(dissenting)-
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion. Section 302 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1924 (26 USCA § 1094 note) provides:
“The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated— * * *
“(g) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life.”
This act of Congress imposes a tax on the transmission of property rights through the death of the assured. The act does not impose a direct tax upon the life insurance policies but upon the privilege of transferring property of the decedent at and by his death. It is immaterial, therefore, whether or not the beneficiary had a vested interest in the policies during her husband’s lifetime. The tax is imposed, not upon that interest, but upon the transfer, which does not become effective until the occurrence of a single contingency, the death of the assured. My view is that the above-quoted act is applicable to the situation in the instant case; that, even though, under the law of Pennsylvania, the beneficiary had a vested interest in the policy during the assured’s lifetime, the tax is valid as a tax upon the transmission of property rights under the policies, arising by reason of, and at the time of, the death of the assured. Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 S. Ct. 126, 73 L. Ed. 405, 63 A. L. R. 388.
I am of the opinion that the decree of the Board of Tax Appeals should be affirmed.