d 1104 (1979), which held that Pa.R.C.P. 1038(d) did not apply to petition and rule proceedings. However, therein, the petition and rule proce*486dure was employed in an effort to open and/or strike a default judgment. The practice governing appeals from the grant or refusal to open or strike a judgment taken by default is totally distinguishable and nondispositive of the instant case. Direct appeals to this court from either the grant or refusal to open or strike a judgment taken by default conforms with Pa.R.A.P. 311(a) which authorizes an appeal as of right from certain interlocutory orders, including orders which open or refuse to open or strike a default judgment. Moreover, this rule specifically directs that such orders are “immediately appealable.” See America Corp. v. Cascerceri, 255 Pa.Super. 574, 389 A.2d 126 (1978); Kennedy v. Frank L. Black, Jr., Inc., supra.
Accordingly, I conclude that appellant, by failing to file timely exceptions in the lower court to the Order dismissing her petition, has failed to preserve any substantive issues for appeal. I would affirm the Order of the lower court.
. Pa.R.C.P. 1038, which dictates the procedure for non-jury trials in actions in assumpsit, is made applicable to actions in trespass by Pa.R.C.P. 1048.